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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on a new general social assistance scheme in Korea, which 
replaced the previous categorical assistance scheme in 1999. First it compares the 
previous and current assistance schemes in Korea to explore whether or not there has 
been a regime shift within Korean social assistance. Second it compares current 
general assistance in Korea with eight OECD countries, in terms of expenditure and 
the claimant numbers, conditions of eligibility and entitlement and benefit levels in 
order to see how far Korea constitutes a unique case. This forms the basis to place 
Korea within social assistance regime theory. 
In the second part of the study, using the NRB data, this study compares recipient and 
low-income non-recipient households with regard to the socio-economic-demographic 
features and the determinants of being in poverty. Finally the effectiveness of Korean 
social assistance in reducing poverty is assessed by family size and type and it is then 
compared with British means-tested social assistance, using micro-data from Korea 
(NRB) and Britain (FRS). 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Welfare states during the second half of the 20th century have made a lot of efforts to 
tackle poverty by establishing very detailed and complicated systems of income 
redistribution, income maintenance or income support. In spite of the efforts of the 
welfare states to eradicate poverty, it has not however been abolished in advanced 
welfare states. Using one of the most commonly used thresholds in research on 
comparative poverty, i. e. 50 per cent of median income, around 10 per cent of 
households or individuals live in poverty in OECD countries (see Gordon et al., 2000; 
Atkinson et al., 2002). As Ringen (1987: 141) stresses, alleviation of poverty has, in 
fact, been one of the primary aims of modem welfare states: `if poverty prevails, the 
welfare state is a failure. ' Why is there still a sizeable level of poverty in the modem 
welfare states notwithstanding the elaborate income maintenance systems? The 
effectiveness of the welfare state should be challenged if the welfare states are not 
effective in reducing poverty (Behrendt, 2002). 
The key aims of social assistance schemes are to prevent hardship amongst those with 
no other resources, whilst also preventing social marginalisation and exclusion. There 
is an important relationship between poverty and social assistance. As a basic and final 
social safety net of welfare state, social assistance provision plays a very important 
role in the alleviation of poverty, which is one of the major aims of the welfare states, 
and is designed to guarantee an adequate (or minimum in some countries) standard of 
living. As can be confirmed from previous studies on social assistance schemes (Ditch, 
1999; Eardley et al., 1996a) and minimum income standards (Veit-Wilson, 1998), 
social assistance schemes are particularly important as they become de facto poverty 
lines, on the basis of certain minimum income levels below which no member of 
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society should be allowed to fall. Therefore in order to evaluate whether social security 
system of a welfare state are effective or not in achieving their goals as social safety 
nets, it is essential to assess the final safety net - social assistance. If any people are 
excluded from the ultimate safety net, they run a higher risk and are more likely to be 
poor than those covered by social assistance. Eardley et al. (1996a) point out that 
certainly some groups of the population even in the OECD countries are not covered 
by social assistance schemes because of conditions of their age, residence and 
nationality, or employment status etc. Behrendt (2002) also argues that parts of the 
population in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom are not supported by any 
kind of means-tested benefits despite low income, while the vast majority of the 
population are covered by social assistance schemes, on the one hand. On the other 
hand, the social assistance benefits in the three developed countries are not distributed 
evenly amongst people with low-income. 
Like in other OECD countries, parts of people with low-income in South Korea 
(hereafter Korea) have also been excluded from social assistance, though they are in 
poverty. Compared to European countries, the issue of poverty had not been in the 
centre of social policy in Korea since 1970s due to the extraordinary high economic 
growth', with full or near full employment rates. Under the `developmental state' 
(Gough, 2001), Korean economy performed one of the highest growths in the world, 
which placed almost exclusive emphasis on economic development, while using social 
policy as an instrument for economic growth. 
1 Korea achieved over 8 per cent, more than three times the world economic growth 
rates during the past four decades. 
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The outbreak of the 1997 economic crisis, which resulted in huge economic recession 
and massive unemployment, however, has an important role in provoking public 
awareness of the poverty problem. The economy recorded negative growth in 1998 
from a positive growth rate of five per cent in 1997, and the unemployment rates 
increased dramatically to 8.6 per cent in February 1999 from 2.6 per cent in 1997 
(NSO, 2001b). As a result, the poverty rate based on the social assistance benefit rates, 
which are about 40 per cent of the median income, soared dramatically to 12.6 per cent 
in February 1999 - more than a four fold increase than that in 1996 (Park, 2000). In 
the wake of the crisis, the problem of poverty has come to the fore in the Korean 
context as one of the main social agendas needing to be solved urgently, and has served 
as a momentum for realizing that the problem is not just limited to a small group of 
people with low-income but there are many potentially poor people excluded from 
social assistance, namely `people just above the social assistance recipient group'. 
Since the economic crisis of 1997, social security reforms have been executed in Korea 
and, in particular, categorical assistance which had had a Poor Law tradition for over 
thirty-five years was finally reformed in 1999. As a consequence of social assistance 
reform, a new social assistance law, the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) 
Act of 1999 was enacted and a new general assistance scheme NBLS was established 
in order to cope with the problems of soaring unemployment and widespread poverty. 
The new social assistance scheme is designed to protect social rights as a part of 
citizenship and to secure minimum income to those eligible, regardless of their age, 
sex and working ability. In Korean context, the NBLS scheme has thus been evaluated 
as an epoch-making programme elevating the level of the Korean social welfare (Choi, 
2000; MOHW, 2000,2002b; Moon, 2002; Shin, 2000). 
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While it is generally agreed that the Korean economy has recovered since the second 
quarter of 1999, the poverty rates have not yet returned to those before the 1997 
financial crisis, since income inequality has been worsened. Despite the far higher 
rates of poverty than before the crisis, the coverage rates of Korean social assistance 
have remained at only around three per cent of the total population since 1994 due to 
strict eligibility criteria. This means certain groups of people on low-income below the 
40 per cent poverty line seem not to be covered by the final social safety net, which is 
responsible for protecting the poor from hardship. Thus the new general assistance 
scheme has been criticized. 
Social assistance provision was, in fact, expected to be residual safety net, which plays 
only a supplementary role for social insurance by Beveridge and others. However, this 
expectation was not fulfilled. Interest in targeting, selectivity and means-testing 
continues to grow in international context. In many OECD countries, there has been 
steady increase in both the recipient numbers and the volume of expenditure, driven by 
rising levels of unemployment and social and family changes (Behrendt, 2002; Ditich, 
1999; Eardley et al., 1996a; Gough et al., 1997; Ditch and Oldfield, 1999). By the 
World Bank and the other international agencies, targeted means-tested social 
assistance schemes are widely recommended for the Eastern European countries and 
other developing world as an essential social protection measure to support its limited 
insurance-based systems. As mentioned at the beginning, social assistance systems are 
de facto poverty thresholds and play a crucial role for the prevention and alleviation of 
poverty in modern welfare states. Social assistance benefits are provided for those with 
no other adequate source of income, whatever their circumstances (Alcock, 1996: 258) 
and are explicitly directed to low-income groups. There is, therefore, a widespread 
perception that social assistance schemes are growing in importance. 
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In terms of social assistance benefits, there is a need to understand to what extent 
reliance on means-tested assistance has been increasing, what patterns and trends have 
emerged in how schemes are organised and administered, and how successful policy 
approaches to common problems have been (Eardley et al., 1996a, 1996b). On the 
OECD level, there are concerns about: balancing the adequacy of benefits with 
financial incentives to work; interaction between social assistance provision and other 
benefits; the levels of benefit; institutional diversity and different functions of social 
assistance; promoting independence (OECD, 1998; Whiteford, 2002). With regard to 
the need and concerns about social assistance, there are a growing number of studies 
on social assistance schemes within a national context in the Western countries. 
However, there has been little attempt to review structures and trends in the 
development and delivery of social assistance and other means-tested schemes on a 
comparative basis in the Western world2 (Behrendt, 2002; Ditch, 1999; Ditch and 
2 In practice, most comparative studies of social policy and welfare state have focused 
on the development of social insurance schemes in Europe together with some studies 
of typology of welfare state regimes. Only for the past decade, as there is growing 
concern for the targeted means-tested assistance, some cross-national analysis of social 
assistance schemes has been emerged. Theses can be divided by two main topics: those 
having attempted to integrate social assistance schemes into typologies of welfare 
regime or identify new social assistance regimes (Eardley et al., 1996a; Leibfried, 
1992; Lodemel and Schulte; 1992), and those systematically comparing the 
institutional design of social assistance schemes in various industrialised countries to 
examine the performance of the schemes and practice (Behrendt, 2002; Guibentif and 
Bouget, 1997; Heikkilä and Keskitalo, 2001; Kuivalainen, 2004; OECD, 1998; 
Saraceno et al., 2002). 
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Oldfield, 1999; Eardley et al., 1996a; Gough et al., 1997). 
However, even of the field of remarkably little cross-national analyses of social 
assistance, the overwhelming majority of comparative social assistance studies have 
been done on the Western countries. In other words, little attention has been paid to 
the social assistance schemes in further parts of the world, in particular, East Asian 
countries, even though since the early 1980s in the West there has been an increasing 
interest in the developmentally dynamic societies of East Asia (Goodman et al., 1998; 
Hort and Kuhnle, 2000). Some studies have previously carried out comparative 
research on means tested social assistance on the scale of the West, Europe, and 
OECD including Japan, which was the only East Asian welfare regime at the time of 
study (Behrendt, 2002; Eardley et al., 1996a, 1996b; Gough et al., 1997,2001b; 
Kuivalainen, 2004; Saraceno, 2002). These studies, however, have not included Korea 
which became the twenty-ninth member of the OECD in December 1996. 
1.1 The purpose of the thesis 
This study makes an effort to step into the gap mentioned above and to offer 
knowledge of social assistance schemes in other parts of the world, in this case - 
Korea, which is one of the East Asian welfare regime. Thus the main aim of this study 
is to contribute to enriching existing comparative knowledge on social assistance and 
our understanding of East Asian social policy. The study will analyse social assistance 
in Korea in comparative perspectives, combining qualitative information on the 
institutional frameworks and quantitative methods to present a comprehensive and 
comparative picture of Korean social assistance. 
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The main research questions to be addressed in this study are: 
1. Has there been a regime shift within Korean social assistance? 
2. How far Korea constitutes a unique case? How far it differs from other countries in 
terms of extent, programme structure and generosity? 
3. Are there differences or similarities between social assistance recipients and non- 
recipients with regard to the socio-demographic characteristics and the determinants of 
being poor? 
4. How effective is Korean social assistance to alleviate poverty? 
5. In which social assistance regime could the Korean model be placed? If it could not 
be located within an existing social assistance regime, what is the distinct feature of the 
Korean scheme? 
1.2 Terminology: What is social assistance? 
Social assistance does not have a single or universally accepted definition, since the 
term is not exactly internationally agreed (Ditch, 1999; Eardley et al., 1996a). Many 
countries have various and different social assistance systems. These social assistance 
schemes take the form of means-tested benefits, including cash and in-kind benefits, 
targeted to those below a certain poverty line. Moreover those benefits are often linked 
to integration programmes designed for recipients. In terms of policy, financing and 
delivery, national or local authorities take responsibility and even non-governmental 
organisations play an important role in some countries. Thus it is not straightforward to 
define what is social assistance. Of Eardley et al. (1996a)'s three preliminary 
distinctions within resource-tested benefits, including general assistance, categorical 
assistance and tied assistance, the main interest in this study is general social assistance 
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to which the new Korean assistance scheme belongs. General assistance is defined as 
the schemes that guarantee a minimum level of subsistence to all (or almost all) people, 
rather than to specified groups below a specified minimum income standard. It is 
usually a last-resort, means-tested, and is characterised by income and asset-tested 
benefits for those with no other adequate resources of providing for themselves and 
their family. Examples include Income Support in the UK, Sozialhilfe in Germany, 
Social Bidrag (Social Welfare Allowance) in Sweden, Living Allowance in Finland, 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance in Ireland, Algemene Bijstand (ABW) in the 
Netherlands, Social Insertion Income in Portugal, Public Assistance in Japan and the 
NBLS in Korea. Yet other tied assistance such as housing benefit is also included in 
the NBLS scheme, thus other types of means-tested benefits are also taken into 
account where relevant. 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the related existing national and international literature on social 
assistance in Korea: the emergence and development of social assistance, comparative 
welfare states and social assistance regimes, and the development of social welfare in 
Korea. Chapter 3 is concerned with the research methods this study adopts. Chapter 4 
to 6 focus on the institutional design of social assistance in Korea. Current general 
assistance in Korea is compared with previous categorical assistance in Korea, and 
with general assistance schemes in other OECD countries with regard to: the extent 
and salience (Chapter 4), conditions of eligibility and entitlement (Chapter 5) and 
benefit levels (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 compares recipient and non-recipient households 
with regard to the socio-economic-demographic characteristics and the factors 
associated with experiencing poverty. The effectiveness of the Korean social assistance 
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scheme on poverty reduction is examined in Chapter 8 and it is then compared with 
that of the British means-tested benefits in Chapter 9. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes 
this thesis. 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
2.1 The emergence and development of social assistance 
Most countries have developed schemes to provide assistance and support for those 
who are otherwise unable to support themselves or lack of support from their families 
or relatives. Current social assistance schemes in many countries are often linked to a 
poor-relief and Poor Law tradition. As many researchers (Alcock et al., 2000; Ditch, 
1999; Eardley et al, 1996a; Lodemel and Schulte, 1992; Thane, 1996) argue the Old, or 
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, which had set up a system of local poor relief (parish- 
based) can be regarded as the starting point of social protection provided by the state in 
the UK. By the early nineteenth century, this strictly locally organised system had been 
in need of reform as Britain became industrialised and urbanised, which caused an 
increase in the number of paupers. 
The Old Poor Law was replaced by the Victorian Poor Law of 1834, and the New Poor 
Law, rooted in the principles of `less eligibility' and the curbing of most `outdoor 
relief' through the workhouse test, and attempted to match the social changes. It 
created a system normally available for the destitute only in the workhouse except for 
the individuals whose poverty was not their own fault and whose behaviour was 
respectable (Alcock et al., 2000; Thane, 1996). That group of people, e. g. the elderly, 
widows, sick and physically or mentally disabled people might still receive outdoor 
relief in their own homes. The above principles of the Poor Law were a key feature of 
early social protection systems and they have remained implicit, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in social security systems ever since. 
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During the late nineteenth century some Western countries adopted the principle of 
social insurance, the so-called Bismarckian paradigm, which embodies assumptions 
about the centrality of work and the practice of complementary contributions linking 
employees, employers and the state in a binding relationship (Ditch, 1999). In the UK 
the insurance principle was adopted in the early twentieth century. The first state-based 
insurance was introduced by the Old-Age Pensions Act of 1908. It was non- 
contributory and available to all who were aged 70 or over, based on a means test, 
which was not a family one but a personal one. A contributory but not means-tested 
insurance scheme was introduced by the National Insurance Act of 1911, which 
provided benefits for sickness and unemployment. One of the main purposes of these 
two acts enacted was to reform and replace the Poor Law. The values associated with 
the locally provided Poor Law however were not formally denied until the publication 
of the Beveridge Report in 1942 (Alcock, 1997; Ditch, 1999). 
Beveridge recommended the introduction of a new social assistance scheme, called 
National Assistance, together with the new National Insurance scheme extended to 
almost everyone in work. He recommended for those people who had insufficient 
contributions, i. e. those excluded from both labour market and the National Insurance 
benefits, means tested assistance benefits should be provided. It was expected that 
demand for means tested assistance would be relatively low and little more than a 
residual safety net as National Insurance expanded. Social insurance has dominated 
social security provisions in most industrialised countries, but the comprehensiveness 
of the scheme, i. e. universal coverage, has hardly been realised (Spicker, 1993). By 
contrast, in practice means tested social assistance has played a much greater role in 
the social security system in most developed countries than Beveridge had envisaged 
(Alcock, 1997; Deacon, 1995; Ditch, 1999; Lodemel and Schulte; 1992). In 1992 it 
11 
even became the primary income source for over 15 per cent of the British population 
and the level of funding on it represented over 30 per cent as a share of social security 
in Britain. General social assistance schemes in the US, Canada, and Finland, all 
deliver to about one in ten of their populations, whilst those in Sweden and Germany 
cover more than five per cent (Eardley et al., 1996a: 39). 
The oil shocks and the so-called `crisis of welfare' deriving from the international 
economic problems of the 1970s, brought about a shift from the dominance of 
universal benefits towards selective or targeted benefits including means tested social 
assistance provision. There has been growing international political and economic 
concerns about levels of spending on social protection and the appropriateness of 
categorical benefits, to contend with the problems such as economic depression or 
stringency, increasing unemployment rates, new poverty and change in family forms 
and other demographic shifts. 
In fact, the international discourse has strongly been influenced by the issue on levels 
of social security expenditure, in particular the capacity of social insurance schemes, 
which can affect competitiveness and employment. This is an issue that has been 
developed since the 1980s by the governments of the UK and the US (Ditch, 1999; 
Eardley, et al., 1996a). It is also a significant topic, which runs through the OECD 
analyses of the Jobs Study (OECD, 1994) and is treated by the EU governments. 
Although the European Union has not fully agreed to reduce social insurance 
programmes and emphasised the significance of the social dimension of the Union, 
there has been a shift in emphasis with policy declaration aimed at increasing 
competitiveness and employment by contracting employers' non-wage costs and 
facilitating work incentives through changing and restructuring social protection 
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systems (European Commission, 1995, quoted in Ditch, 1999). Through the dispute 
over the social security cost, some implications can be found - reduction or 
reconstruction of social insurance schemes encouraged and turning to assistance-based 
provision with stricter conditionality rules and stronger requirements to job search. 
The emergence of `new poverty', which is the argument that even in these days of 
expanding affluence and elaborate welfare systems, a considerable amount of poverty 
still exists in Europe and other industrialised countries (Room, 1990), has been another 
factor resulting in demand for social assistance. There has been evidence of a change 
in the composition of the poor over time, leading to an increase in the number of 
people not protected by insurance-based social protection, due to long-term exclusion 
from labour market or reliance on inadequate and loosely structured social assistance 
provision as well as change in social structure and class formation. Measures of this 
new poverty vary but are mainly based on percentages of households living below 
poverty (percentage) lines of the mean/median incomes or expenditures, whereas the 
results are sensitive to the poverty lines and the equivalence scales applied (Behrendt, 
2002; Eardley et at., 1996a: 21-22). Here is a manifest reason why social assistance 
provision is especially important - it is de facto poverty lines (Eardley, et al., 1996a; 
Veit-Wilson, 1998). 
All of the concerns and problems described above have enabled selectivity to gain 
ground, and stronger targeting on the poorest/those most in need to be thought to be 
more effective and efficient at closing poverty gaps and alleviating poverty, than 
universal benefits. Actually the most notable features or advantages of means testing 
are focusing resources on the most needy and redistributing resources vertically from 
rich to poor. The importance of targeted social protection programmes has been 
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supported by international institutions and agencies. The World Bank (1990: 3) 
suggests: `a comprehensive approach to poverty reduction calls for a programme of 
well-targeted transfers and safety nets as an essential complement to the basic strategy' 
(quoted in Atkinson, 1993). The developing world and central and eastern Europe in 
the new market economies has been widely required by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to establish means-tested safety nets as an 
essential anti-poverty measure to support its limited insurance-based systems and to 
accompany economic reforms by the World Bank and the IMF. On the EU level, all 
member countries have been encouraged to institute a minimum income scheme, by a 
recommendation adopted by the EEC Council in June 1992.3 
However, there is an extensive literature on the problems of means-tested benefits. For 
example, means tested benefits create the complexity and difficulty of administration, 
poverty and unemployment traps, stigma, low take-up, and a problem of equity at the 
margins, between those who qualify and those who do not. There are other drawbacks 
too - focusing on poverty relief rather than on other possible legitimate objectives for 
social security policy: protection against social risk, horizontal equity, redistribution of 
resources over the lifecycle, and the improvement of social cohesion (Eardley et al., 
1996a: 23). In addition, there are critics of means tested benefits that means tested 
benefits cannot satisfactorily eradicate poverty due to niggard benefit levels and low 
take-up rates caused by stigmatisation (Smolensky et al., 1995; van Oorschot and 
Schell, 1991). 
3 Recommendation 92/441/EEC of 24th June 1992, on common criteria concerning 
sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems. 
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Industrialised welfare states have been built up by the development of typically social 
insurance systems together with means-tested social assistance benefits. The means- 
tested benefits however have not been reduced to the role of safety net envisaged for 
them by Beverage. Instead the role of them has risen to become the principle feature of 
state support in modem welfare states, but these benefits are targeted on those most in 
need. 
2.2 Comparative welfare states and social assistance regimes 
Through the developments of social security systems in the twentieth century, two 
main but contrasting models of social protection have emerged - those countries based 
on social insurance and those relying on other arrangements such as the market and 
private insurance. As some commentators (Ditch, 1999; Eardley et al., 1996a) argue, 
however, this kind of dichotomy is too simplistic since social protection is associated 
with other factors in what have been called `welfare state regimes or typology', to 
identify more complex and distinctive clusters of provision. Comparative research on 
welfare state has thrived during the past decades. Titmuss (1974) made an early 
contribution to identifying a typology of welfare states. Titmuss suggested his own 
three types of welfare state: residual model based on means testing, achievement- 
performance model based on earnings-related contribution systems and institutional 
redistributive model based on universalism. Titmuss's classification is rather abstract 
because he did not attempt to explain each model with a theory about why there were 
different types of welfare state, while he stated that some countries (or national 
traditions) appeared to rely more on one principle than another (Mabbett and 
Bolderson, 1999: 46). 
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Esping-Andersen identified himself intrigued by Titmuss's study, three types of 
welfare state in his seminal book Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) and the 
book became one of the most influential and cited books on welfare state regimes and 
comparative social policy. The book focused on two main dimensions: `social 
stratification', which indicates class divisions (according to occupational status) and 
social solidarity; the extent of 'de-commodification', in which social policy makes 
citizens live outside the labour market. Those countries with flat-rate and universal 
welfare benefits get a higher score than those on the basis of mainly contributory social 
insurance and means tested benefit systems. In his study, Esping-Andersen classified 
countries into the following three welfare regimes: 
" Social democratic regime: characterized by principles of universalism, de- 
commodification of social rights and benefit equality. Examples of this model 
include the Scandinavian countries. 
" Liberal regime: characterized by an emphasis on market-based social insurance 
and the use of means-testing in the distribution of benefits, indicating low levels of 
de-commodification. Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia, Canada and the 
USA (and potentially Britain) are the nations in this category. 
0 Corporatist or conservative regimes: based on previous earnings and contribution- 
based institutions and the protection of the traditional family. Bismarckian 
countries such as Austria, France, Germany and Italy are included in this category. 
Yet, Esping-Andersen's typology has attracted criticism. Esping-Andersen takes 
account of only pension, sickness and unemployment benefits and labour market 
policies, which focuses on social insurance and excludes many other policy areas. As 
Bradshaw et al. (1993), who conducted comparative research on examining child 
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support packages, argued, if other policy areas excluded from his model, such as 
family benefits, health care, housing, education were taken into account, his research 
might come to a rather different classification of welfare regime types. Lewis (1992) 
and Siaroff (1994) criticised the concept of `de-commodification', on which Esping- 
Andersen focused, is biased against gender, since part-time or unpaid work has been 
ignored, thus meaning the position and contribution of women in society was not 
considered in his model. Lewis suggested three alternative categories based on the 
dominance of the male breadwinner: `strong male breadwinner (Britain)', `modified 
male breadwinner' (France), and `weak male or dual breadwinner (Sweden)'. 
There has also been much debate about which countries should be located in which 
Esping-Andersen's welfare state regime types and whether more regimes need to be 
added to his typology. Castles and Mitchell (1993) have challenged Esping-Andersen's 
ambiguous grouping together of Australia and New Zealand with the other Anglo- 
Saxon countries, and Japan and Switzerland, which are all characterised as liberal - 
relying mainly on means tested benefits. Castles and Mitchell argued that the result of 
his typology of the liberal regime disregards the outcomes deriving from means tested 
benefits, and suggested a further cluster composed of Australia and New Zealand 
together with Britain, depicted as a `radical' regime based on the tradition of labour 
politics. A country included in the type of fourth regime is characterised as a very 
effective and strong redistribution. In effect, Esping-Andersen concluded means tested 
benefits are `highly conditional in terms of offering rights' (1990: 54), but this was not 
on the basis of achieved outcomes but supposed. Although his welfare state typology 
assigned special importance of means testing and makes it a defining characteristic of 
the Liberal regime, he overshadowed the existence of means tested benefits and their 
performance in the other welfare state regimes (Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002: 308). 
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Consequently, he counted means tested programmes for low decommodification and 
the focus was on social insurance. The existing typologies of welfare state regimes are, 
therefore, insensitive and not very applicable to comparative research on social 
assistance schemes. 
Given the lack of weight given to social assistance provision, compared to social 
insurance, in analysis of welfare state typologies, there are only a few studies where 
means tested social assistance schemes dealing with poverty are deemed a crucial 
institution in forming typologies. Leibfried's (1992) study of poverty regimes argued 
poverty policy of the welfare state is a significant testing ground for evaluating the 
level of social citizenship in Europe, and, in particular, focuses on the relationship 
between work (labour market) and welfare as embodied in the social citizenships. He 
added a fourth regime to Esping-Andersen's threefold division of welfare regimes 
`Latin Rim' of southern countries of Western Europe, characterised by a `rudimentary 
welfare state', which proclaims a right to both work and welfare, albeit it is exercised 
partially. 
Lodemel and Schulte (1992) discussed development and features of minimum income 
or social assistance schemes in several European countries to analyse the extent to 
which they affect dominating welfare state models of Titmuss and Esping-Andersen. 
On this basis, Ledemel (1992) identified four welfare regimes. The Nordic 
(Scandinavian) regime is depicted as marginalized or residual social assistance4 
through the extension of social insurance. Social assistance is locally administered 
4 Compared to other regimes, very poor able-bodied people are the main target group 
in Nordic countries (Ledemel and Schulte, 1992: 22). 
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with a high degree of discretion and a strong emphasis on social work treatment. The 
British cluster (UK) is characterised by extensive and integrated social assistance with 
limited social insurance. It offers centralised means tested assistance with strong 
entitlement conditions and little social work involvement. The Continental 
(Bismarkian) regime is described as less integrated social assistance with social 
insurance than the British regime. Social assistance schemes of countries in this 
category represent an intermediate position of centralisation between the British and 
the Nordic regimes. The Latin cluster (France, Mediterranean and Southern European 
countries) shares the feature of less developed general social assistance, which forces 
numerous groups to rely on the family and voluntary sector, however classifying this 
cluster needs to be done with caution. 
The two typologies of welfare state regimes above are closely connected with Esping- 
Andersen's model. By contrast, the comprehensive comparative analysis of social 
assistance programmes in OECD countries of Eardley et al. (1996a, 1996b) and Gough 
et al. (1997)5 arrives at a quite different conclusion. On the basis of data on social 
assistance arrangements in the early 1990s, they identified eight distinct social 
assistance regimes. 
" Selective welfare systems: including Australia and New Zealand. This model is 
unique in that all benefits are means tested. There are a number of programmes 
that are categorical and rights-based. The means testing is carefully constructed 
and monitored and is implemented in a consistent way. Assets, earnings disregards, 
and benefit levels are relatively generous. 
5A later article based on the results of Eardley et al. 's study. 
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" Public assistance state: including the USA, with an extensive set of means-tested 
benefits hierarchically organised with regard to acceptability and stigma. Benefits 
are variable and tend to be low. There are tough assets-tests and strong work 
incentives but fixed earnings disregards, and procedural rights are well entrenched. 
" Welfare states with integrated safety nets: including Britain, Ireland and Canada, 
with large, national, general assistance schemes providing an extensive safety net 
at around social insurance levels. Benefits are granted as a right, and there are 
important disregards with some incentives for people with children (Family 
Credit). In the case of Britain, when Housing benefits are taken into account, 
benefits are above the OECD average. 
" Dual social assistance: including Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
with categorical assistance schemes for specific groups, supplemented with a 
rights-based general safety net, though there is a degree of local discretion within a 
national regulatory framework. Assets tests and earnings disregards are moderately 
flexible but benefit levels are below average. 
" Citizenship-based but residual assistance: including the Scandinavian countries, 
except Norway, and the Netherlands. Each country in this category has a single 
general scheme with relatively high benefits. There are locally administered and 
financed schemes, guided only by national regulatory frameworks, and links with 
social work and social care continue to exist. Strict means tests combine with a 
view of family financial responsibilities which lay more emphasis than in most 
countries on the individual and citizenship-based appeal systems. A tradition of 
universal welfare state and/or full employment leaves a marginal or residual role to 
social assistance until the early 1990s. 
" Rudimentary assistance: including Southern Europe and Turkey, with national 
categorical assistance schemes covering mainly older and disabled people. 
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Otherwise there is discretional relief provided by municipalities or local religious 
charity organisations. Means tests are not particularly strict but benefit levels are 
very low and for certain groups and geographical areas, non-existent. Apart from 
Turkey, obligations do not extend the nuclear family. Cash benefits are often 
linked to social work and other services. 
" Decentralised, discretionary relief. including Norway, Austria and Switzerland. 
This model contains elements of the Nordic and Southern European models. Social 
assistance is localised and discretionary and linked to social work and wider kin 
obligations, but is claimed by few people while benefit levels are relatively high. 
This is partly because of the record of full male employment and partly because of 
low-take up, which is caused by stigma and the considerable powers of 
intervention entrusted to local social workers. 
" Centralised, discretionary assistance: including Japan, and containing both 
features of the British and Alpine models, though Japan is difficult to place in the 
preceding categories. The Japanese social assistance is long-standing, nationally 
regulated with very little geographical variation. Yet the regime shares with the 
Alpine model, i. e. the decentralised, discretionary relief, wider family obligations, 
and stigma which tend to be wide spread. 
The results of the social assistance regimes distinguished derive from the authors' own 
judgments in connection with three dimensions of countries' social assistance schemes: 
extent and salience, programme structure, and outcomes/generosity (Table 2.1). Table 
2.1 points out criteria and measures used in the typology of social assistance regimes 
are complex and large. It is definitely more useful than existing welfare state models 
for the cross-national comparison of welfare states as well as social assistance 
provision and for analysing the role and features of minimum income schemes. The 
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above classification of the eight `social assistance regimes' is partly contrary to the 
previous welfare state regime typologies. While the regime of Nordic countries 
remains almost unchanged, considerable changes are made to the others. 
Table 2.1 Dimensions and indicators considered in Gough et al's typology of social 
assistance regimes 
Dimension Indicator 
Extent and Salience " Expenditure on social assistance 
" Number of social assistance recipients 
Programme Structure " Centralisation v. Local variation 
" Rights v. Discretion 
" Individual entitlement v. Wider family obligations 
" Liberal v. Tough means-testing and work-testing 
Outcomes/Generosity " Benefit levels and replacement rates 
Source: Gough et at. (1997). 
Germany was first (Eardley et al., 1996a, 1996b) classified together with the UK, 
Ireland and Canada. It is a most astonishing classification of Eardley et al. (1996a) that 
allocated the Bismarkian country to the Welfare states with integrated safety nets 
together with the Beveridgean countries, whereas all other prevalent typologies 
classified Germany into a different cluster from these Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Behrendt, 2002: 8). Germany shares some of the features with this regime; social 
assistance is rights-based and largely regulated at the central government level. 
However there are also marked differences, e. g. social assistance in Germany is both 
administered and funded at a local level. Yet, Eardley et al. (1996a: 169) admitted that 
Germany can be deemed as a bridge to the cluster of the Dual social assistance 
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because there are some different features such as the existence of a separate 
unemployment scheme and wider family obligations, though these seem to be limited 
in importance. In contrast, the later article of Gough et al. (1997) placed Germany 
more traditionally in the Dual social assistance together with France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, separated from the British model. 
On the other hand, Saraceno (2002: 24) argued for grouping all the Southern European 
countries together in one label of the Rudimentary assistance regime. The author 
insisted Spain and Portugal since 1998 could be allocated in the Dual social assistance 
regime since general safety nets that supplement the categorical assistance schemes 
have been established in the two countries. Moreover, while Gough et al. pointed out 
the significant role of voluntary organisations such as non-profit, charitable, and 
religious agencies in the residual regime, they did not take it into account in the dual 
social assistance and the integrated safety nets regimes. Saraceno also claimed that 
other measures which might affect the typology, in particular, requirement to seek 
work for the unemployed and lone parents are somewhat underplayed. In practice, both 
the role of the voluntary sector and the ways social assistance recipients' obligations 
are defined are crucial elements for evaluating how social assistance works in the real 
world. 
A recent study by Kuivalainen (2004) comes with a slightly different picture from 
Eardley et al. and Gough et al. Using more recent data and more variables, she 
analysed social assistance in six European countries (i. e. Sweden, Germany, the UK, 
Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands representing different welfare state models), 
utilising the notion of welfare production and social rights. Her study established 
social assistance clusters on the basis of four core dimensions: extent (inputs), 
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entitlement rules (production), generosity (outputs) and the incidence of poverty 
(outcomes). The main interest was in general social assistance. 
Sweden and Finland were placed in the Nordic cluster, which is consonant with 
previous studies. The extent of social assistance in the two countries is rather marginal 
and the entitlement rules are strict, but social assistance provides relatively high levels 
of support and people on social assistance are protected well against poverty. The 
Dutch scheme is clustered together with the Nordic schemes. After the withdrawal of 
categorical type of unemployment assistance and the introduction of more extensive 
general social assistance in 1996, the Netherlands has moved more towards an all- 
encompassing scheme with high levels of outputs and outcomes. In previous work, 
Britain was classified together with Ireland and Canada. In her study, however, the 
British scheme is much closer to the Nordic and Dutch schemes. The extent of general 
assistance has decreased (while that of categorical assistance Jobseekers' Allowance 
has increased) during the 1990s. Moreover, the British scheme has relatively generous 
entitlement rules and strong protection against poverty with higher benefit levels than 
Germany and the Netherlands representing the conservative welfare state regime. The 
most distinguishing feature of Ireland from Britain and other countries is that the Irish 
scheme failed to alleviate poverty amongst households receiving social assistance, with 
relatively strict means-testing. Ireland's spending on social security as a percentage of 
GDP is relatively low. Yet the role of social assistance within the social security system 
is low, indicating the extent of social assistance is rather marginal. While Ireland and 
Britain have similarity in that both countries have various categorical social assistance 
benefits, and general assistance is mainly provided for those who are non-able-bodied 
(thus no work-test for the recipients) and the unemployed are covered by separate 
schemes. 
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In the next part of this section, the following key features of social assistance in OECD 
countries in the early 1990s, referring to all categories of means or income-tested 
benefits, including general, categorical, housing, and other tied assistance are 
presented: patterns and trends, conditions of eligibility, administration and delivery of 
social assistance benefits, benefit levels and work and incentives. 
2.2.1 Patterns and trends 
Table 2.2 shows government spending on cash social assistance as a share of GDP 
between 1980 and the early 1990s. In 1992 the level of funding on social assistance 
varied from 0.2 to 13 per cent. Some countries spend substantially on it. New Zealand, 
where almost all benefits are resource based stands out - spending 13 per cent of GDP - 
followed by Australia, Ireland and the UK, which means the social protection of 
English-speaking countries rely more on means tested benefits than the other countries. 
Those spending little on social assistance (less than one per cent of GDP) are 
composed of different sorts: Portugal and Greece 6, Turkey, Japan, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Finland, Iceland, Norway. In most continental EU member 
countries, categorical assistance schemes for specific groups are more important than 
general assistance programmes. Tied benefits including housing benefits are prominent 
in the UK, France, and Sweden. 
6 The only two countries that lack any kind of general, non-categorical assistance 
programme, whereas that of Turkey is very limited and those in Spain and Italy vary 
clearly between regions (Gough et al., 1997: 20). 
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In spite of the differences amongst the OECD countries, so far as definitional 
uncertainty is allowed and comparable data are available, it is found that between 1980 
and 1992 the share of social assistance expenditures rose in all countries, especially 
Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and the UK, except Japan and Switzerland7. While the 
proportion of beneficiaries increased significantly in most countries, particularly in the 
UK, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Germany and the Scandinavian countries except Japan, 
Austria and New Zealand (Eardley, et al., 1996a: 32-46). 
The unemployed and disabled and lone parents have become the most rapidly 
growing groups who depend on social assistance benefits, therefore they seem to be 
the main factors that trigger the expansion of social assistance provision shown above. 
The impact of older people as a group, however, has become a less significant factor - 
the result of widespread improvements in social insurance (Gough et al., 1997). In fact, 
this is a similar pattern to the changes in poverty and the composition of the poor in 
Europe, called the `new poverty' (Room, 1990). 
2.2.2 Conditions of eligibility 
Earlier studies have proved that on the international level, the main preference of 
social assistance schemes is to provide protection only to those categorically poor 
(Eardley, et at., 1996a; Ditch, 1999). Only in the Scandinavian countries are minimum 
income guarantees provided through generalised, all encompassing, means-tested 
benefits. In Southern Europe and Turkey, national categorical assistance covers certain 
groups, mainly the elderly, disabled, and the unemployed together with unemployment 
7 The only two countries to have registered a declining share. 
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Table 2.2 Cash social assistance as a proportion of GDP, 1980-1992 
Country 1980 1985 1992 Change 
1980-92 
(% of GDP) 
Index 
1992/1980 
1980 = 100 
Australia 5.4 6.0 6.8 1.4 126 
Austria 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.3 124 
Belgium 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 156 
Canada 1.6 2.0 2.5 0.9 156 
Denmark N/A 0.9 1.4 Na Na 
Finland 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.3 438 
France 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.7 205 
Germany 1.0 1.6 1.6 0.6 160 
Greece 0.1 0.1 Na 0.0 100 
Iceland N/A Na 0.2 Na Na 
Ireland 3.0 4.5 5.1 2.2 174 
Italy 1.1 1.3 1.5 0.4 135 
Japan 0.4 0.4 0.3 -0.1 60 
Luxembourg N/A Na 0.4 Na Na 
Netherlands 1.7 2.5 2.2 0.5 133 
New Zealand 8.6 9.2 13.0 4.4 151 
Norway 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 486 
Portugal 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 22 
Spain 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.0 473 
Sweden 0.8 1.2 1.5 0.7 186 
Switzerland N/A na 0.8 na n/a 
Turkey N/A Na 0.5 Na Na 
UK 1.8 3.0 3.9 2.1 212 
USA 1.1 1.0 1.3 0.2 115 
Note: Cash social assistance includes general and categorical assistance, but excludes housing and other 
tied assistance. However, housing assistance is included for numbers of France, Sweden and UK. 
Source: Reconstructed Table from Eardley et al. (1996a: 37, Table 2.4). 
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assistance (usually available only on a temporary basis) and families with children. 
Otherwise, local, discretionary assistance is provided by municipalities or religious 
charitable organisations. In the UK and the other Northern European countries, one 
primary and inclusive national assistance programme, together with some categorical 
assistance schemes for specific groups such as Family Credit and Disability Working 
Allowance in the UK, is organised. 
Social assistance schemes in the majority of OECD countries adopt a minimum age, set 
mostly at the age of 18 years, confirming parents' responsibility for supporting their 
children. There are some countries which set a higher age: 25 years in Spaing and 
France, and 30 years in Luxembourg, though people with dependent children (including 
those pregnant) and people with disabled dependents are generally not included in the 
formal age limit. This minimum age threshold also needs to be seen within the context 
of wider policies on access to non-means-tested unemployment schemes as well as 
youth training and labour market, while these sorts of provisions seem to embody some 
problems since placements are not always possible or suitable (Behrendt, 2002: 90; 
Ditch, 1999: 126). Parts of the population are also excluded from eligibility because of 
nationality and residence conditions. Over half of the assistance schemes in the OECD 
world require the applicants to be national, citizen or resident, and these requirements 
limit the entitlement to social assistance benefits for some groups such as recent 
migrants, particularly refugees or asylum seekers. 
8 Except the regions of Andalucia, which has a minimum age of 35 for applicants who 
live alone, and Aragon, where the minimum age is 18 years. For more detail, see 
Aguilar et al. (1995) (quoted in Guibentif and Bouget, 1997: 13). 
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2.2.3 Conditions of entitlement 
In various countries only the resources, i. e. savings and assets, as well as income of the 
applicant and the spouse or partner, in the case of couple, are taken into account. But 
several countries require an extended family support, i. e. the income of other people 
living with the claimant, in particular his/her children is also assessed (Austria, 
Germany, Switzerland and Japan). At the other extreme, in the Nordic countries the 
resources of a partner living with the applicant, unless they are a married couple, are not 
taken into account. 
The level and the type of components that are exempted or discounted from means 
testing are varied and based on different countries' expectations of family responsibility, 
the emphasis placed on work incentives, social attitudes towards lone parenthood and 
cohabitation, and the relative position and importance of means tested assistance 
programmes within the social protection systems (Eardley et at., 1996a). Here the 
patterns are somewhat different from those expected. There are some countries with 
relatively high earning disregards such as Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Germany 
and the USA. By contrast, in the Scandinavian countries, Southern Europe, Turkey, 
Austria and Switzerland, there are no or minimal disregards, and the situation is not 
clear in the case of Japan. Only the UK and Ireland have limits to the number of hours 
claimants can work and still receive benefit. In relation to the assets test, assets are 
treated less strictly in the English-speaking countries with the extensive social 
assistance schemes, except the US programme of AFDC9, and the strictest assets tests 
9 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, which is a categorical assistance 
programme. 
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are found in the Nordic countries, Japan, Austria and Switzerland. 
In relation to family obligations, the nuclear family rather than the household is taken as 
the benefit unit and the resource unit in most countries, with some exceptions where the 
household is the norm of the benefit unit, which derives from a wider concept of family 
obligation, 10 such as Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Turkey and the USA. 
In various countries, as an element within the general social assistance payment, all or 
parts of the housing costs are provided only for social assistance beneficiaries, and are 
provided in other separate and general means-tested housing benefit schemes for all 
kind of people with low-income. Only Spain, Italy and Turkey are those which do not 
have either of these (Ditch, 1999: 124). 
2.2.4 Administration and delivery of social assistance benefits 
In relation to organisation and implementation of social assistance benefits, there is a 
marked contrast between countries where schemes are administered at the centralised, 
integrated and national levels, with common rules of eligibility and payment levels, 
such as the UK, Australia, and the USA, and those in which local governments have 
substantial power, such as Norway, Italy and Switzerland. However, there is a wide 
variation in the degree of central-local responsibilities between countries. Some similar 
features of the administrative process, such as methods of application and payment, 
lo In Austria, the concept of family obligation is extended to grandchildren for their 
grandparents, and grandparents for their grandchildren, and even to uncles and aunts for 
their nephews and nieces in Portugal (Guibentif and Bouget, 1997: 19). 
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reporting requirements on claimants, and recovery of overpayment, are found, at least in 
principle, in the majority of OECD countries (Eardley, et al., 1996a, 1996b). 
2.2.5 Benefit levels 
To estimate the levels of social assistance in the OECD countries, Eardley et al. (1996a) 
have adopted the `model families income matrix' methodology, comparing the data 
collected from national informants on the impact of different social assistance benefits 
on a selection of model families in specified circumstances. A variety of family types 
that might be dependent on social assistance benefits have been chosen, and there are 
three income packages: social assistance, social insurance, and the working for national 
average male earnings. Common assumptions have been specified with regard to 
housing costs, local taxes, health costs and the costs of schooling and pre-school child 
care. All income relating to 1992 has been converted using OECD purchasing power 
parities (PPPs), which are generally more satisfactory than exchange rates, though they 
have some limitations. One limitation of the `model family' approach, used by Eardley 
et al., however, is that in case of countries" where assistance programmes vary from 
municipalities to municipalities and there are immense regional variations in benefit 
levels, it seems difficult to discuss a national social assistance system and their analysis 
only applies to the particular region chosen. 
The analyses done by Eardley et al. (1996a) point out that there are considerable 
variations in the income values of families dependent on social assistance benefits 
11 Such as Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Italy, the Nordic countries, and Canada (to a 
lesser degree). 
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between countries and even within countries, according to different family types and 
comparison made before or after housing costs. Table 2.3 shows a composite ranking of 
countries by taking the total amounts, in PPPs, paid to nine family types, expressed as a 
proportion of the mean for all OECD countries. In the case of the USA, because of the 
degree of regional variations, benefit levels for four separate states - New York, 
Pennsylvania, Florida and Texas - varying from among the most to the least generous 
have been analysed. The results are presented both before and after housing costs. Top 
of the table, after housing costs, come Iceland and Switzerland, heading a group which 
includes the Nordic countries, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Australia and Italy all with 
social assistance levels over 20 per cent above the mean. However, the figures for Italy 
are considerably unreliable (Eardley et al., 1996a: 129-130). At the bottom come a 
group all with levels of over ten per cent below the mean. This includes the US states 
except New York, Belgium, New Zealand and the Southern European countries. In 
between are the UK, the USA (New York), Japan, France, Canada and Germany. 
Overall, amongst the group of which countries have the highest levels of social 
assistance benefit, the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland have common features: 
relatively high levels of GDP per capita, traditionally low levels of unemployment, and 
residual social assistance schemes administered at the local levels. Furthermore, 
replacement rates are high but there are strict mean tests with no or minimal capital and 
earnings disregards, and in the Nordic countries, strong arrangements to encourage 
labour participation in the Nordic countries (Eardley et al., 1996a: 109-138). To sum 
up, level of benefit seems to be in inverse proportion to numbers of recipients, i. e. 
when a country has only a small number of beneficiaries, it can have relatively high 
levels of social assistance benefits. 
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Table 2.3 Social assistance percentage difference from the mean (1992) 
Country 
Iceland 50 (49) 
Switzerland 41 (91) 
Luxembourg 35 (32) 
Netherlands 33 (16) 
Finland 31 (-5) 
Denmark 29 (26) 
Italy 28 (0) 
Australia 28 (15) 
Norway 25 (38) 
Sweden 24 (17) 
UK 11 (. 19) 
Japan 8 (1) 
USA (New York) 6 (8) 
France 4 (28) 
Ireland 2 (-15) 
Canada 2 (26) 
Austria -2 (-29) 
Germany -5 (-32) 
Belgium -12 (1) 
New Zealand -18 (-4) 
USA (Pennsylvania) -23 (-24) 
Spain -41 (-45) 
USA (Florida) -64 (-27) 
USA (Texas) -85 (40) 
Portugal -90 (-63) 
Greece -119 (-91) 
Notes: Disposable income of recipients of social assistance after housing costs in purchasing power 
parity £ sterling, expressed as a proportion of the mean for all OECD countries: average for nine family 
types. Numbers in brackets exclude housing costs. 
Source: Eardley et al. (1996a: 130,131, Table 6.7a & 6). 
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2.2.6 Work and incentives 
In most countries, recipients for social assistance benefits are required to seek work and 
are offered incentives to work. In these countries, availability to take a job is an 
essential requirement so as to receive benefits, which means the recipient is usually 
registered with the employment services. Although the work-seeking requirement is not 
a formal rule in Greece, 12 Switzerland, Japan and a region of Iceland, it seems that 
there are strong expectations that applicants will make full use of their capacities (Ditch, 
1999: 130; Eardley et al., 1996a: 147). 
In virtually all countries, only some categories can be exempted from work tests - 
people who are ill or disabled, or older people, and in a few countries such as Austria 
and Luxembourg, students or people who have to care for dependent children (Guibentif 
and Bouget, 1997: 15). However, the major variations relate to lone parents, especially 
to the age of children who exempt lone parents from the work-seeking requirements 
(see Eardley et al., 1996a: 147-148). 
A range of mechanisms are intended to encourage recipients to return to work in some 
countries: vocational training arrangements, job search programmes, earnings disregards 
in the means testing, loans and grants for work experiences or self-employed business 
start-up. Municipalities or social institutions are obliged to implement or provide special 
employment schemes in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. Specific positive incentives are also identified 
12 Where general assistance payments are only provided on a one-off basis and work 
tests are irrelevant for regular eligibility. 
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in Australia, Ireland, the UK and the USA. In these countries, the agencies which have 
responsibility for administration of social assistance schemes work in close cooperation 
with employment services, and implementation of the employment schemes may 
depend on collaboration between some ministries13 (Guibentif and Bouget, 1997: 36). 
In most countries, there are sanctions which recipients may suffer if they refuse work 
tests or work-seeking requirements. The negative incentives take the form of partial or 
full suspension of benefits. 
In addition to the relationship between generosity of benefit and small numbers of 
recipients, which is derived from the common features of the Nordic countries with the 
highest levels of benefit shown above, Eardley et al. (1996a) suggest a triangular model 
- adding labour participation policy. Countries can perhaps have higher levels of benefit, 
only when social assistance benefits are not important elements of the unemployment 
benefit system, so they have a small number of claimants, and when there are strong 
labour participation policies. Therefore it seems difficult to combine active insertion 
policies when social assistance benefits are relatively low and they are an important 
component of the benefit system for the unemployed so numbers of beneficiaries are 
large. 
2.3 Development of social welfare in Korea 
Until the early 1960s, Korea was one of the least developed countries, which was based 
on agriculture and Confucianism. The Choson dynasty, which lasted over 500 years, 
13 For example, the ministries of employment and education as well as the ministry of 
social affairs appear to be involved in the implementation in France and Luxembourg. 
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was ended and colonized by Japan in 1910. Under the thirty-five years of Japanese 
colonial rule (1910-1945), relief-giving was provided as an expedient, short-term 
emergency treatment for political purposes rather than ideological responses to welfare 
need (Hwang, 2002: 55; Kim, K., 2000: 175). The Japanese Poor Law, which was 
established in 1929, was introduced in Korea in 1944 and named Chosun Poor Relief 
Order of 1944. It was introduced in Korea because there was an urgent need from the 
Japanese colonial government for conscription and labour requisition for military 
purposes. The Japanese occupation left a notable legacy of militaristic, bureaucratic, 
authoritarian political culture and the state became a powerful actor (Hwang, 2002; Kim, 
1991). 
After the colonial period, the concept of the welfare state was adopted by the first 
Republic of Korea (1948-1960), of which the first Korean president Syngman Rhee was 
given political favour from the American military government. Yet the corrupted and 
indulgent bureaucratic authoritarian regime could not see welfare or labour policy as a 
structural necessity for modernising a capitalist society due to the lack of an economic 
infrastructure (Goodman and Peng, 1995: 25; Lee, 1999b: 26). During this period, 
welfare was operated mainly as charity and emergency relief organised and funded by 
international humanitarian or aid organisations, as well as massive American military 
and economic aid. The country itself was one of the largest beneficiaries of foreign aid. 
People were suffering from poverty, loss and bereavement and absolute poverty was 
natural and widespread throughout the whole country. 
The Korean welfare state was laid down by the authoritarian Park and Chun regimes, 
which began in 1961 and lasted until 1987 (Kwon, 1998; Lee, 1999b). Between 1961 
and 1996, Korean economy performed one of the highest growths in the world, under 
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the `authoritarian developmental state' (Johnson, 1988) or `developmental state' (Gough, 
2001a), which placed almost exclusive emphasis on economic development, while 
making relatively little commitment to develop social welfare system. The 
developmental state used social policy to build political legitimacy, which is a 
characteristic noted in the development of European social policy in the 1800s (Joo, 
1999; Gough, 2001 a; Hwang, 2002; Ku, 1998; Kwon, H., 1999a; 2002,2003). 
These characteristics are not confined to Korea but also can be found in other East 
Asian countries. In fact, East Asian countries introduced the first social security 
programmes at lower levels of modernization or socio-economic development than 
European countries (Hort and Kuhnle, 2000: 167-8). This suggests the developmental 
states in this region performed good economic growth for last decades by adopting 
social welfare programmes as policy instruments for economic development (Aspalter, 
2006; Goodman and Peng, 1996; White and Goodman, 1998; Gough, 2001a; Holliday, 
2000; Kwon, H., 2003,2005). The East Asian welfare states, at least Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, share important characteristics: a development ideology 
that subordinated welfare to economic efficiency and growth, discouraged welfare 
dependency on the state, promoted social and private resources of welfare including 
family, firm and community, and diverted the financial resources of social insurance to 
investment in social and physical infrastructure (White and Goodman, 1998: 17). In 
addition, the developmental states play the role of regulator, rather than direct provider, 
to expand social protection programmes without a direct financial burden (Kwon, 1997). 
Social insurance programmes in Korea and Japan are examples. 
Korea also shares the features of the developmental state. Social welfare in Korea had 
been primarily the responsibility of the family, companies and non-governmental 
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organisations (NGOs)14, and public spending on the social security system was low. 
Total social expenditure including both public and private expenditure represented only 
5.3 per cent of GDP in 1996 - one of the lowest levels amongst the OECD member 
nations, and mandatory private expenditure amounted 1.4 per cent - the second lowest 
level after Italy amongst the countries. This indicates the Korean welfare system under 
the developmental state heavily relied on the private sector, while there was relatively 
little commitment from the State. Until the 1997 economic crisis, this arrangement 
seemed to be adequate in the context of rapid economic growth with full employment 
combined with great employment stability and relatively low levels of unemployment, 
poverty and income inequality (see Chapter 4). While the economy grew fast, the 
number of unemployed people was small and those who were unemployed relied on 
their families or on their savings as a safety net (Kwon, 2005: 3). Under these relatively 
stable socio-economic conditions, such dynamics of economy had been the main source 
of Korean people's welfare (Kim, 2005: 4) and, accordingly, there was no urgent need 
for establishing an elaborate welfare system. It thus took a long time for Korea to take 
shape of a welfare state. 
A wide range of welfare-related laws, including those related to health insurance, 
disaster relief, veteran's welfare and child welfare services were enacted in the early 
1960s, but many of them remained dormant: mainly those of instrumental value were 
put into effect (Lee, 1999b). These included social assistance programmes (1961), 
pension schemes for military personnel (1963) and government employees (1962), as 
well as workmen's industrial accident compensation insurance in 1963, along with a 
14 Almost 1,400 NGOs, about half of which receive public funding, are involved in the 
operation of local welfare centres (OECD, 2000b). 
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pilot programme for health insurance. 
The Livelihood Protection (LP) Act of 1961 was the first statutory provision of social 
assistance in Korea, though the budget for the assistance scheme was not allocated until 
1969. It was mainly a rewrite of the Chosun Poor Relief Order of 1944, which provided 
subsistence assistance only to those categorically poor and unable to work. The LP 
programme had the aim of providing a minimum level of relief, having a very strict 
entitlement condition and providing a living allowance, medical care and educational costs 
etc. only for those unable to work and aged under 18 and 65 and over. Those aged between 
18 and 64 were thus excluded from coverage even if their income fell below the minimum 
income levels, since they were regarded as having earning ability and not deserving income 
support (Kwon, 2002). Thus the LP was based on the residualist approach (Yi and Lee, 
2005) and covered only a small segment of the poor. It lasted for about forty years until 
1999, while there had been partial changes in its contents. 
Two major pieces of social security legislation came into being during the 1970s. One 
was the National Welfare Pension Act of 1973 and the other was the revised National 
Health Insurance Act. Implementation of the former was postponed due to the oil crisis 
in 1973. In 1986, the National Welfare Pension Act of 1973 was rewritten and renamed 
the National Pension (NP) Act and eventually put into effect in 1988. The National 
Health Insurance (NHI) Act (first enacted in 1963) was revised and put into effect in 
1977. 
In the field of social welfare services, the Welfare Act for the Elderly, and the Welfare 
Act for the Disabled were enacted in 1981 and revised in 1984, and the Law for the 
Education of Pre-school Children was legislated in 1982. Subsequently, the Welfare Act 
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for Children was enacted in 1984 to incorporate the universal perspective of child 
welfare services. The Maternity Health Care Act was revised in 1987 and the Maternity 
Welfare Act was legislated in 1989. 
The democratic transition after July 1987, followed in December 1987 by the first direct 
presidential election in 17 years was a turning point for the social welfare system in 
Korea. Between 1988-1997, virtually all types of social security programmes came into 
effect, with the exception of family allowances. The minimum wage system was 
introduced in 1988. The NP scheme was finally reintroduced in 1988, as stated above. 
By 1989 the NHI scheme was able to cover the entire population with the Health 
Benefit that is a non-contributory means-tested benefit for people with low-income. 
Unemployment insurance named the Employment Insurance (EI) programme was 
introduced in 1993 and implemented from 1995. Yet the social security system in Korea 
was still used and developed with consideration for politico-economic necessity (Deyo, 
1992; Joo, 1999; Shin, 2000: 101). The social security system was not designed to 
embody a guaranteed social right, instead relying on social insurance schemes, in which 
the government did not take responsibility for financing (Shin, 2000: 86-87). Even the 
social insurance programmes were underdeveloped or premature because they were at 
an early stage of development. 
The outbreak of the 1997 economic crisis triggered reform of the social welfare system 
in Korea. The developmental state that had thrived on expansion and growth over the 
past thirty years was sternly tested in terms of its effectiveness of the social protection 
system during the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8 (Kwon, 2005: 3). In fact, Korea was 
one of the hardest hit countries by the crisis. The crisis has made a profound impact, not 
only on the Korean economy but also on social development. As the Korean economy 
40 
recorded negative growth in 1998 from a positive growth rate of five per cent in 1997, 
the unemployment rate reached 8.6 per cent in February 1999, the highest point since 
1980s (NSO, 2001b). Moreover, the poverty rate based on the minimum living standard, 
which was about 40 per cent of the median income, soared dramatically to 12.6 per cent 
in February 1999 from 3.1 per cent in 1996 (Park, 2000). 
The developmental state could not cope well with the sudden rise in the 
unemployment and poverty. The existing social protection system was not well 
designed or equipped to address the socio-economic conditions, because it had been 
based on the assumption of full employment and low poverty and, therefore, minimal 
support for those who are unemployed and poor (Kwon, 2005). The categorical social 
assistance programme LP was based on the residualist approach, providing a 
minimum level of relief with strict eligibility criteria and a low level of benefits for 
those incapable of working. It thus covered only three per cent of the population in 
1997 and only 26.2 per cent of the recipients received cash benefits. The NP scheme 
did not cover those self-employed living in urban areas. The NHI scheme began to 
cover the whole population. Yet there were more than 400 health insurance societies 
within it with different contribution rates and independently managed funds for different 
workplaces and geographical areas, and their financial situations varied considerably. 
This caused inequity in healthcare financing and a chronic fiscal instability of insurance 
societies for rural self-employed workers (Kwon, S., 2003; Lee, 2004). The latest social 
insurance programme the EI programme (i. e. unemployment insurance) covered only 
four million employees (20.6 per cent of total employees in 1997). Therefore although 
regular wage and salary workers in firms over a certain size were well covered by the 
social insurance schemes, the majority of irregular workers and those in small firms, i. e. 
the most vulnerable to unemployment and poverty were out of the social protection 
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system. 
The social and economic consequences proved that the negative social impact has 
become greater due to the relative neglect of the development of institutions for social 
protection during the decades of economic development. Thus the Korean 
government was continually and strongly requested by civil society and the IMF15 to 
establish an adequate social safety net to cope with the unprecedented social problems 
produced by the shock of globalization. 
In the wake of the economic crisis, welfare reforms came to be appreciated as an 
institutional means for ideological responses to welfare need for the first time in Korean 
history. In response to the demand from civil society organisations to introduce a 
comprehensive social safety net, the Kim Dae-Jung government, inaugurated in 1998 
just after the crisis, made clear its departure from the previous pre-crisis developmental 
state model with the family and economic growth as the best welfare policy. Instead the 
government announced the `productive welfare' aiming to secure a minimum living 
standard for all citizens (Presidential Office, 1999,2000; for further details, see Jung, 
2002). In order to cope with the problems of soaring unemployment and poverty, the 
government has given priority to the strengthening of social protection systems by 
15 The IMF made agreements with the Korean government focused on three agendas: a 
conventional IMF agenda; a US trade- and investment-opening agenda; and a Korean- 
imposed institutional reform agenda (Mathews, 1998). But they included measures to 
strengthen and expand the social safety net, though the IMF's overall policy orientation in 
terms of social policy was not to place emphasis on developing a universal social security 
system (Shin, 2000: 100). 
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establishment of a social safety net - by reforming the EI programme and the social 
assistance programme. In 1998, coverage of unemployment benefit under the EI was 
expanded to cover all workplaces including temporary or part-time workers but 
excluding day workers. In 1999, previous categorical assistance was replaced by new 
general social assistance the NBLS scheme, which aims to secure minimum living 
standards for those eligible regardless of their age and ability to work, and it was put 
into effect in 2000. 
Following the reforms of social assistance and unemployment insurance, three other 
major social insurance schemes have been restructured and expanded. In 2000, the NHI 
scheme was transformed into a single insurer system by merging about 420 health 
insurance societies. Indeed, the integration of the health insurance has been regarded as 
one of the most important social security reforms as it is expected to solve the problem 
of inefficient management and little contribution to redistribution (Kwon, S., 2003; Lee, 
2004). In 1999, another important change has been made in the NP scheme, which has 
been expanded to cover all the economically active population over 18. In 2000, the 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (IACI) was also been extended to cover all 
workplaces. In addition to the existing four major insurance schemes, Long-term Care 
Insurance for older people is scheduled to put into effect from 2008. 
It is evident that the State's role in social welfare policy has considerably expanded 
since the 1997 economic crisis. Yet public spending on social welfare as a percentage of 
GDP remains at the lowest level amongst the OECD countries, on the contrary, private 
spending on it is the highest level among them (OECD, 2004b). Thus commentators 
argue that even under the more democratic regimes, the legacies of the authoritarian 
regimes, such as low spending for the social protection system, the State relying on a 
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social insurance mechanism, welfare role of family, partnership between public and 
private sectors, avoidance of dependency on the State and the bigger role of private 
income transfers in mitigating poverty and inequality than public transfers, seem to 
remain intact (Choi, 2002; Joo, 1999; Hong, 2002; Hong and Song, 2006; Hwang, 2004; 
Kim, 2005; Kwon, H., 2001b; Park et al., 2002; Shin, 2000). 
2.4 Limitations of the existing studies 
The review of previous literature on comparative welfare states and social assistance 
regimes presented the development of typologies of social assistance during the past 
decades, and provided information on the extent and salience of social assistance in 
developed countries, conditions of eligibility and entitlement, administration and 
delivery mechanisms, benefit levels and work incentives in the early 1990s. Previous 
studies identified several types of social assistance regimes varying by studies but no 
more than eight regimes (Leibfried, 1992; Ledemel and Schulte, 1992; Eardley et al., 
1996a; Gough et at., 1997; Kuivalainen, 2004). They have mainly focused on European 
countries (Leibfried, 1992; Lodemel and Schulte, 1992; Kuivalainen, 2004) or on the 
OECD member nations (Eardley et at., 1996a; Gough et al., 1997). 
Yet none of the existing studies has suggested a clear model or regime type of East 
Asian social assistance schemes. There are two reasons. On the one hand, although there 
is a growing number of comparative studies of East (and Southeast) Asian social policy, 
in particular, in terms of East Asian welfare state models/regimes, social insurance 
schemes and social welfare reforms after the East Asian economic crisis in the late 
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1990s16, little attention has been paid to social assistance schemes in this region. 
On the other hand, comparative social assistance research has also showed little interest 
in social assistance in East Asia and, consequently, there has been remarkably little 
cross-national analysis of social assistance schemes in the region. In fact, Japan was the 
only representative of the Pacific/Confucian regime that was included in a few studies 
on comparative social assistance on the OECD level (Eardley et al., 1996a, 1996b; 
Gough et al., 1997; Gough, 2001b). Korea was not included in the previous research 
because it joined the OECD later than the time of research. In the previous studies, 
commentators failed to place Japan both in one of the existing seven regime types and 
in a category of its own, instead concluded that Japan has elements of both the British 
and Alpine models. The analysis of only one country, in this case Japan, which does not 
have its own unique character but has an unclear and mixed image, might be insufficient 
to posit a social assistance regime representing East Asia. Almost all other social 
assistance regimes identified in the earlier studies, included at least two countries, except 
the public assistance state including the US only but having its own distinct character 
distinguishing from others (see Eardley et al., 1996a and Gough et al., 1997). If other East 
Asian countries were included, then there might be a possibility of identifying a regime 
type (or more than one type) of East Asian social assistance schemes. 
16 This group of studies includes Aspalter (2006), Croissant (2004), Goodman et al. 
(1998), Goodman and Peng (1995,1996), Gough (2001), Holliday (2000,2005), 
Holliday and Wilding (2003), Hort and Kuhnle (2000), Jacobs (1998,2000a, 2000b), 
Jones (1993), Kwon (1997,1998a, 2005), Lin and Rantalaiho (2003), Ramesh (2003, 
2004) and Walker and Wong (2005). 
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It is not only cross-national or comparative analysis of welfare state and social 
assistance regimes but also national and international social policy research, which has 
underestimated and neglected Korean social assistance. Previous research on Korean 
social policy shed light on the development of social welfare in Korea (Hwang, 2002, 
2006; Joo, 1999; Kwon, 1999a; Lee, 1999b) and on the Korean welfare system in a 
comparative perspective or within East Asian welfare (state) models/regimes (Aspalter, 
2006; Croissant, 2004; Deyo, 1992; Goodman et al., 1998; Goodman and Peng, 1995, 
1996; Gough, 2001a; Holliday, 2000,2005; Holliday and Wilding, 2003; Hort and 
Kuhnle, 2000; Jacobs, 1998; Jones, 1993; Kwon, 1997,1998a, 2005; Ramesh, 2003, 
2004). 
Previous studies have also addressed welfare reform after the 1997 economic crisis 
(Kwon, 2002; Kwon, S., 2001; Shin, 2000), the mechanisms of income transfers (Choi, 
2002; Hong, 2002; Kim, 2002; Kwon, H., 2001b) and income redistribution (Hwang, 
2004), as well as social protection programmes in Korea, mainly social insurance such 
as national pensions (Choi, 2006; Kim and Kim, 2005; Kim, 2006; Kwon, 1998b, 
1999b; Yang, 2004), health care insurance (Kwon, H., 2005; Kwon, S., 2003), 
unemployment policy including unemployment insurance and the unemployment 
benefits (Kwon, H., 2001a; Yi and Lee, 2005). The review of the existing literature on 
the development of the Korean welfare system has uncovered some important features 
of the Korean welfare system, but has sketched a pretty crude picture of social 
assistance in Korea. A few commentators (Kwon, 1998a, 2002; Lee, 1999,2004; Shin, 
2000; Yi and Lee, 2005) provided some basic information on the previous and new 
social assistance schemes, such as the development of Korean social assistance, the 
meanings of the introduction of general assistance in Korean welfare history, eligibility 
criteria, social assistance expenditure and the number of social assistance recipients 
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covered. 
Yet, the previous studies are mainly descriptive rather than systematic or analytical in 
their nature and only a partial picture of Korean social assistance has been produced in a 
small space in their studies. Only in recent years has policy-making process of social 
assistance reform after the economic crisis, led by NGOs not by the government 
administration, appeared to attract the interest of national and international social policy 
towards Korean social assistance. '7 
In fact, social assistance in Korea has hardly been the focus of cross-national or 
comparative welfare state analysis as well as national and international social policy 
research. It may be because the Korean welfare system relies mainly on social insurance, 
and social assistance is concerned with a relatively small proportion of the population 
on low-income. However, social assistance is growing in importance in the Korean 
context since the 1997 economic crisis. First, after the 1997 crisis, the role of social 
assistance within Korean social security has considerably become large at least in terms 
of the volume of government expenditure. In 2004, spending on social assistance as a 
proportion of the total budget of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), which 
administers most social security benefits, amounted to 42.4 per cent, while in 1997 that 
represented 31.6 per cent (MOHW, 2005d). 
Second, the introduction of general assistance the NBLS scheme was acknowledged as 
the most conspicuous achievement of the history of Korean social policy (Jung, 2002; 
17 This group of studies includes Hwang (2002,2006), Jung (2002,2005), Kwon, H. 
(2003), Moon (2002) and Yeo et al. (2004). 
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Kim, 2005; Kwon, 2002; Lee, 2004, Moon, 20002; Yeo et al., 2004). Unlike the 
previous assistance scheme which had had a Poor Law tradition, the new social 
assistance scheme is designed to protect the social right and to guarantee a minimum 
living standard for all citizens (Jung, 2002; Kwon, 2002; Lee, 2004). Thus regardless of 
reasons for being poor, all the people earning less than the minimum living standard 
defined by the government have right to be guaranteed the minimum standard of living 
by the State. The social assistance reform replacing categorical assistance which lasted 
for about forty years by general assistance was one of the main agenda items of the 
productive welfare initiatives of the Kim Dae-Jung government, after the economic 
crisis shocked the Korean society in the late 1990s. Together with the replacement of the 
existing pre-crisis categorical assistance scheme, the State has recognised its 
responsibility for poverty and welfare for the first time in Korean history. 
Nevertheless the new general assistance scheme has been criticised. First there is little 
difference in the total number of recipients covered by it. Second, the eligibility criteria 
remain strict so a large proportion of people or households with low-income are 
excluded from the final safety net. Third, the social assistance benefits are not effective 
enough in alleviating poverty, instead private transfers such as financial support from 
family and relatives contribute more to mitigating poverty. In consideration of the 
weakness of existing literature, there are needs for more analytical and systematic in- 
depth analysis on Korean social assistance. Therefore this study will bring social 
assistance in Korea, which has gained little attention from the mainstream of national and 
international social policy studies, as well as comparative welfare state research, into the 
analysis, and will analyse it in comparative perspectives. This research will contribute to 
increasing our knowledge and understanding of social assistance schemes on a 
comparative basis. 
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Chapter 3 Research methods 
The aim of this study is to contribute to enriching our understanding of East Asian 
social policy and existing comparative knowledge on social assistance. The study 
analyses social assistance in Korea in comparative perspectives, combining qualitative 
information on the institutional frameworks and quantitative methods to present a 
comprehensive and comparative picture of Korean social assistance. The study adopts 
the combination of two approaches, i. e. institution-by-institution and group-by-group. 
The institution-by-institution approach emphasizes specific social security provision, 
such as pension schemes, unemployment benefits and social assistance schemes, in 
order to detect variation and homogeneity of institutional design. This approach thus 
focuses on the organisation of social policies. By contrast, the group-by-group approach 
focuses on the benefit packages available to individuals and households, and involves 
secondary analysis of national or international datasets. This approach is thus concerned 
with their income position and the distributive effects of policies on the individuals and 
households (Behrendt, 2002; Hauser, 1997). In Bradshaw (1994)'s typology, the former 
approach can be seen as micro studies of inputs and the latter one as micro studies of 
outcomes. The combination of the two approaches is expected to help to broaden the 
focus of this study while supplementing the blind spots each of the approaches has. 
3.1 Comparison of previous and current social assistance in Korea 
As stated above, this study aims to analyse Korean social assistance in comparative 
perspectives. The first comparison is done between the previous categorical and current 
general assistance schemes to see whether there has been any significant improvement 
or a regime shift within Korean social assistance. The following three broad criteria are 
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examined: 
" extent and salience of social assistance: spending on social assistance and 
claimant numbers 
" programme structure: eligibility and entitlement rules 
" outcomes/generosity: the absolute and relative levels of benefits 
The comparison is based on a variety of sources, including government documents, 
official statistics produced by government, government affiliated organisations and a 
number of think thanks, and national studies on the social assistance schemes and social 
welfare system in general. Acts and regulations related to social assistance are also 
collected to examine their principles and objectives. 
3.2 International comparison 
The second comparison is done between Korea and other countries. It is increasingly 
acknowledged that reaching a full understanding of welfare system in a single country is 
only possible if its experience is set in the context of those of other countries (Cochrane, 
1993). In fact, cross-national analysis provides a better understanding of the domestic 
social policy environment. By examining how and why things are done differently in 
other countries, not only academics or scholars but also policy makers or political actors 
can learn from other nations' experiences, avoid mistakes which others have made 
elsewhere, and replicate their successes (Higgins, 1981; Madison, 1980; O'Higgins et 
al., 1990). This study thus puts Korean social assistance in a wider international context 
to see how far Korea constitutes a unique case or how far it differs from other countries. 
This forms the basis to place Korea within social assistance regime theory. The current 
general assistance scheme in Korea is compared with schemes (mainly general 
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assistance) in eight OECD countries, in terms of the following three measures, which 
are mainly derived from the dimensions and indicators considered in Eardley et al. 
(1996a)'s typology of social assistance regimes. 
" extent and salience of social assistance: social assistance expenditure as a 
percentage of total social expenditure. 
" programme structure: 
- conditions of eligibility (residence/nationality, minimum/maximum age, 
duration of benefit entitlement) 
- conditions of entitlement (benefit/resource units and resource testing) 
- availability for work (work test and incentives to work). 
" outcomes/generosity: the relative level of social assistance benefits provided 
3.2.1 Choice of cases 
Korea is compared to eight countries representing different welfare state regimes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990,1999), poverty regimes (Leibfried, 1992) and social assistance 
regimes (Lodemel, 1992; Lodemel and Schulte, 1992; Eardley et al., 1996a; Gough et 
al., 1997). Britain, Germany and Sweden have been selected as paradigmatic cases for 
three distinct welfare states, discussed in Chapter 2, representing liberal, conservative 
and social democratic regimes, respectively. Portugal has been chosen as a 
representative of the Southern European model/Latin Rim. Additional two countries 
regarded hybrid welfare states have been selected: Ireland (a hybrid of liberal and 
conservative regimes) and the Netherlands (a mix of conservative and social democratic 
regimes). Finland is deemed a latecomer to the Nordic welfare regime, which joined it 
in the late 1980s (Kangas, 1994; Kuivalainen, 2004). In the ranking of Esping-Andersen 
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(1990)'s de-commodification score, Finland is placed in the conservative cluster with 
Germany and France, but in an analysis of social stratification it is situated in the 
socialism cluster with the Scandinavian countries. Thus Finland has been selected to a 
Nordic counterpart to Sweden. In fact, the last four selected do not fit clearly into one of 
the three clusters and there is some ambiguity in locating the four countries within 
welfare state or social assistance regime theory (Hill, 1996; Kuivalainen, 2004; 
Saraceno, 2002). Yet these cases would offer a better mirror and more comprehensive 
comparison than including only the three archetypes (Kuivalainen, 2004: 32). 
Japan has been included as an East Asian counterpart to Korea. As illustrated in Chapter 
2, Korea shares certain common points with Japan. For example, strong historical links 
(Goodman and Peng, 1995,1996), developmental states (Gough, 2001a), low social 
spending (Jacobs, 2000a, 2000b; Jones, 1993; Finer, 1999) and the significant role of 
family and market in welfare provision (Aspalter, 2006; Fu, 2003; Hill, 1996; Kim, 
2005; Scherer, 2003). In previous comparative studies of social assistance (Bradshaw 
and Finch, 2002; Eardley et al., 1996a; Gough et al., 1997), Japan was the only 
representative of the region. By including both Korea and Japan as well as European 
countries, this study is expected to present various aspects and characteristics of East 
Asian and European social assistance regimes. 
There are some limitations of the selection of countries. First, North America (e. g. 
USA) and Australasia are excluded from this study. In the case of the US, the degree of 
variation between states is significant, thus it would be rather difficult to obtain a 
uniform and reliable picture of social assistance in this large federal country. On the 
other hand, social security systems in Australia and New Zealand are almost entirely 
means-tested or income-related, using an approach that they are not focused solely on 
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those with minimum incomes (Eardley et al., 1996a: 27; Hill, 1996: 46). Given the fact 
that nearly all income maintenance benefits are means-tested, it seems rather difficult to 
determine precisely what constitutes last resort social assistance benefits (Kuivalainen, 
2004: 33). 
Second, in this study, Portugal has been included in the analysis of programme structure 
and generosity. Yet it was not possible to obtain data on expenditure and claimant 
numbers, other than information from Eardley et al. (1996a; 1996b) resting on 1992 
data, which is too old for this study. Thus Portugal has been excluded from the cross- 
national comparison of the extent and salience. Owing to this, the Portuguese assistance 
scheme presented in the study is rather incomplete. In order to gain better and useful 
results, statistical and methodological manners should be improved and diversified. 
3.2.2 Sources of data 
Information on the institutional frameworks stems from various sources, including 
national and international data and statistical sources, national and comparative studies 
on welfare states and social security in general, as well as social assistance, and 
governmental documents, citizen advice handbooks and related laws and regulations. 
Comparable data on social assistance expenditure and recipients are highly problematic 
(Eardley et al., 1996a; Kuivalainen, 2004; Puide and Minas, 2001). First, there are 
hardly comparative data on social assistance expenditure at the international level. 
Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) from the OECD includes information on public 
and mandatory private social assistance expenditure, but does not offer detailed 
information on general or categorical assistance for the member states of the OECD. 
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Eurostat statistics provide information about expenditure on means-tested benefits and 
social exclusion, but the inclusion of benefits is unfit (Eurostat, 2006; Kuivalainen, 
2004). The lack of cross-national comparable data is crucial for comparative research on 
poverty and social assistance. In particular, there are hardly available data for 
comparative social assistance research on East and South-east Asia. SOCX from the 
OECD is the only exception that provides information on social assistance expenditure 
for Korea and Japan. Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data provide quantitative data on 
income for Taiwan but do not include information on other Asian countries. 
Second, estimates of the number of social assistance recipients are beset by similar 
problems to those of expenditure data or even more problematic (see Eardley et at., 
1996a: 38; Kuivalainen, 2004: 71,109). One of the major problems is the difference in 
the period of estimates. In Finland and Sweden, national statistics on recipients cover 
the whole calendar year, whereas in the other countries, i. e. Korea, Japan, Germany, 
Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands, estimates are based on a one-time measure. The 
number of social assistance recipients in the two Scandinavian countries, thus, seem to 
be considerably higher. 
For this study, the data on social assistance expenditure and claimant numbers are 
derived from national official statistics. Year book of health and welfare statistics 
produced by the MOHW (Korea) and statistics collected by the National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research (Japan) and Abe (2002) are used to analyse the 
extent and salience of social assistance in Korea and Japan. The data for six European 
countries, except Portugal for which no data are available, are derived from Kuivalainen 
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(2004) that collected information from national official statistics of each country. ' 8 For 
the reasons stated above, like previous comparative social assistance research (Eardley 
et al., 1996a; Kuivalainen, 2004), expenditure and the recipient numbers are not wholly 
comparable and the comparisons made in the following chapters represent only a first 
attempt at making sense of the overall picture. The data on total social expenditure are 
derived from the OECD (2004b). 
3.2.3 Purchasing power parities 
In many comparative studies, purchasing power parities (PPPs) are used to eliminate the 
differences in price levels between countries. PPPs are a method of comparing the 
actual value of a currency in terms of purchasing power. They equalize the purchasing 
power of different currencies in their home countries for a given basket of goods and 
services. It is acknowledged that PPPs are generally more satisfactory than exchange 
rates (Eardley et al., 1996a; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). They take into account of 
differences in the price of a common basket of goods in each country, and thus, are used 
to compare the standards of living in two or more countries. It is believed that PPPs 
18 Finland: Yearly social assistance statistics produced by the National Research and 
Development Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES); Sweden: Annual statistics on 
financial assistance based on individual data produced by the National Board of Health 
and Welfare; Germany: Statistics produced by Statistisches Bundesamt; the 
Netherlands: Statistics produced by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and 
the Statistical Office; Ireland: Statistical information on social welfare services by the 
Department of Social and Family Affairs; the UK: Quarterly statistical enquiry by the 
Department of Work and Pension (formerly Department of Social Security). 
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reflect the long-run equilibrium value. While exchange rates vary day by day and 
fluctuate widely due to speculation of the money markets, accordingly, exchange rates 
are not considered to be best to compare countries' standards of living. 
In this study, therefore, PPPs are used to compare expenditure and the value of benefits 
in Korea with other countries. The PPPs used here have been developed by the OECD 
(2001c and 2006). Most of the analysis in the study will be based on a comparison using 
£ sterling purchasing power parities. Table A. 1 in the appendices provides a comparison 
of PPPs and exchange rates in 2001 - the year in which the cross-national analysis of 
benefit levels in this study relates to the situation. 
There are, however, some limitations. PPPs are mainly used for aggregate data and are 
calculated for each country on the basis of the consumption patterns of an average 
household. Thus the use of PPPs may be misleading in the case of low income 
households, who may well have different consumption patterns from the average (Edin 
and Lein, 1997; Kuivalainen, 2004). There are also difficulties in the construction of 
PPPs themselves and they are not always regarded as fully accurate and reliable 
(Eardley et al., 1996a). Previous studies on comparative social assistance have shown 
that the relationship between exchange rates and PPPs tend to vary between countries 
(Eardley et al., 1996a; Kuivalainen, 2004). For the majority of the countries considered 
in this study, PPPs give a lower conversion to the $ than exchange rates, with the only 
exception of Japan (see Appendix Table A. 1). There are countries with big differences 
(over 30 per cent) between the exchange rates and the PPPs: Korea and Portugal. 
Therefore, although PPPs are considered as the most useful way of comparing the 
monetary values of benefit packages between the countries in this study, they should be 
taken as indicators of relative benefit levels rather than exact measures. PPPs have been 
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used here, yet the exchange rate calculation would have given different results. 
3.3 Using micro-data 
The third comparison is done between recipients and non-recipients using micro-data 
from the National Basic Livelihood Security Scheme Review Board (NRB). The NRB 
data were originally designed for the study of `Reform Measure of National Basic 
Livelihood Security Scheme', which was initially commissioned in 2001 by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. The survey for the NRB data was carried out in 2001 
by the NRB, consisting of a group of independent researchers in social policy and 
economics from universities and research institutes. The central aim of the study was to 
investigate the problems with which the new social assistance programme NBLS, put 
into effect from 2000 is confronted and to develop the scheme. 19 The NRB dataset 
provides information on NBLS recipients and those who were disqualified from social 
assistance provision by eligibility criteria. Using the micro-data, the characteristics and 
determinants of being in poverty between recipients and non-recipients are assessed in 
order to explore whether there are differences or similarities between the two groups 
with low-income and to seek adequate anti-poverty measures for both. 
The NRB data are also used to analyse the effectiveness of social assistance in Korea on 
poverty reduction. The data allow a detailed assessment of the income position of 
recipient households and actual outcomes. To obtain a comparative perspective, the 
effectiveness of social assistance in Britain on poverty alleviation is assessed on the 
basis of the Family Resources Survey of Great Britain (FRS). There are two reasons to 
19 For a more detailed description of the NRB data, see Chapter 7 and Appendix C. 
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choose Britain as a counterpart. First, Britain is a mature social assistance country. 
Britain has a long tradition of poor relief and social assistance provision and means- 
tested benefits play a very important role in the social security system. The second 
reason is not an academic one but a practical one. The author could access a good 
dataset for Britain, i. e. FRS, while doing this research in the UK. FRS is a good survey 
dataset containing detailed information on socio-demographic characteristics and 
incomes of private households in Great Britain. The incidence and the intensity of 
poverty for a range of household types are analysed before and after social assistance 
benefits for both countries in the last two chapters of the study. 
While the FRS database is a continuous cross-sectional survey with a rich sample, the 
NRB database is a one-time survey conducted in 2001, when only after a year of the 
implementation of the new general assistance in Korea. The NRB data were, in fact, the 
only one available at the time of starting this research for assessing the performance of 
the Korean scheme. This study thus focuses only on the direct impact of social 
assistance in the two countries on poverty, and does not consider trends over time, long- 
term effects or side effect. 
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Chapter 4 Patterns and trends in the extent and salience of social 
assistance 
In this chapter, the extent and salience of social assistance in Korea are analysed. This 
chapter scrutinizes data on expenditure on, and recipients of, the previous and current 
social assistance schemes in order to examine whether or not there has been any 
significant improvement or differences within Korean social assistance. The Korean 
schemes are also compared with those in other OECD countries, mainly focusing on 
general assistance, in order to obtain comparative perspectives on the newly established 
general assistance scheme in Korea. First, the chapter begins with the background to 
current social assistance in Korea, i. e. demographic and socio-economic context, which 
are relevant for an understanding of the Korean social protection system, followed by 
brief information on the nature and structure of the social security system as a whole. 
4.1 Background to current social assistance in Korea 
4.1.1 Demographic context 
The Republic of Korea is a small, populous country. It's population in 2004 was 
estimated as 48 million and density at 474 people per square kilometre, amongst the 
world's densest population (NSO, 2005). In the last decades, Korea's population growth 
has fallen steadily from 1.57 per cent in 1977 to 0.84 per cent in 2000 and 0.49 per cent 
in 2004, and the fertility rate also decreased to 1.16 in 2004 from over five in the 1950s, 
in fact, the lowest birth rate among the members of the OECD (NSO, 2001a and 2005). 
The crude marriage rate (i. e. the annual number of registered marriages per 1,000 
population) has been declining since 1980 (6.4 per 1000 inhabitants in 2004), and the 
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number of divorces is rising rapidly to 2.9 per 1000 persons in 2004, from 0.6 in 1980 
(MOHW, 2005d). This decline in the marriage rate and the increase in the divorce rate 
can mainly be attributed to changes in attitudes towards marriage and divorce and living 
arrangements that have occurred since then. The country had far lower estimated 
percentage of lone parenthood (7 per cent in 2000) than European countries except 
Greece, but the prevalence of lone parents is similar to Japan and Israel (Bradshaw and 
Finch, 2002; NSO, 2005). 
Korea has the youngest population structure of all the OECD member countries after 
Mexico and Turkey (OECD, 2001 a). In 2004,19.6 per cent of the population was under 
15,71.7 per cent was aged 15 to 64, and just 8.7 per cent aged 65 or more (NSO, 2005). 
The ageing process is, however, among the most rapid in the OECD area. Indeed, as 
shown in Table 4.1, the proportion aged 65 and over is expected to increase to 37 per 
cent by 2050, and Korea's population, currently one of the youngest with a median age 
of 32 years in 2000, will be one of the oldest amongst the OECD countries in 50 years. 
Korea's elderly dependency ratio (i. e. the ratio of persons over 65 to those between aged 
20 and 64), which is the third lowest in the OECD in 2000, is also projected to be the 
sixth highest in 2050 (OECD, 2001a). The speed of population ageing reflects the social 
changes accompanied by rapid industrialisation, as well as an active population policy 
to reduce fertility rate during the previous developmental era. 
A strong tradition of family care and support for elderly parents has changed slowly 
over the past decades. Korea's rapid industrialisation has weakened the traditional 
pattern of family support. The percentage of households containing three generations 
has fallen slowly from 17.8 per cent in 1980 to 9.9 per cent in 2000 (NSO, 2001a). The 
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Table 4.1 Indicators of ageing populations in Korea and selected large economies 
Share of population 65+ Median age 
2000 2050 2000 2050 
Canada 12.6 25.6 36.9 45.2 
China 6.8 23.6 30.1 44.8 
France 16.3 27.1 38.0 45.5 
Germany 16.4 28.4 40.0 47.4 
Italy 18.2 35.5 40.3 52.5 
Japan 17.2 35.9 41.3 52.3 
Korea 7.2 37.3 31.8 56.2 
UK 15.9 23.2 37.7 42.9 
us 12.3 20.6 35.3 41.1 
Source: Aderaa (2006); NSO (2005). 
proportion of the elderly not living with a child but living alone or only with a spouse more 
than doubled (to 47 per cent) between 1984 and 1998 (OECD, 2000a: 123). In spite of 
the weakening of family ties, however, support from children remains to be the most 
important source of income for the elderly, though the importance is getting weaker 
(OECD, 2000b). Table 4.2 shows that in terms of financial support, the proportion of 
elderly people supported by their children fell to 44 per cent in 1994 from 64 per cent in 
1988. By contrast, wage income, which is the second major income source for elderly 
people, has increased sharply in recent years - 38 per cent in 1994 from 26 per cent in 
1988. A study of nine OECD countries20 except Korea shows that four-fifths of the 
20 Including the following countries: Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. 
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income sources for the elderly on average are pensions (both public and private) (OECD, 
2001a: 83). Pensions are, however, a relatively unimportant income source for older 
people in Korea because the current public pension scheme, NP, has not fully matured 
yet - it does not begin paying regular pensions until 2008. 
Table 4.2 Income sources for the elderly in Korea, 1988 and 1994, percentage of total 
income 
1988 1994 
Pensions 1.2 3.9 
Wages 26.3 37.6 
Support from children 63.7 44.3 
Savings and wealth income 6.8 6.9 
Public assistance 1.8 3.5 
Other 0.2 3.8 
N 1,200 2,048 
Source: Rhee et al. (1988,1994). 
4.1.2 Socio-economic context 
One of the most impressive features of contemporary Korea is the remarkable economic 
performance since the early 1960s. From 1961 to 1997, Korea grew to become the 
world's 11th largest economy, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
exceeding US$10,000, and became the twenty-ninth member of the rich nations' club, 
the OECD. In fact, it recorded the highest economic growth rates over the three and a 
half decades - over eight per cent of economic growth, more than three times of the 
world average growth rate of 2.4 per cent between 1990 and 1998. 
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Compared to European countries, the issue of poverty had not been an important one in 
Korean society, due to the high economic growth, with relatively low-income 
inequality21 and full or nearly full employment combined with great employment 
stability (e. g. lifelong employment) (Jung, 2005: 2-3; Kim, 2005: 4). Indeed, the 
average unemployment rate was 3.2 per cent between 1977-1997 (NSO, 2001a), and the 
average Gini coefficient explaining domestic income inequality, which was calculated 
on the basis of urban household expenditures, was 0.29 between 1975-1995 (Park and 
Kim, 1998). 
Coinciding with this, the poverty rate for households based on the minimum living 
standards, which have customarily been accepted as an official poverty line in Korea 
and was about 40 per cent of the median income in 1996, was only 3.1 per cent of the 
total population of Korea (Figure 4.1). Moreover, according to the National Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey, the percentage of households living below the relative 
poverty line of 50 per cent of the median income in 1996 was 11 per cent (Park et al., 
2002). Thus it is generally agreed that the problem of absolute poverty had considerably 
21 According to national family income and expenditure surveys, income inequality in 
three East Asian countries, i. e. Korea, Japan and Taiwan, is about average amongst 
industrialised countries, and less severe than in Britain (Jacobs, 2000a). It is, however, a 
unique feature that the factor influencing the lower income inequality in the Asian 
countries is the relatively equal distribution of earnings between households, compared 
to social security in Britain, for example. 
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been resolved22, and the issue of relative poverty had yet to be addressed in Korean 
society. 
However, the Korean economy, which had been a model for economic development, 
was shocked by the economic crisis in December 1997 and bailed out by an emergency 
rescue loan from the IMF. Yet, as conditions for the emergency loan, the IMF requested 
the Korean government to carry out economic reforms and much of the structural 
reforms were undertaken from public sector (bureaucratic structure), financial sector 
and corporate governance to the labour market. The IMF demanded a high interest rate 
to stabilize the Korean currency and avoid capital flight, discourage consumption and 
firms' investment, and restrain inflation pressure (Kwon, S., 2001). While the high 
interest rate, 22 per cent at one point in 1998, increased savings, it also led to the 
bankruptcy of a great number of firms and banks23, most of which were small and 
medium-size ones. Traditionally Korean firms had maintained a high-debt-equity ratio, 
relying on bank loans (Wade, 1988). This made the Korean firms vulnerable to the 
abrupt rise in interest rate (Kwon, S., 2001; Kwon, H., 2001a). 
With regard to the labour market reform, its main purpose was to increase labour market 
flexibility. A tripartite commission, the Employees-Employers-Government Committee, 
was launched in January 1998 for the purpose of reaching major issues on labour and 
22 The problem of absolute poverty was believed to have been reduced to an 
insignificant minimum affecting only a small proportion of vulnerable groups, such as 
older people and disabled people (Ku, 2004). 
23 The number of banks decreased from 29 in 1997 to 20 in 1999 and 17 in 2001 (Park 
et al., 2003). 
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signed a total of 90 agreements. The agreements include structural adjustments that 
allow firms to lay off workers easily due to financial or managerial difficulties with 
some conditions and procedures for employment adjustments. They also include 
unemployment policies, expansion of social security programmes, and improvement of 
fundamental rights of workers and working conditions. 
The outbreak of the economic crisis was followed by a contraction of the economy by 
6.7 per cent in 1998, which meant an 11.7 per cent contraction from the positive 5 per 
cent for 1997. Consequently, per capita gross national income (GNI), which mirrors real 
purchasing power, fell from US$ 10,307 in 1997 to US$ 6,723 in 1998 (BOK, 2000). It 
is acknowledged that this severe recession resulted from the universal action taken in 
accordance with the prescription of the IMF, which requested high interest rates 
artificially set to stop capital flight from the country, and significant cuts in government 
expenditures (Kwon, H., 2001a, 2003; Kwon, S., 2001; Mathews, 1998). 
The economic crisis, in particular, the labour market reform has had a great social 
impact on Korea. First of all, the country that since industrialisation had been used to 
full employment was faced with high unemployment. A huge number of firms went into 
the bankruptcy due to the high interest rate, as stated above, and this resulted in huge 
unemployment. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the unemployment rate as measured by the 
NSO using the standard ILO definition, jumped to 8.6 per cent in February 1999 from 
2.6 per cent in 1997, with the number of jobless people counted at 1.8 million. With 
regard to the composition of the unemployed, in particular, middle-aged people had an 
increased risk of becoming unemployed. There was more than a doubling in the number 
of the unemployed among all age groups between 35 and 59. In particular, those aged 
45-49 expanded more than threefold between 1997 and 1998 (NSO, 1998). This figure 
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suggests that the people of this age group were the main targets of structural adjustment 
in the labour market in the name of improving labour flexibility (Shin, 2000: 91). 
Considering that these middle-aged people are the main breadwinners in households, 
social stress would he much higher than the figure suggests. 
Second. the economic crisis in the late I 990s had an important role in provoking public 
awareness of the poverty problem. As Figure 4.1 shows, as a result of' the economic 
crisis, the poverty rate based on the minimum living standards. which was just bclovv 40 
per cent of the median income in 2000, soared dramatically to 9.4 per cent in 2000 -- 
more than a three told increase than that in 1996. The poverty rate for households 
based on 50 per cent of the median income in 2000 also increased rapidly to 15.8 per 
cent from 11 per cent in 1996 (Park et al., 2002). 
Figure 4.1 Trends in unemployment and poverty in Korea 
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Third, through the economic crisis, income distribution became more unequal. As can 
be seen in Table 4.3, the income share of the lowest decile groups decreased to 13.1 per 
cent in 1999 from 14.6 per cent in 1997. At the same time, the income share of the 
highest decile groups grew from 49.7 per cent in 1997 to 52.6 per cent in 1999. Income 
inequality for families measured by the Gini coefficient 24 also increased from 0.28 in 
1997 to 0.32 in 1999. 
Table 4.3 Income distribution in Korea (%), 1995-1999 
Ist-3rd 4th-7`h 8th-10`h Gini coefficient 
1995 14.7 35.3 49.8 0.284 
1996 14.3 35.3 50.4 0.291 
1997 14.6 35.8 49.7 0.283 
1998 13.2 34.6 52.1 0.316 
1999 13.1 34.3 52.6 0.320 
Source: NSO (2001a) 
The socio-economic conditions have been recovering quickly since their peak in 
February 1999. The economy regained positive economic growth in 1999. The poverty 
rate based on 40 per cent of median income decreased to 9.4 per cent in 2000 from 12.6 
in February 1999 (Figure 4.1). Unemployment was 4.1 per cent of the workforce in 
2000, while it was 8.6 per cent in February 1999. But they are still higher than the low 
points before 1997 when the 1997 economic crisis caused unemployment and poverty to 
24 It ranges from 0, which corresponds with perfect equality (where all households have 
the same income), to 1, which corresponds with perfect inequality (where one 
household has all the income, and the rest have zero income). 
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rise. The proportion of the unemployed who were out of work for one year or more 
decreased slightly to 2.5 per cent in 2002 from 3.9 per cent in 1996, while the 
unemployed out of work for less than three months consist of over half of the 
unemployed between 1996-2002 (NSO, 2005). Participation rates for men have fallen a 
bit after the 1997 financial crisis from 76.5 per cent at the peak in 1995 to 74.7 per cent 
in 2003 but remained stable around 75 per cent during the past two decades. The rates 
for women have risen slowly and steadily from 40.7 per cent in 1984 to 49 per cent in 
2003 (2005, NSO), but they are still low compared to European countries. 
4.1.3 Structure of the social security system 
The current social welfare system in Korea can be classified into three categories: four 
major social insurance schemes (National Health Insurance, National Pension, 
Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance), social 
assistance (NBLS scheme, Health Benefit, Veterans relief, Disaster relief), and social 
welfare services (for the elderly, the disabled, children, women, and people with mental 
illness etc. ). Most social welfare benefits are administered by the MOHW, except for the 
Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, which come 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour. Other government ministries are also 
involved in the social security system in some areas. The main social security benefits 
are as follows: 
National Health Insurance 
National Health Insurance (NHI) provides only healthcare, not cash benefits. 
Contributions are shared between employers and employees; each pays 2.5 per cent of 
the contributions, and the self-employed and the state (together with the NHI Fund) 
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each pays 2.5 per cent in 2006. The NHI scheme started with large-scale companies 
(workplaces with more than 500 regular employees) first, then public employees and 
private school teachers, and it became universal from 1989. Under the new integrated 
health insurance system, single contribution rates are applied nationwide and the same 
kinds of benefits are provided, thereby increasing the equity of health insurance 
contributions. Although the health insurance has been able to cover the entire population 
since 1989 and all health societies have been merged into a single insurer system, 
however, patients still directly paid 44 per cent of their total medical costs (15 per cent 
of insured medical care and 29 per cent of uninsured services) in 1999 (Kwon, S., 2001). 
This reflects not only the high co-payment rates of the patient, deriving from the low 
contribution of less than 3 per cent of income, but also the low level of state subsidies in 
the health insurance system (Shin, 2000: 87). 
The Health Assistance Act was prepared to provide healthcare services to the poor who 
were excluded from health insurance coverage, on the other hand. Thus individuals not 
covered by the NHI have free access to the Health Benefit. Those who are entitled to 
general social assistance, i. e. NBLS scheme, are automatically entitled to the Health 
Benefit, which is also provided to other clients, such as veterans, traditional artists and 
craftsmen, refugees from North Korea, and disaster victims (OECD, 2000a: 155). In 
2004, the total number of individuals, including children, receiving the Health Benefit 
was 1.5 million, representing 3.2 per cent of the whole population. NBLS recipients 
made up 88 per cent of total Health Benefit recipients, and others such as veterans and 
disaster victims represented 12 per cent (MOHW, 2005d). 
National Pension Scheme 
To supplement private sources of support for the elderly, the government established the 
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National Pension (NP) scheme in 1988 for firms with more than ten employees, which 
has both elements of a basic pension and an earnings-related pension. In the wake of the 
economic crisis, some important changes have been made. In 1999, the pension 
insurance was expanded to cover the urban self-employed, firms with less than five 
employees, temporary workers, and daily workers, who were previously excluded. The 
current NP scheme has not fully matured yet, since it does not begin paying regular 
pensions until 2008, as mentioned above. The NP scheme has been suffering from 
financial instability (Kwon, 2001; Lee, 2004; OECD, 2000a). It is thus projected that 
the contribution rate for the scheme will have to rise from the current 9 per cent 
(financed equally from employer and employee, and the self employed pay 9 per cent of 
income), to over 17 per cent during the next few decades. The replacement rate has been 
reduced from 70 per cent to 60 per cent, with forty years of contributions. Thus a 
pension equals to 60 per cent of his or her average lifetime wage. The pension age will 
be increased from current 60 to 65 from 2013 by one year every five years, while the 
minimum contributing period for old age pension was cut from 15 to ten years. The 
fund of the public occupational pension schemes for civil servants, the military and 
private school teachers are already exhausted, and liabilities are largely out of the 
government account (OECD, 2000a: 124). 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance 
At the beginning, Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (IACI) covered people in 
workplaces of 500 or more regular employees, and was gradually expanded to 
workplaces with 200 employees in 1970,16 in 1974 and less than five in 2000. While 
the number of people covered has increased gradually, reaching 45 per cent of all 
employed people in 2003 from 38 per cent in 1998 and 1.9 per cent in 1965 (MOHW, 
2005d; NSO, 2005), the majority of irregular workers are still excluded from the IACI. 
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The IACI Fund is financed solely by contributions from employers. Contributions are 
related to safety records in such a way that employers in accident-prone workplaces 
have to pay larger contributions than those with better safety records. There is no state 
subsidy to help finance the insurance. Injured workers can claim compensation from the 
fund if an accident either happens in the process of work or is related to work. 
Employment Insurance programme 
Employment Insurance (EI) programme, which is the latest social insurance programme, 
was motivated by the necessity for an active labour market policy to help the structural 
adjustment effort in the labour market, resulting from the economic deterioration and 
soaring unemployment after the 1997 economic crisis (Lee, 1999b and 2004). Therefore 
it clearly emphasised its prioritised function of the active labour market policy such as 
job training, education and placement over and above the income support by insurance- 
based unemployment compensation for the unemployed. The EI is based on four 
components: the Employment Stabilization Scheme to subsidise for temporary lay-offs, 
redeployment and new hiring, and to promote the employment of disadvantaged groups 
such as laid-off workers, women and older workers; Employment Development Scheme 
to provide education and job training for the unemployed; Maternity Protection Scheme 
to provide maternity leave and childcare allowance; Unemployment Benefit to provide 
income support to job-losers. The employment stabilization scheme and the 
employment development scheme aim to protect job security and to enhance job 
capability of job-losers, while the unemployment benefit focuses on smoothing out the 
social impacts caused by mass lay-offs and providing income support for the laid-off 
workers (Yi and Lee, 2005). In 2005, the contribution rate for the unemployment benefit 
is 0.9 per cent of monthly wage (financed equally from employers and employees), and 
that for the employment stabilization scheme and employment development scheme 
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varies in scale of establishments from 0.25 to 0.85 per cent (financed from employers 
only). 
The entitlement conditions for the unemployment benefit were relaxed. From 2000, the 
insured period was reduced to 180 days out of an 18 months base period prior to the day 
of job loss, from 12 months out of the 18 months base period. The duration of benefits 
is currently 90 to 240 days, depending on employment history, age and length of the 
insured period. The amount of benefits is 50 per cent of the previous wage, subject to a 
minimum level of 90 per cent (previously 70 per cent) of the minimum wage. After the 
economic crisis of 1997, the number of beneficiaries covered by the unemployment 
benefits rose sharply to 175 thousand in 2004 from 10 thousand in 1997. Despite the 
expansion of the unemployment benefit coverage, only 21.5 per cent of the unemployed 
were receiving unemployment benefits in 2004 (HRD, 2005). There are two main 
reasons for this. First, it is mainly because the EI programme did not cover all non- 
regular workers. According to the NSO (2002a), it covered only 3.8 per cent of daily 
workers and 24.4 per cent of temporary employees, very low rates compared with 
regular workers (79.4 per cent). Second, it is partly due to a low level of take-up derived 
from restrictions on the entitlement to unemployment benefits. Those who quit their job 
voluntarily are not entitled to receive the unemployment benefits. To qualify the 
claimants should have justifiable reasons, such as economic restructuring, lay-off for 
managerial reasons, business closure, bankruptcy, early retirement or termination of 
their employment contract. Only about 30 per cent of unemployed people met the 
entitlement conditions in 2002 (Yi and Lee, 2005: 158). 
In 2004, the majority of EI expenditure was spent for unemployment benefits - it 
represented 68 per cent of total expenditure on EI, while the employment development 
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scheme, employment stabilization scheme and maternity protection scheme represented 
24.5 per cent, 4.5 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively (HRD, 2005). The number of 
people covered by it increased considerably to 34 per cent of total employees in 2004 
from 20 per cent in 1997 (HRD, 2005; NSO, 2005) but the coverage rate is still low. In 
1998, the EI coverage was expanded to all workplaces including temporary or part-time 
workers but a great number of daily workers are still excluded. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the expansion of coverage of the programme, a relatively small 
proportion of the working population is insured by the EI. 
In addition to the main social insurance schemes mentioned above, non-state sectors, in 
particular, strong familial traditions and enterprise welfare programmes play an 
important role in Korean social welfare (Hong and Song, 2006; Kim, 2005; OECD, 
2000a; Shin, 2000). Since the 1980s, corporate welfare rapidly expanded by internal and 
external pressure on business organisations. The corporate sector provides social 
benefits, such as mandatory severance payments for job leavers and retirees, paid 
maternity leave and child allowances. In particular, the legal severance payments 
provided by employers represented 94 per cent of total (both public and private) 
spending on unemployment compensation in 2001 (Kho et al., 2003). However, those 
social benefits cover mainly regular workers and a significant number of temporary or 
daily workers are excluded. 
As can be seen in Table 4.4, almost half of total social protection expenditure in 2001 
was devoted to social insurance schemes, while the expenditure of the corporate sector 
took up 29 per cent, with social services taking up 14 per cent, and social assistance 11 
per cent. As stated above, social insurance schemes are largely financed by employer 
and employee contributions. The government pays only about 20 per cent of the 
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contributions to the pension and health insurance schemes (OECD, 2000a) and there is 
no state subsidy for the accident compensation and unemployment insurance 
programmes. This welfare mix structure shows the characteristics of the Korean welfare 
regime, largely depending on social insurance schemes and placing the burden on the 
corporate sector and family, with relatively small commitment from the state, though the 
state has expanded its role both as a provider and regulator since the 1997 economic 
crisis (Lee, 1999b; Kim, 2005). Thus given the limited coverage of social insurance 
schemes and of the unemployment benefit for the unemployed with a contribution 
record, Korea seems to need a more comprehensive social assistance scheme for the 
unemployed poor. 
Table 4.4 Total social expenditure in Korea by category of social welfare system, 1990- 
2001 (billion won) 
1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Social insurance 3,687 10,973 12,865 18,202 22,929 18,820 21,808 
Social assistance 861 1,780 2,077 2,521 3,353 3,810 5,265 
Welfare services 1,103 3,578 4,446 5,799 7,090 6,657 6,701 
Company welfare 1,797 5,742 9,786 21,622 13,636 18,090 13,874 
Total expenditure (a) 7,591 22,142 29,270 48,629 47,179 47,648 47,995 
(a)/GDP (1/6) 4.25 5.29 6.46 10.86 9.77 9.13 8.70 
Note: 
1. Social assistance includes LP/NBLS, Health Benefit, disaster and veterans relief, and facility care services for vagabonds. 
2. Company welfare includes mandatory severance payments for job leavers and retirees, and paid maternity and sick 
leave. 
Source: Kho et al. (2003). 
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Table 4.5 shows public and private social expenditure on the social security system in 
Korea in comparison with other countries. Korea's spending on social protection has 
traditionally been low. As can be seen in the table, total social expenditure represented 
only 8.7 per cent of GDP in 2001 (public social expenditure amounted to 6.1 per cent of 
GDP, while mandatory private social expenditure amounted to 2.6 per cent of GDP). 
In fact, total social expenditure rose sharply from 4.3 per cent in 1990 and 5.3 per cent 
in 1996 just before the economic crisis to 10.9 per cent in 1998, in order to resolve the 
problem of the soaring unemployment and poverty. As indicated above, the 
unemployment benefit under the Employment Insurance increased rapidly, the National 
Pension, as well as the National Health Insurance administration system became 
universal, and of particular importance was the establishment of a new general social 
assistance scheme the NBLS, which replaced previous categorical assistance. Thus 
public social expenditure rose rapidly to 6 per cent in 1998 from just 3.2 per cent in 
1990. On the other hand, mandatory private social expenditure also increased sharply to 
4.9 per cent in 1998 from 1.1 per cent in 1990. It was due to the massive increase in the 
expenditure of the corporate sector - largely the increase in mandatory severance pay- 
offs. 
Despite of the rapid increase in State and enterprise welfare benefits since 1997, Korea's 
social protection expenditure as a share of GDP in 1998,10.9 per cent, was less than 
half the OECD-28 average of 21 per cent in 1998, and even after 1998, it remains at the 
lowest level among the OECD member nations as shown in Table 4.5. The low level of 
social expenditure in Korea partly reflects the relatively recent development of the 
social insurance schemes (Kho et al., 2003; OECD, 2000a). As mentioned above, the 
health insurance scheme was introduced in 1977 followed by the public pension in 1988 
and the unemployment insurance in 1995. Even though the non-State sectors such as 
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Table 4.5 Total social expenditures in selected OECD countries 1990-2001, percentage 
of GDP 
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Australia 14.4 18.1 18.3 18.7 18.9 18.5 19.5 18.9 
Czech Republic 17.0 18.9 18.8 19.7 19.5 19.8 20.3 20.1 
Finland 25.7 32.3 32.1 29.8 27.6 26.2 24.6 24.9 
Germany 22.5 29.1 30.3 29.7 29.2 28.7 28.5 28.8 
Ireland 19.0 19.6 18.5 17.2 15.8 14.2 13.6 13.8 
Japan 11.0 13.7 14.2 14.6 15.0 15.5 16.6 17.5 
Korea 4.3 5.0 5.3 6.5 10.9 9.8 9.1 8.7 
Mexico 3.8 8.1 8.0 8.8 8.8 9.0 9.9 11.8 
Netherlands 28.0 26.2 25.1 24.7 23.8 23.3 22.5 22.5 
Portugal 14.1 18.4 19.5 19.3 19.5 20.1 20.9 21.5 
Sweden 30.8 33.5 33.0 31.6 31.6 31.1 30.1 30.4 
Turkey 7.6 7.5 9.7 10.8 11.1 13.2 - - 
United Kingdom 19.8 23.3 23.2 22.4 21.9 21.7 22.2 22.3 
United States 13.9 15.9 15.6 15.3 14.8 14.6 14.6 15.1 
Source: OECD (2004b). 
family, enterprise and NGOs have been an important provider of social benefits in 
Korea, their vitality and impact have been getting weaker as market purchases are 
vulnerable to the economic conditions and the supportive role of the extended family 
has weakened, as stated above. Thus, when the frailty of non-State sectors is considered 
in the long-term, an even greater role of the State (both as a provider and regulator) in 
social protection seems inevitable. While, when it is considered that the National 
Pension scheme is fully matured in 2008 and a long-term care insurance scheme is 
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projected to put into effect from 2008, the possibility of the change in the structure of 
the welfare mix in Korea cannot be denied in the long term (Kim, 2005). 
Korea spent 37 per cent of total social expenditure on health in 2001, while 29 per cent 
was devoted to unemployment compensation (largely severance payments provided by 
employers), 14 per cent to old-age, and 7 per cent to incapacity-related benefits (Kho et 
al., 2003; OECD, 2004b). By contrast, spending on family25, social assistance and active 
labour market programmes are relatively low, while in response to the 1997 economic 
crisis, spending on social assistance26 increased from 2.6 per cent of total social 
expenditure in 1997 to 5.4 per cent in 2001 and that on active labour market 
programmes rose from 1.3 per cent in 1997 to 3.4 per cent in 2001. 
4.2 Patterns and trends in social assistance in Korea 
4.2.1 Expenditure on social assistance 
Table 4.6 shows trends in estimated spending on the main social assistance schemes in 
Korea - previous categorical assistance LP and current general assistance NBLS27 - as 
a share of total social expenditure and GDP between 1985 and 2004. As can be seen in 
25 Between 1997 and 2001, expenditure on family remained at 1.8 per cent of total 
social expenditure. 
26 Social assistance is represented by `other social policy areas' in the OECD social 
expenditure database (SOCX). This includes LP/NBLS, disaster relief and facility care 
services for vagabonds, but excludes Health Benefit and veterans relief. 
27 The NBLS replaced the LP in 2000. 
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the first and second columns of the table, both LP/NBLS expenditure and total social 
expenditure increased steadily in cash terms over this period. Until the outbreak of 1997 
economic crisis, social assistance expenditure as a share of total social expenditure, shown 
Table 4.6 Expenditure on Livelihood Protection /National Basic Livelihood Security, 
1985-2004, (annual prices/per cent) 
[A] [B] [A] [A] 
Expenditure on Total social as a percentage of as a percentage of 
Year 
LP/NBLSS' expenditure [B] GDP 
Won (billions) Won (billions) 
1985 148 0.2 
1990 386 7,537 5.1 0.2 
1991 438 8,643 5.1 0.2 
1992 463 10,707 4.3 0.2 
1993 488 12,368 3.9 0.2 
1994 539 15,077 3.6 0.1 
1995 574 18,960 3.0 0.2 
1996 713 22,000 3.2 0.2 
1997 926 29,085 3.2 0.2 
1998 1,121 48,142 2.3 0.3 
1999 1,848 47,168 3.9 0.4 
2000 2,332 47,648 4.9 0.5 
2001 3,243 48,002- 6.8 0.6 
2002 3,383 - 0.6 
2003 3,506 - - 0.6 
2004 3,912 - 0.6 
Notes: 
1. LP became NBLS in 2000. 
2. Using purchasing power parities for 2004, f 1= W 1,242.5. 
Source: Author's calculation from the MOIIW (2002a, 2005d); NSO (2002b); Moon (2003); OECD (2004b). 
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in column 3, decreased steadily from 5.1 per cent in 1985 to 2.3 per cent in 1998, owing 
to the high economic performances and low levels of unemployment and poverty. 
However, after 1998 it increased sharply to 6.8 per cent in 2001 as the new general 
assistance scheme NBLS was implemented in order to cope with the dramatic upturn in 
unemployment and poverty. While expenditure for social assistance as a percentage of 
GDP, presented in column 5, remained stable at only 0.2 between 1985 and 1997, but 
after the crisis it rose steadily up to 0.6 per cent in 2001 and afterwards presents a static 
trend. Total expenditure on social assistance in 2004 was 3,912 billion won, equivalent 
to around £315 million. 
Under the present NBLS scheme, the following seven different types of benefits can be 
provided for NBLS recipients: Livelihood Benefit, Housing Benefit, Educational 
Benefit, Health Benefit, Maternity Benefit, Funeral Benefit, and Self-Reliance Benefit. 
Of theses, the Livelihood Benefit is a main cash benefit, which is provided to all NBLS 
recipients. The Housing Benefit, which was newly introduced in the NBLS scheme, is 
another cash benefit, which is provided together with the Livelihood Benefit only for 
NBLS recipients. The other benefits are in-kind benefits that are provided according to 
the needs of the recipient. Table 4.7 gives a breakdown of expenditure on LP/NBLS 
between 1998 and 2003, by benefit type. This shows the Health and Livelihood/Housing 
benefits are the most important components of LP/NBLS. In particular, the role of the 
Health Benefit (free access to medical services) within the NBLS scheme is getting 
large - expenditure for the Health Benefit as a share of total LP/NBLS expenditure 
increased to 50 per cent in 2003 from 44 per cent in 1999, while that for the Livelihood 
and Housing Benefits as a proportion of total LP/NBLS expenditure declined to 42.5 
per cent in 2003 from 45.4 per cent in 1999. 
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Table 4.7 LP/NBLS expenditure by type of benefit, 1998-2003 (billion won) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Livelihood + Housing Benefits 448 839 1,114 1,461 1,443 1,492 
Health Benefit 600 810 1,032 1,590 1,690 1,762 
Educational Benefit 65 91 99 120 107 94 
Maternity + Funeral Benefits 5 7 9 7 7 9 
Self-reliance Benefit 3 101 78 92 149 149 
Total expenditure on LP/NBLS 1,121 1,848 2,332 3,270 3,396 3,506 
Note: 
1. Housing Benefit was newly established in 2000. 
2. Using purchasing power parities for 2003, it =W1,250.4. 
Source: MOHW (2005d); Moon (2003); Yeo et at. (2004). 
4.2.2 Recipients of social assistance 
Table 4.8 shows trends in beneficiaries of previous categorical assistance LP and current 
general assistance NBLS between 1981 and 2004, both in absolute and relative terms. 
With the low rates of unemployment and poverty, Korea had a decreasing population of 
recipients of the LP up to 1997, and since 1998 the number of recipients remained 
constant at around three per cent of the total population. It is however notable that 
although the expenditure on social assistance has risen steadily after 1997, as shown in 
Table 4.6, with the mass unemployment and poverty and the establishment of general 
assistance, there was little expansion in the total number of LP/NBLS recipients: 
compared to the previous LP of which coverage was 3.1 per cent of the whole 
population in 1997, the total number of individuals receiving the NBLS benefits was 
nearly same - three per cent of the population in 2004, equivalent to 1.42 million people. 
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These trends point out social assistance provision in Korea has been targeted more on 
those most in need on the one hand, and the level of the NBLS benefits provided has 
increased to some extent than the previous LP benefits on the other. Discussion of 
benefit levels is held over to Chapter 6. 
Table 4.8 Number of LP/NBLS recipients (thousands/per cent) 
Year 
Total recipients [A] Cash assistance 
recipients 
[A] as a percentage of 
total population 
1981 2,090 n/a 5.4 
1990 2,256 n/a 5.3 
1992 2,176 421 5.0 
1993 2,001 421 4.5 
1994 1,902 401 4.3 
1995 1,754 385 3.9 
1996 1,506 372 3.3 
1997 1,413 373 3.1 
1998 1,175 440 2.5 
1999 1,175 540 2.5 
2000 1,490 1,490 3.2 
2001 1,420 1,420 3.0 
2002 1,351 1,351 2.8 
2003 1,374 1,374 2.8 
2004 1,424 1,424 3.0 
Source: MOHW (2002a);. Moon (2003); NSO (2005). 
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While the total number of beneficiaries did not increase greatly over the period, 
recipients of cash benefits, including the Livelihood and Housing Benefits grew 
considerably from 372 thousands in 1996 to 1,490 thousands in 2000, slight decrease to 
1,374 thousands in 2003. Nevertheless, a sizeable proportion of poor people seem not to 
be covered by social assistance. For example, the poverty rate based on the minimum 
living standard, which is the customarily accepted official poverty line in Korea28, in 2003 
was 11.6 per cent (Yeo et al., 2005). However, as Table 4.8 shows, only 2.8 per cent of 
the population in 2003 is covered by the NBLS scheme. This means coverage of the 
NBLS is limited to about 24 per cent of the poverty population in 2003 - the remaining 
76 per cent (about four million people) seem to be excluded from general social 
assistance, even though their earnings fall short of the poverty line. Thus the low 
coverage of the new general assistance scheme NBLS has been criticised by 
commentators (Kim, 2003; Huh, 2003; Jung, 2005; Lee, 1999b; NRB, 2001; OECD, 
2000a; Park, 2002; Shin, 2000; Yeo et al., 2004). 
In terms of the low coverage rates and low levels of spending on general assistance, 
there are two continuing policy debates on social assistance in Korea - avoidance of 
dependency on the State and the low levels of expenditure on the social security system. 
In fact, as discussed in the literature review chapter, the policy idea of avoiding welfare 
dependency was ironically dominating the policy-making process in Korea during the 
past developmental period, which placed almost exclusive emphasis on economic 
development, while using social policy as an instrument for economic growth. As a 
result of this policy idea, most people had to find substantial security measures in 
28 It was about 40 per cent of the median income. While the poverty rate based on 50 
per cent of the median income in 2003 was 15.5 per cent. 
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private sectors, such as wider concepts of family obligation, enterprise and commercial 
sectors (Shin, 2000: 89). But the legacy of the authoritarian regimes still seems to 
remain even under the new democratic governments. The idea is apparently proved 
from the low levels of social and public expenditure on the social security programmes, 
as shown above, while the levels have rapidly increased since the 1997 economic crisis. 
The governments and the MOHW have always taken into account budget constraints on 
expenditure on social security, including social assistance. Eligibility criteria for the 
NBLS are, thus, very strict and complicated in order to minimize the budget and the 
number of recipients (OECD, 2000a; Yeo et al., 2004: 172). The conditions of eligibility 
and entitlement are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Table 4.9 gives a breakdown of LP/NBLS recipients by the main forms of benefit 
between 1998 and 2003. It can also be seen here that there is a big upturn in the 
numbers of recipients of main cash benefits, i. e. the Livelihood and Housing Benefits, 
before and after the establishment of the NBLS in 2000. In 1998, only 440 thousands 
(37 per cent of LP recipients) received the Livelihood Benefit (but there was no 
Housing Benefit available), but from 2000, cash benefits are provided to all NBLS 
recipients. It needs to be explained why this change has been made. Under the previous 
categorical assistance scheme (LP), there were two types of recipients: livelihood aid 
recipients who were unable to work due to, inter alia, disability and old age (i. e. over 
65); self-support care recipients who were capable of work. Income support to 
recipients who were considered unable to work (i. e. livelihood aid recipients) was more 
generous than payments to able-bodied recipients (i. e. self-support care recipients). 
Accordingly, livelihood aid clients received the Livelihood Benefit at 100 per cent of 
the standard benefit rates, while self-support care recipients had received only in-kind 
benefits including the Health Benefit until 1998, and in 1999 they received the 
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Livelihood Benefit at a reduced rate for at most six months only (OECD, 2000: 128- 
130; 141). The NBLS scheme abolished the classification, and from 2000 there is no 
difference in the level of income support provided between those able and unable to 
work, and the Livelihood and Housing Benefits are provided to all NBLS recipients. For 
these reasons, there was a sudden increase in the number of beneficiaries receiving cash 
benefits in 2000. 
Table 4.9 shows there is a considerable overlap in the receipt of benefits because under 
the NBLS scheme, not all types of benefits are provided to recipients, but they are 
provided according to the needs of the recipient. As stated above, the Livelihood 
Benefit together with the Housing Benefit is provided to 100 per cent of NBLS 
recipients since 2000.93 per cent of total NBLS recipients in 2002 received healthcare 
services provided by the Health Benefit. The Educational Benefit was provided to 12 
per cent of total recipients. While 23 per cent of total NBLS recipients in 2002 were those 
capable of work, only 15 per cent of NBLS recipients having ability to work received the 
Self-reliance Benefit. Discussion of the Self-reliance Benefit is held over to Chapter 5. 
Table 4.9 Recipients of LP/NBLS by main type of benefit, 1998-2003 (thousands) 
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Livelihood + Housing Benefits 440 1,490 1,420 1,351 1,374 
Health Benefit 1,132 1,401 1,335 1,253 1,276 
Educational Benefit 162 183 165 157 n/a 
Self-reliance Benefit -- 39 45 43 
Total LP/NBLS benefits 1,175 1,490 1,420 1,351 1,374 
Note: Housing Benefit was newly established in 2000. 
Source: MOHW (2002a, 2005d); NSO (2005); Yeo et al. (2004). 
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Table 4.10 gives a breakdown of recipients of NBLS in 2004, by age group. The figures 
presented here include children living together. As can be seen in the table, those aged 
less than 18 and 65 years and over formed the two largest age groups of beneficiaries in 
2004. These groups represented over half the total recipient population (51 per cent), 
while those aged 18 to 64 represented 49 per cent. In addition, 73 per cent of the NBLS 
recipients were those unable to work because of old age (46 per cent), illness or 
disability (44 per cent) and other reasons (10 per cent) (MOHW, 2002c), while those 
capable of work made up 27 per cent, whose 16.3 per cent were unemployed people, 74 
per cent were people with low-income and 9.7 per cent were others. Thus unlike in most 
OECD countries, the unemployed are not yet a major category - represented only 4.4 
per cent of all the recipient households in Korea. This is partly because of the low level 
of unemployment - 3.7 per cent in 2004 (NSO, 2005). However, the unemployment rate 
among those aged 15 to 29 has expanded steadily from 4.6 per cent in 1996 to 8.2 per 
cent in 2004. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 4.10, young adults (30 years and under) 
represented one of the smallest groups of social assistance recipients. These reflect the 
fact that the new general assistance scheme NBLS still tends to substantially focus on 
the previous demographic condition, i. e. under 18 and 65 and more and those unable to 
work, although benefits are awarded as a right under the new scheme. It thus seems that 
many poor people who are young and have working ability are being excluded from the 
NBLS, due to the strict eligibility criteria, mentioned above (Yeo., 2004: 174). 
Table 4.10 Recipients of LP/NBLS by age group, 2004 (per cent) 
Under 18 years 18-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years 51-64 years 65 years and over Total 
24.7 9.6 9.3 15.8 14.2 26.3 100 
Source: NSO (2005). 
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Table 4.11 shows a breakdown of the recipient population in 2004, by categories. Older 
people households (aged 60 and over) are again the largest clientele in receipt of NBLS 
- 32 per cent of total recipient households. Households headed by a lone parent make 
up 12 per cent, and households with disabled people represent 16 per cent. The high 
proportion of elderly recipients is expected to be lower to some extent from 2008 when 
the NP scheme starts to pay regular pensions. Lone parents do not form a large group of 
social assistance recipients yet, compared to other OECD countries. It is because the 
lone parent population is relatively small in Korea, as mentioned in the section on the 
demographic context of this chapter, while the proportion of this group has risen 
steadily. 
Table 4.11 Covered households of NBLS, by categories, 2004 (thousands/per cent) 
Aged 60 Lone parents Disabled Household headed Others Total 
Or over by young people' 
Number 240 89 123 15 286 753 
Per cent 32.0 11.8 16.3 2.0 37.9 100 
Note: *Young people aged 18 or under. 
Source: MOHW (2005e). 
Like in many EU countries, poverty and social assistance are gendered in Korea. In 
2000, female-headed households represented 18.5 per cent of total households, while 
male-headed households represented 81.5 per cent (NSO, 2005). The poverty rate for 
female-headed households in 2000, based on the minimum living standards was 17 per 
cent; in contrast that for households headed by male was 6 per cent (KWDI, 2003). 
Women are also more dependent upon social assistance than men in Korea - 58 per cent 
of all beneficiaries were women in 2001. This seems to be partly because the average 
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span of women is 6.95 year longer than men (MOHW, 2005e). Lone mothers 
represented 79.8 per cent of total lone parents in receipt of general assistance benefits, 
because of fast growing divorce rate as a percentage of marriage. 29 
In terms of the numbers of household member of recipient households, one person 
households represented over half the total recipient households (56.6 per cent), and two 
and three person households were 20.2 and 13.4 per cent respectively in 2004 (MOHW, 
2005e), while the number of average household members in 2000 was 3.1 persons 
(NSO, 2005). 
4.3 International comparison 
In this section, the NBLS scheme is compared with seven countries (excluding Portugal 
due to the lack of comparable data) to obtain a comparative perspective. Table 4.12 
presents estimates of spending on general social assistance in 2000 as a share of total 
social expenditure in Korea and other OECD countries. It shows the importance and 
extent of social assistance in the context of total national welfare arrangements. The 
extent of social assistance in terms of spending on social assistance is highest in Korea, 
where spends the lowest level of expenditure on social support amongst the selected 
countries. The UK also joins the group, where the role of means-tested income support 
is considerably larger than elsewhere. Those spending relatively low on social 
assistance (less than three per cent of total social expenditure) are composed of two 
29 Divorce rate as a share of marriage indicates total annual divorce cases divided by 
total annual marriage cases. The rate has risen rapidly to 44.8 per cent in 2004, from 
10.3 per cent in 1985 (NSO, 2005). 
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different sorts: the two Nordic countries that have universal benefits, and Ireland and 
Japan, where exhibit relatively low levels of spending on social protection. In between 
are found Germany and the Netherlands, where have comprehensive insurance-based 
welfare systems and spend relatively high level of expenditure on social protection. 
Table 4.12 Expenditure on general social assistance as a percentage of total social 
expenditure, 2000 
Total social expenditure as a percentage Social assistance expenditure as a 
of GDP percentage of total social expenditure 
Sweden 30.1 1.4 
Finland 24.6 1.3 
Germany 28.5 3.9 
Netherlands 22.5 3.5 
United Kingdom 22.2 5.0 
Ireland 13.6 2.0 
Japan' 17.5 2.3 
Korea* 8.7 6.8 
Note: *2001. 
Source: IPSS (2005); Kuivalainen (2004); MOHW (2005d); OECD (2004b). 
Table 4.13 shows trends in spending on social assistance as a share of total social 
expenditure between 1993 and 2000. Overall, country differences in social assistance 
expenditure as a share of total social expenditure narrowed over this period. The 
absolute change in social assistance spending as a proportion of total social expenditure 
since 1993 was highest in Korea (nearly three percentage points), followed by the 
Netherlands (1.5 percentage points). Proportionately, again it is Korea and the 
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Netherlands which have witnessed the most rapid growth of social assistance spending 
over the period. The rise in the share of social assistance expenditure in both countries 
is due to institutional changes: in Korea categorical assistance (LP) was withdrawn and 
replaced with general assistance (NBLS) in 2000, while in the Netherlands 
unemployment assistance (RWW) was replaced by general assistance (ABW) in 1996. 
Ireland is the only country, where the proportional share of social assistance expenditure 
rose steadily without a decrease over the period, while Germany is the only country, 
which registered a declining share without an increase. In the UK, since 1996, 
unemployed people are no longer entitled to Income Support but to Income-based 
Jobseekers' Allowance. As a result of the institutional change in the UK, expenditure on 
general assistance naturally decreased and that on categorical assistance increased 
(Kuivalainen, 2004: 100). Indeed, expenditure on general social assistance as a share of 
total social expenditure declined from 8.2 per cent in 1995 to 6.8 per cent in 1996, and 
afterwards it remained at 5 per cent. 
Table 4.13 Social assistance as a proportion of total social expenditure, 1993-2000 
Swe Fin Ger NL UK Ire Jap Kor 
1993 1.4 1.2 5.2 2.0 8.7 1.3 2.2 3.9 
1995 1.8 1.5 5.1 1.8 8.2 1.5 2.1 3.0 
1996 2.0 1.7 4.8 5.0 6.8 1.7 2.1 3.2 
1998 1.8 1.5 4.0 4.1 5.1 1.9 2.2 2.3 
2000 1.4 1.3 3.9 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.3+ 6.8' 
Index 100 108 74 175 57 154 105 174 
(1993=100) 
Note: '2001. 
Source: IPSS (2005), Kuivalainen (2004); MOIHW (2005d); OECD (2004b). 
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In Ireland and the UK, the importance of categorical assistance is larger than general 
assistance, particularly within the Irish welfare system. After the inclusion of 
categorical assistance, the share of total social assistance expenditure in Ireland is even 
higher than that in the UK (see Kuivalainen, 2004: 228-9). Thus if categorical assistance 
were to be included in the comparison of the extent of social assistance, more variations 
between the countries would be found. 
Table 4.14 shows trends in beneficiaries of social assistance as a proportion of the total 
population in each country since 1990. This provides a broad indication of the salience 
of social assistance in the different countries (Eardley et al., 1996a: 38). As discussed in 
the methodology chapter, comparable data on the number of social assistance recipients 
are highly problematic (see Eardley et at., 1996a: 38; Kuivalainen, 2004: 71,109). One 
of the major problems is the difference in the period of estimates. In Finland and 
Sweden, national statistics on recipients cover the whole calendar year, whereas in the 
other countries, i. e. Korea, Japan, Germany, Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands, 
estimates are based on a one-time measure. The number of social assistance recipients 
in Finland and Sweden, thus, seem to be considerably higher. For this reason, the 
numbers are not wholly comparable and the following comparison represents only a 
first attempt at making sense of the overall picture. 
Looking at the recipient populations, in 2000 the UK operated the most extensive social 
assistance programme notwithstanding the reduction of the scale of Income Support 
from 1996. The number of beneficiaries of Income Support in 2000 represented 11.2 per 
cent of the total British population. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands also stand 
out. However, as mentioned above, in the case of Finland and Sweden estimates of 
recipients concern the whole calendar year, while in other countries statistics are based 
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on a one-time measure every year. Thus the figures for the two Nordic countries are 
overestimated to a great extent. 0 Those with the lowest numbers receiving general 
assistance included Japan and Ireland. They delivered to two per cent and under of their 
populations in 2000. Whilst general social assistance in Korea and Germany covered 
about three per cent in the early 2000s. The Korean scheme thus can be considered as 
rather marginal in terms of the proportion of the population receiving assistance benefits. 
Apart from Korea and the Netherlands, the majority of the countries of the chapter 
recorded an increasing share of the number of recipients as a proportion of the 
populations during the first part of the 1990s, while from 1996 the proportion of the 
population receiving assistance benefits took a downward trend in every country, except 
Ireland. 
Overall country differences in the coverage of social assistance narrowed slightly (one 
percentage point) during the 1990s. Finland and the Netherlands recorded the greatest 
growth in absolute terms (2.5 and 2.2 percentage points respectively), while the 
proportionate increase was greatest in the Netherlands and Germany. Korea and the UK 
are the only countries where recorded a substantial decrease in the number of 
beneficiaries as a percentage of the populations both in absolute and proportionate terms. 
As mentioned above, in the case of the UK, the scale of general assistance expanded 
during the first part of the 1990s, but from 1996 it diminished due to the institutional 
change: since 1996, unemployed people, who had previously been covered by Income 
Support, are covered by separate categorical assistance (Jobseekers' Allowance) and 
30 According to Kuivalainen (2004: 109), estimates based on a one-time measure 
estimated in November every year, show Finland exhibited lower numbers of recipients 
as a proportion of the whole population between 1990 and 2000 than the Netherlands. 
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there was a rapid decline in the number of recipients of Income Support as a proportion 
of the total population (from 17 to 11 per cent). 
Table 4.14 Individual beneficiaries of social assistance as a percentage of total 
population, 1990-2000 
Swe Fin Ger NL UK Ire Jap Kor 
1990 6.0 6.3 2.2 3.8 12.2 1.4 0.8 5.3 
1995 7.8 11.4 3.1 3.0 16.7 1.8 N/a 3.9 
1996 8.2 11.9 3.3 7.9 11.9 1.9 N/a 3.3 
1998 7.5 10.4 3.5 6.5 11.4 1.6 0.8 2.5 
2000 5.9 8.8 3.3 6.0 11.2 2.0 0.8 3.0" 
Index 98 140 150 158 92 143 100 57 
(1990=100) 
Note: "2001 
Source: Abe (2002); Eardley et al. (1996a); Kuivalainen (2004); MOIIW (2005d). 
The Korean case is quite opposite to the British case. Unlike the majority of the 
countries of the chapter, where exhibited an increasing share of the number of recipients 
during the first part of the 1990s, Korea had a decreasing share of the number of 
beneficiaries of LP as a proportion of the total population until 1998, due to the low 
levels of unemployment and poverty. One notable thing here is that although categorical 
assistance (LP) was replaced by general assistance (NBLS) in 2000, there was little 
expansion in the proportion of beneficiaries as a share of the total population between 
1998 and 2001 (a growth of only 0.5 percentage point). Since 2000, the proportion of 
the population receiving NBLS remained stable at three per cent, as shown in Table 4.8. 
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Looking at expenditure, the Korean scheme NBLS plays the largest role within the 
welfare state, followed by the UK. Considering the recipient populations, however, the 
Korean scheme can be considered as rather marginal: Korea comes sixth out of eight 
countries considered in the chapter, while the UK and the Netherlands stand out. 
General assistance in Ireland can be considered as marginal both in terms of expenditure 
and recipients. However, the Irish scheme can be considered as extensive if categorical 
assistance is included. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the extent and salience of previous categorical and current 
general social assistance in Korea. Until 1998 social assistance expenditure as a share of 
total social expenditure decreased steadily to 2.3 per cent, owing to the high economic 
performances and low levels of unemployment and poverty. However, after the outbreak 
of the 1997 economic crisis, the share of social assistance expenditure expanded to 6.8 
per cent, since categorical assistance (LP) was replaced by general assistance (NBLS) in 
order to cope with the dramatic increase in unemployment and poverty. Expenditure for 
social assistance as a proportion of GDP also rose after 1997, and since 2001 it 
remained stable at 0.6 per cent. In contrast, trends in recipients are somewhat different 
from those in expenditure. While there was a steady expansion of social assistance 
expenditure after the establishment of general assistance in 2000, there was little 
expansion in the proportion of the population receiving assistance benefits over the 
same period. 
The chapter also reveals the pattern of expenditure on, and recipients of, the Korean 
social assistance scheme in 2001 and trends since 1990 in a comparative perspective. 
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The UK operates the most extensive and salient social assistance scheme both in terms 
of expenditure and coverage of the population. On the contrary, the Nordic countries 
and Japan operate the most marginal social assistance schemes. The German and Dutch 
schemes are characterised with a higher share of expenditure and a lower share of 
recipients as well as relatively high spending on total social expenditure. In contrast the 
Korean scheme is characterised with the highest share of expenditure and a lower share 
of recipients as well as the lowest spending on social support. General assistance in 
Ireland can be considered as marginal both in terms of expenditure and recipients. 
However, the Irish scheme can be considered as extensive if categorical assistance is 
included. 
Apart from Korea and the UK, the majority of the countries of the chapter recorded an 
increasing share of both social assistance expenditure and the number of recipients, 
during the first part of the 1990s: a similar trend to that of the 1980s (Eardley et al., 
1996a). However from 1996 the countries of the chapter took a downward trend in both 
expenditure and recipients, except Ireland. Korea exhibited a rather different trend: the 
share of social assistance expenditure expanded, whereas there was little change in the 
number of recipients since 1998, as mentioned before. On the other hand, in every 
country, except the UK and Germany, the share of social assistance expenditures was 
more extensive in 2000 than in 1990, while social assistance in every country, except 
Korea and the UK, was more salient in 2000 than in 1990, in terms of coverage. 
It was found in the chapter that given the low level of spending on social protection, in 
particular, low coverage of the unemployment benefits and the weakening of family tie 
and enterprise welfare benefits, there is a need for more comprehensive and extensive 
social assistance as a last-resort safety net. External factors such as focusing on labour 
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market integration measures for social assistance recipients, budgetary concerns and 
political acceptance of benefit support have contributed to a decline in the real benefit 
position of many social assistance recipients in OECD countries since 1980s and to a 
tightening of conditions of eligibility and entitlement (Adema, 2006: 27-28). These 
external factors also seem to have played a significant role in the patterns and trends in 
the extent and salience of social assistance in Korea. The next chapter looks in more 
detail at the conditions of eligibility and entitlement and those relating to work 
availability. 
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Chapter 5 Conditions of eligibility and entitlement 
This chapter analyses social assistance scheme in Korea at the institutional level, 
looking at the structure and the rules governing eligibility, the conditions of entitlement 
and those relating to work availability. The chapter first examines the Korean scheme 
and it is then compared with social assistance schemes in eight OECD countries in order 
to obtain a comparative perspective. It looks at the conditions of eligibility in terms of 
the residence/nationality and the minimum/maximum age requirements. The conditions 
of entitlement are examined with regard to benefit/resource units and resource testing. 
With regard to availability for work requirements, work test and incentives to work are 
discussed. Special focus is on: whether or not there has been any significant 
improvement within Korean social assistance; how far Korea differs from other 
countries considered here. 
5.1 Korea 
5.1.1 Legislation and policy objectives 
The National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) scheme is currently governed by the 
NBLS Act of 1999. The Livelihood Protection (LP) Act of 1961 was the first statutory 
provision of social assistance in Korea. The LP scheme, to which there had been partial 
changes in terms of its contents until 1999, had the aim of providing a minimum level of 
relief mainly for those categorically poor - aged under 18 and 65 or over, or unable to 
work (MOHW, 1999: 4; OECD. 2000a: 128; Yeo et al., 2004: 131). Spurred by soaring 
unemployment and poverty arising from the economic crisis in 1997, the NBLS Act, 
which aims to secure a minimum income standard for all people eligible regardless of 
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their age or ability to work, was enacted in September 1999, and was put into efi ct in 
October 2000 (Jung. 2005: 4-6, Moon, 2002: 4-6: OFCU, 2002: Yeo et al., 2004: 92-96). 
Table 5.1 provides a broad outline of social assistance in Korea. It allows for a 
comparison of previous and present assistance schemes with regard to: designation, 
legal basis, types of benefits provided and main cash benefit. 
Table 5.1 A comparison of previous and present social assistance in Korea 
Previous assistance (1961-2000) ('resent assistance (Since 2000) 
Designation Livelihood Protection (IT) 
Legal basis Livelihood Protection Act of' 1961 
National Basic Livelihood Sccurith (NIII S) 
NBLS Act of 1999 
! PC of' assistance Categorical assistance provided mainly General assistance 
for those aged under 18 and 65 and over. 
or unable to work 
Types of benefits Six aids: Livelihood, Educational, Seven benefits: Livelihood, Educational, 
provided Health, Maternity, Funeral, and Self- Health. Maternity. Funeral, Selt' Reliance, 
Reliance Aids and I lousing Benefits 
Main cash benefit Li%clihuud Aid: provided oni) liar I. i'clihood Rcnciit: pros dcd fir all 
claimants who are nom-working aged or recipients. For those able to wirk. the 
unable to %%ork bcnclit is provided on the condition that 
thrv participate in self' reliance scheme 
From a legal point of view, the social assistance reform carried out in 1999 was 
noteworthy for some reasons. First, NI3LS is designed to guarantee a right to a 
minimum income, while prior social assistance simply served as a hcneticial protection 
(Jung. 2005: 6. Yco et al., 2004: 131). The term Protection has therefore been changed 
to Security, which shows the state's responsibility for poverty and weltäre. Second, 
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there was a shift in the form of social assistance in Korea - from categorical assistance 
to general assistance. The demographic condition `under 18 and 65 and over, or unable 
to work' was abolished from the contents of the NBLS law, and all the people earning 
less than the minimum cost of living have right to be guaranteed the minimum standard 
of living by the state. Third, as a measure to stabilize housing for people with low- 
income, Housing Benefit has newly been established in the NBLS scheme. Enforcement 
of housing benefit, which has resulted in adoption of minimum housing standard and an 
increase in public housing, can be seen as an opportunity for strengthening housing policy 
in Korea. Four, the main beneficiaries under the previous categorical assistance were 
those non-working aged or unable to work, but under the new general assistance, working 
age able-bodied people are included as a recipient group. To prevent long-term 
dependency and to enhance financial incentives to work for those able to work, the 
NBLS places emphasis on promotion of self-support, and earnings disregards are 
partially applied to social assistance clients (OECD, 2000a; SSWI, 2005). 
Under the present NBLS scheme, the following seven different types of benefits can be 
provided for the recipients: Livelihood Benefit, Housing Benefit, Educational Benefit, 
Health Benefit, Maternity Benefit, Funeral Benefit, and Self-Reliance Benefit. 
" Livelihood Benefit (main cash benefit): for low-income people earning less than 
the minimum cost of living, i. e. NBLS recipients. It is made up of cash grant for 
food, clothing, fuel expense and other necessities of life. For the claimant able 
to work, Livelihood Benefit is provided on the condition that he/her participates in 
the Self-Reliance scheme. 
0 Housing Benefit: for NBLS recipients. This is the newly introduced benefit in 
the NBLS scheme. It covers housing cost, house maintenance/repair services 
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and other items necessary for the stabilization of housing. It is provided by cash 
(housing cost) and in-kind (e. g. maintenance/repair services). 
" Health Benefit: for low-income people, including NBLS recipients, who are 
unable to pay for medical treatment from their own resources. It provides health 
care, not cash benefits. 
" Educational Benefit: payment covers entrance fee and tuition and school meals, 
textbooks and other school goods or supplies necessary for up to high school 
(or secondary school). It is provided in the form of in-kind benefit. 
" Maternity Benefit: is provided for NBLS claimants with cash grant when they 
deliver. Payments cover the cost of midwifery services for deliver, pre-natal and 
post-natal care and any required dressings. 
" Funeral Benefit: is provided for NBLS recipients when they die. It meets costs 
of post-mortem examination, transportation, cremation or burial or other things 
needed for a funeral service. 
" Self-Reliance Benefit: is provided for able-bodied low-income people including 
NBLS recipients. For NBLS recipients, Livelihood Benefit is provided with a 
condition that they participate in the Self-Reliance scheme, including 
employment support programmes. 
Of these, Livelihood and Housing Benefits are the two main cash benefits that are 
provided to all NBLS recipients. The other benefits are provided according to the needs 
of the recipient. Health, Self-Reliance and Educational Benefits are also significant and 
frequently paid benefits. Housing Benefit was newly introduced in the NBLS scheme, 
as mentioned above. It provides help as one of the NBLS benefits and only for NBLS 
recipients. All the NBLS benefits, which are provided in the form of either cash or in- 
kind benefits, are subject to means test. 
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The purposes of social assistance are generally outlined in legislation (Eardley, et al., 
1996a: 47). The objective of NBLS is stated as to provide necessary benefits to all 
people whose monthly income is less than the minimum cost of living, thus 
guaranteeing a minimum standard of living, and to promote self-reliance (NBLS Act, 
Article 1). Furthermore, the scheme is based on the principle of subsidiarity; all other 
available benefits and resources as well as help from those legally responsible to support 
him/her must be exhausted before being entitled to social assistance (Art. 3, Para. 1 and 
2). Thus social assistance is granted as a last resort. The question of who are legally 
responsible is discussed in detail in the following section. The purpose of the promotion 
of self-reliance indicates that the scheme aims not only to boost financial resources but 
also to promote the independence of recipients and to enhance them to rejoin the labour 
market. The NBLS scheme, which has included able-boded clients, places more 
emphasis on individual and familial responsibility and minimising disincentives (Yeo et 
al., 2004). 
The NBLS scheme is administered at the national level. At the level of central 
government, policy responsibility for social assistance has been held by the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (MOHW) and the implementation of social assistance is delegated 
by law to the local authorities and local welfare offices. Professional social welfare 
officials carry out administration within a framework of statutes, memoranda and 
manuals issued by the MOHW. Benefits are financed by the central government (more 
than 80 per cent of the expenses) and the local governments (less than 20 per cent) by 
the law. All costs are, in effect, provided from general taxation. 
To assist recipients, the government has increased the number of social welfare officers 
administering the NBLS and the self-reliance programmes to 7,200 in 2003 from 5,500 
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in 2001. A single welfare officer took the responsibility for an average of 188 recipients 
(98 households) in 2003 from 273 recipients (130 households) in 2001 (Moon, 2003: 16). 
The question of how the minimum standard of living is determined and what constitutes 
the level of minimum in Korea is examined in Chapter 6. Analysis simply based on the 
legislative aims can be normative and ideal, and be insufficient to reveal the actual 
function of legislation (Kuivalainen, 2004: 121). The next step thus is to analyse the 
conditions of eligibility, i. e. for whom the benefit is intended, and the conditions of 
entitlement, i. e. whether an applicant is entitled to benefit based on his or her needs and 
resources (Eardley, et al., 1996a: 48). First the conditions of eligibility is examined, and 
later those of entitlement. 
5.1.2 Conditions of eligibility (nationality/residence and minimum/maximum age 
thresholds) 
Entitlement to NBLS is in general limited to Korean nationals resident in South Korea 
under the NBLS Act. Non-Korean nationals have no entitlement for claiming social 
assistance. 31 North Korean nationals who are resident in South Korea may, under 
certain circumstances, be entitled to social assistance benefits. People accepted as 
refugees can receive on the same basis of Korean nationals, but asylum seekers are not 
(MOHW, 2005c). Benefits are not portable to other countries. In fact, there has been 
little difference between the previous and the present social assistance schemes in terms 
of the residence and nationality conditions. The strict eligibility conditions have been 
31 While foreigners are eligible for insurance-based social protection depending on a 
previous contribution record (MOHW, 2005c). 
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criticised since foreigners and asylum seekers are in effect not eligible for social 
assistance, in spite of their economical vulnerability (Moon, 2005: 262-265). Discussion 
of the issue on foreigners and asylum seekers is held over to the next section. 
There is no lower age limit, but parents have legal obligation for supporting their 
children. In particular, parents are responsible for unmarried children living together at 
least until their children reach the age of 29 (MOHW, 2005a). As long as conditions of 
entitlement continue to be met, there is no time limit on the receipt of the NBLS 
benefits. Claimants working more than 18 hours per week cannot get the benefits. 
5.1.3 Conditions of entitlement (benefit/resource units and resource testing) 
An important character of social assistance is that it is needs- and means- tested. While 
the conditions of eligibility determine whether an applicant is eligible for the benefit, 
the conditions of entitlement determine whether the claimant is entitled to benefit on the 
basis of needs and resources they have (Eardley et al, 1996a: 48). The more conditions 
and responsibilities are tied to the family members and the wider resource unit, the 
weaker the social right is and consequently the less society's responsibility (Kuivalainen, 
2004: 127). The strict conditions of entitlement for NBLS have been one of the main 
areas of policy debate on social assistance in Korea (Kim, 2003; Moon, 2003; NRB, 
2001; Park, 2002; Yeo et at., 2004; Yoon, 2003). The benefit and resource units are 
analysed first and the focus then moves on the resource testing. 
The benefit unit is the unit to whom the benefit is payable. The resource unit is the unit 
whose resources must be taken into account (Eardley et al., 1996a: 65). Actually both 
benefit and resource units in Korea are a wider concept than those in many OECD 
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countries. The entitlement to NBLS benefits is normally established on a household 
basis, except in special circumstances, in which case individuals may be treated as 
separate units (Art. 4, Para. 3). The households (i. e. the claimant and the other 
household members) are thus treated as both the benefit and resource units, requiring an 
extended family support (MOHW, 2005a: 5). Article 5 of NBLS Act lays down that the 
following person whose income and assets estimated meet the criteria set annually by 
the Health and Welfare Minister, shall be entitled to the recipient for NBLS: a person 
who has not any legal supporter(s) responsible for supporting him/her, or a person who 
has legal supporters but cannot receive support from them. To be entitled to the NBLS 
recipients, thus, the following three requirements need to be met at the same time: 
income, assets and absence of legal supporter(s). From 2003, by the law, the separated 
selection criteria of income and assets are simply unified into new criteria called 
`recognized income'. 
Looking at the treatment of earnings, most earnings of the claimant and the other people 
in the household including children's income are counted in full in the means test. The 
total amount of assistance under NBLS is calculated by taking the minimum cost of 
living (see Chapter 6) and subtracting the `recognized income' of the household (see 
below). Most forms of income are taken into account for the means test, with the 
exception of certain benefits for the patriots and veterans, and educational grants. Most 
social security benefits are counted in full, except for old-age pensions, disability 
allowance, attendance allowance and child-care benefits (MOHW, 2005a). 
Some claimants may be excluded from entitlement to social assistance due to the level 
of their own resources. Disregards for earned income and assets may contribute to the 
effectiveness of social assistance schemes and enhance incentives to work (Behrendt, 
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2002: 98; Blundell, 2000; OECD, 2000a; Park, 2002: 11-12). The NBLS scheme thus 
adopts earnings disregards and they are now partially applied to the recipients. Students 
are allowed to keep 30 per cent of earned income. 30 per cent of the earned income by 
the disabled in the Job Rehabilitation programmes and all recipients taking part in Self- 
Reliance scheme are also disregarded. But the current earnings disregards do not 
include earnings from general paid work (full-time or part time) (MOHW, 2005a). 
Assets are usually taken to include cash, money held in accounts, land, property (house) 
and even cars as resources in the means test, unless they are regarded as necessary to 
maintain a minimum living standard. Households living in big cities with homes above 
38 million won (equivalent to approximately £30,458 in 2004 purchasing power parities) 
will not receive any NBLS benefits before they have liquidated their homes (Table 5.2). 
Those with cars both above 2000cc for disabled persons and above 1500cc for non- 
business use are also excluded from the NBLS entitlement. The amount of disregarded 
capital in 2005 is 3 million won (approximately £2,405) (MOHW, 2005a). 
Table 5.2 Assets (property) criteria by area in 2005 
Area Won $£ 
Big cities 38 million 49,287 30,458 
Medium and small size cities 31 million 40,208 24,848 
Farming and fishing villages 29 million 37,613 23,245 
Note: 
1. Big cities refer to six major cities of which populations are more than a million including Seoul. 
2. Dollar and sterling currency equivalents are based on 2004 OECD purchasing power parities. 
Source: MOHW (2005a). 
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To be entitled to the NBLS recipients, both income and assets requirements needed to 
be met at the same time until 2002. Yet, the dual criteria had been criticised. First, a 
large number of people below the minimum costs of living were excluded from social 
assistance because of their assets above the limits, and they were neither supported by 
social assistance nor by their legal supporters (NRB, 2001: 58). Second, the criteria 
separated into income and assets had been evaluated as resulting in the problem of 
inequality of benefit levels not only between recipients and non-recipients but also 
among recipients themselves, in particular, between working and non-working 
recipients (see NRB, 2001; Park, 2002: 12; SSWI, 2005). Thus, to solve these problems, 
the dual criteria were merged into new criteria called `recognized income' in 2003. For 
the calculation of the recognized income, the value of assets above the assets ceilings is 
converted into income, and the converted income is then added in the claimant's total 
household income (i. e. recognized income = total household income + assets value 
converted into income). The value of assets converted into income is calculated as 
taking the value of assets and subtracting the assets limits and debt, and this is then 
multiplied by conversion rates, shown in Table 5.3. For example, if an applicant living 
in a big city32 has a house of 50 million won and has a debt of 10 million won, the 
amount of assets converted into income is 83 thousand won (i. e. (50-38- 
10)*0.0417=0.083), which means an earning of 83 thousand won is deemed to be 
produced every month. 
The recognised income is actually unusual criteria amongst the OECD countries. The 
underlying logic of the criterion is that claimant's assets above the limits can produce 
income for the claimant (Park, 2002: 13). The integrated criterion has been evaluated as 
32 Assets limit is 38 million won as shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.3 Conversion rates of assets 
Property (house) Financial assets Cars 
Conversion rate (%) 4.17 6.26 100 
Source: MOHW (2005a). 
contributing to reducing the problem of inequality mentioned above to some extent 
(Kim, 2003; SSWI, 2005). Yet the people with very low or without income, who were 
excluded from social assistance by the criterion, could not still receive assistance, 
although they were still one of the poorest groups. Debate on the levels of the 
conversion rates is thus under way at the moment, as the current rates set seem to be 
more or less high (SSWI, 2005). 
Unlike many OECD countries, but together with only Germany, Switzerland and Japan, 
the Korean means test takes into account the income position of the claimant, and the 
extended family members who live elsewhere, which stresses stronger family 
obligations (Abe, 2002; Adema et al, 2003; OECD, 1999). As described above, those 
who have legal supporter(s) are not entitled to NBLS. The scope of legal supporters 
includes: a partner, parents, adult children and even people of the opposite sex, i. e. a 
daughter-in-law and a son-in-law (MOHW, 2005a: 5-6). Grandparents, adult 
grandchildren and applicant's siblings who live elsewhere can also be legal supporters if 
they share the living expenses with the applicant. Until 2004, grandparents and 
grandchildren could also become claimants' supporters, regardless of sharing of 
earnings. The obligation as a legal supporter is exempted in some cases such as if 
his/her income is less than 120 per cent of the income limit (i. e. minimum cost of 
living). 
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Traditionally support from the extended family is the most important source of income 
for the elderly in Korea. Many Korean commentators identified that income support 
from family and relatives have been much more effective to mitigate poverty than social 
transfer systems including social assistance (Choi, 2002; Hong 2002; Kim, 2002; Park 
et al., 2002; Son, 1999). However, the supportive role of the extended family has faded 
over the last decades. As shown in Chapter 4, the percentage of households containing 
three generations has fallen from 17.8 per cent in 1980 to 9.9 per cent in 2000, and 82 
per cent of households in 2000 were nuclear families consisting of couple or single 
parent with dependent children, while only 8 per cent were the extended families (NSO, 
2001a). Also the proportion of elderly people supported by their children has dropped to 
44 per cent in 1994 from 64 per cent in 1988 (Rhee et al., 1994). The scope of 
supporters shown above indicates the Korean government still compels the first and 
maximum responsibility of the extended family for social welfare, although family ties 
have become distant. In 2003,1 million people (about 2 per cent of the total population) 
were excluded from NBLS because they did not meet the criteria of the absence of legal 
supporters, although they met the other criteria, i. e. income and assets (Yeo et al., 2004: 
177). 
With regard to the conditions of eligibility and entitlement, there seems to be little 
difference between the previous and present assistance schemes. The conditions for 
NBLS are still strict and complicated to minimize the number of recipients, taking into 
account the financial constraints on total public expenditure, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
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5.1.4 Work incentives and labour market policy 
As explained in Chapter 4, there were two types of recipients under the previous LP 
scheme: livelihood aid recipients who were unable to work; self-support care recipients 
who were capable of work. Self-support care recipients had not received income support 
until 1998, and only received it at a reduced rate for at most six months in 1999, 
whereas income support was provided for livelihood aid clients at 100 per cent of the 
standard rate of benefit throughout the year (OECD, 2000a: 128-130; 141). The NBLS 
scheme abolished the classification, and from 2000 there is no difference in the level of 
income support (such as Livelihood and Housing Benefits) between those able and 
unable to work. Claimants of NBLS however have to be available for work and actively 
seeking it, and are required to accept offered training or work in order to gain 
entitlement to benefit, unless they are exempt from this requirement. Until 1999, the 
requirement relating to work remained dormant, because people receiving social 
assistance benefit were mainly non-working age or considered as unable to work 
(OECD, 2000a: 135-136). With the enactment of the NBLS Act of 1999, work 
incentives have become one of the main areas of policy debate on social assistance. 
Regulations outline the circumstances in which claimants of assistance are exempt from 
the requirement to be available for work, as follows: 
" If the claimant is aged under 18 or over 60 
" If the claimant works less than 18 hours per week over one month 
" If the claimant is incapable of work because of illness or disability 
" If the claimant is a woman who are pregnant or are less than six months after 
the birth, or whose youngest child is aged under 12 months 
" If having to work would endanger the proper upbringing of a child 
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" If the claimant has responsibility for the running of a household or for someone 
who needs substantial care. 
The NBLS clients are also required to participate in activation measures. In 1996, re- 
insertion measures for social assistance recipients and other people with low-income 
took a first step with the establishment of the self-reliance aid centres, but until 1999, 
these activation measures remained latent and targeted at non-recipients (Kim et al., 
2002: 1; OECD, 2000a: 136). By the NBLS law, working age recipients capable of 
work are required to participate in the Self-Reliance scheme. The aim of the scheme is 
to help people with low-income get out of poverty and to prevent unnecessary 
dependency of the employable poor on social assistance (Lee, 2004: 294). As measures 
to provide Self-Reliance benefit for those having the ability to work and working less 
than 18 hours per week for over a month, a self-support aid plan for each household 
depending on the recipient's working ability, employment situation, desire for self- 
support and living condition is provided from 2000 (MOHW, 2005b: 46-47). The 
municipalities are given the responsibilities to provide the Self-Reliance scheme and the 
self-support aid plan. The direction and services necessary for recipients' self-reliance 
are first determined by the welfare official at the local welfare office, and employment 
promotion measures such as job search activities, job training, public works, 
community-based employment programmes and self-reliance loans are provided under 
the Self-Reliance scheme. 
The self-reliance aid centres provide activation programmes for promoting self-reliance, 
such as job-search assistance, job-counselling services and community-based 
employment programmes, in cooperation with local authorities, social welfare centres, 
religious groups and civil organisations. These centres are run by local groups but 
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designated by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and partly or wholly funded by the 
public budget (OECD, 2000a: 136). The number of self-reliance aid centres increased to 
242 in 2004 from 20 in 1999 (MOHW, 2005b). 
The current Self-Reliance scheme is provided mainly for unemployed people including 
both NBLS recipients and non-recipients, and a large number of employed recipients 
(including full-time/part-time workers and wage earners in unstable jobs such as 
temporary or daily workers) are excluded from it, because the scheme is still 
underdeveloped. In 2003,23 per cent of total NBLS recipients (about 300 thousands) 
were considered capable of work, of which only 13 per cent (40,000 beneficiaries) 
participated in an activation programme (SSWI, 2005: 56). 33 The coverage for 
recipients remained stable at 40,000 since 2001, while there was a steady increase in 
that for non-recipients, from 10,000 in 2001 to 20,000 in 2005 (MOHW, 2005b). As 
mentioned above, the Self-Reliance scheme aims to help the poor escape from poverty 
and to promote independence of social assistance clients, yet in practice, the role of the 
scheme is limited to a work-for-benefit measure for unemployed social assistance 
recipients. The government is planning to maintain the participation of recipients in the 
Self-Reliance scheme at the current level (i. e. 40,000) and to increase that of non- 
recipients up to 50,000 in 2008 (MOHW, 2005b: 13), yet not to include employed 
recipients. Thus on whom the activation programmes should target has become one of 
the main areas of policy debate on social assistance and active labour market policy 
(Kim et al., 2002; SSWI, 2005). 
33 The participation rate is considerably lower than other OECD countries. For example, 
in the case of Germany, 60 per cent of recipients considered employable participated in 
an activation programme in 2000 (Adema et al., 2003: 39). 
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With the introduction of NBLS scheme in 2000, sanctions for non-compliance with 
activation measures have also been imposed; if, without due reason, a claimant does not 
participate or drop out of any programme provided by the Self-Reliance scheme, 
Livelihood Benefit (main cash benefit) can be refused or terminated (MOHW, 2005b: 
60). Failure to comply can result in total suspension of benefit for three months. In the 
case of repeated refusals, benefit is terminated until the individual attend the programme. 
5.2 International comparison 
In the next section, the current NBLS scheme is compared with social assistance 
schemes in other OECD countries to see how far Korea constitutes a unique case. The 
following eight countries representing different welfare state regimes and social 
assistance regimes have been selected: Britain, Germany, Sweden, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal and Japan. The rationale of choosing these countries was 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
5.2.1 Legislation and policy objectives 
All the countries with written constitutions have included the individual right to a 
minimum income, and the obligation of the state to guarantee its citizens a minimum 
standard of living. In each country considered here, the main aim for social assistance, 
set in legislation or policy statements, is to guarantee a minimum standard of living to 
those with few or no other resources. The aim consists of two key functions or 
principles of social assistance: providing guaranteed minimum income; protecting 
people in need from hardship, i. e. preventing poverty (Kuivalainen, 2004: 91). With 
regard to the minimum standard, countries vary in defining the minimum level to be 
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guaranteed. In Sweden, Finland and Germany, the aims refer to a decent standard, those 
in keeping in human dignity or those prevalent in society, while, in the UK, Portugal, 
Japan and Korea, reference is made to minimum standards. The question of what 
constitutes the level of minimum is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
The majority of countries place an emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity. In other 
words, social assistance is a supplement to all available help or resources, and all other 
benefits must be consumed before there is a call on social assistance. It is thus provided 
as a last resort. 
Most countries in this chapter explicitly set the second aim, in addition to the main aim, 
for social assistance: promotion of social integration (or prevention of social 
marginalization) and self-reliance. The exceptions include the two Anglo-Saxon 
countries (UK and Ireland), where any other legislative aims are not stipulated apart 
from the relief of hardship. With regard to the second aim, there are two kinds of 
measures (Ditch, 1999: 122). Measures to promote social integration, which elevate 
individual growth, development, integration and participation, can be seen in a positive 
way. These measures are provided with the forms of voluntary training programmes, 
arrangements to support to childcare, in-work benefits and other means of social work. 
On the other hand, measures to minimize the disincentives to paid employment and the 
promotion of self-reliance and individual responsibility can be seen in a negative way. 
Negative measures constitute tighter conditionality rules for the receipt of benefit and 
stricter conditions of eligibility. These work-for-benefit measures, which aim not only 
112 
to boost financial means but also to prevent long-term dependency34, have increased 
during the last decade in many OECD countries (Kuivalainen, 2004: 120-121; Lodemel 
and Trickey, 2001: xii; Saracen, 2002: 255). This issue is dealt with later in this 
chapter. 
5.2.2 Regulatory and administrative framework 
The UK, Ireland, Portugal and Korea have nationally-set scale rates and there are no 
regional differences in benefits (Kuivalainen, 2004: 143; MISSOC, 2005; Yeo et al., 
2004). In theses countries, social assistance is organised and regulated at the national 
level. In Ireland, Local Community Welfare Officers have a certain degree of discretion 
in relation to individual cases, in particular in the case of those with special needs 
(MISSOC, 2005: 319). 
34 Previous studies found that there is no evidence that social assistance per se creates 
dependence (Leisering and Leibfried, 1999; Saraceno, 2002; Walker and Shaw, 1998). 
While Saraceno (2002: 245) shows the prevalent idea that the majority of social 
assistance beneficiaries are long-term ones simply does not correspond to reality, on the 
one hand. On the other hand, long-term dependency is more influenced by the 
characteristics of the recipients - those having specific disadvantages, such as being 
disabled, ill, aged, female with heavy family demands, low education and skills etc. - 
than the corrupting feature of social assistance - generosity or lack of rigid constraints. 
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In a number of the countries of the study, social assistance schemes are administered at 
the local level to a varying degree within national guidelines for benefit rates. 35 In 
Sweden, Finland, German, the Netherlands and Japan, benefit levels are nationally set, 
but the levels differ between local municipalities. In Finland, two categories are in use 
according to the municipality classification (MISSOC, 2005: 919). In Japan, the benefit 
levels vary between six categories of municipalities in relation to living standards 
(Eardley et al., 1996b: 246). In Sweden, the minimum benefit rates are fixed at the 
national level after a national minimum standard of social assistance was introduced in 
1998, but there is still a strong local variation as municipalities continue to finance and 
to administer the scheme (Behrendt, 2002: 109-110; Kuivalainen, 2004: 143). In 
Germany, standard benefit rates (Regelsätze) are set by the federal state (Länder). The 
standard rates vary between the individual state, but only marginally (MISSOC, 2005: 
318) 36 In the Netherlands, municipalities have a discretionary power to determine the 
additional allowances of no more than 20% of the minimum wage for people living 
alone (MISSOC, 2005: 619). 
5.2.3 Conditions of eligibility 
Table 5.4 provides a comparative outline of main conditions of eligibility for the means- 
tested social assistance benefits in the countries studied. Here only general assistance is 
included and other types of benefits, i. e. categorical or tied benefits, except housing 
benefits, are excluded. The table presents main features of eligibility, including the 
35 In some countries such as Spain, Italy and Norway, social assistance is locally 
regulated and locally administered (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002: 120). 
36 In 2005, the rates vary between ¬331 and ¬345. 
114 
1'ablc 5.4 Main conditions of eligibility 
Benefits Legal basis Nationality/ Age Duration Other 
Residence 
Swe Social Welfare Law 01 January No nationalih No ace Ililimucd 
Allowance 2(1(12 requirements linuts but in 
practice 18 
Fin Living Allowance Social Assistance Without regard to No age Unlimited 
Act, 1997 nationality limits hill in 
practice I8 
Ger Su I; IIhiIlc" I cdcral Socrd ''; uwnab , nd Nu ape I lrluruted 
Assistance Act, citizens of all IT conditions 
1961 Member Slates, but 
restrictions Iitr 
other torciencrs 
and asp him seekers 
NL AlgemeneBijstand National Social Without regard to In general, Unlimited 
Assistance Act, nationality, all front 18 
1965 persons residing 
in the country 
UK Inconic Support Income Support No nationality Normall) IR Ilnlimitrd People 
( iencral) requirement, bill \sorking less 
regulations 1987, claimants who than 16 hours 
Social Security have lived outside a %seck 
Administration the l1K must 
Act. 1992 salisfi the habitual 
residence test 
Ire Supplementary Social Welfare Without regard to In general, llnlimited People not 
WeIl'are (Consolidation) nation alits, all from 18 working over 
Allowance Act, 1993 persons residing years of'age 30 hours a 
in the country week 
Por Social Insertion National I a\c lndcprndcnl of Normalls IK I2 months. 
Income 13/03 of 21 Mav nationality cxlcndahlc 
Jap Public Assistance Public Assistance Nationals and No age Unlimited 
Law, 1950 others with long- conditions 
term residence 
licence 
Kor National Basic National (Basic Nationals and No special l nlimilcd People 
Livelihood Secunth Livelihood Security recognised lower age %%orkmg Icss 
Act, 1999 refirgees, excluding limit Than 18 hours 
Source: Abe (2002): Fardlcý et at. (1996x. 1996h): Kukalainen (2004): MISSO(' (2005): IN()] IW (2005a). 
11:, 
designation and applicable statutory basis of general social assistance provision, 
nationality/residence and minimum age requirements, duration of benefit entitlement, 
and other important country-specific criteria. 
Minimum age thresholds 
Over half of the countries have not adopted an explicit minimum age, but in practice it 
is set mostly at the age of 18 years. 37 In Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK, 
entitlement to social assistance benefit can generally be established after an individual 
reaches the age of 18. Germany has no lower age limit so minors can claim on their own 
right, but parents have strong responsibility to support children (Behrendt, 2002: 91; 
MISSOC, 2005: 314). In Japan, there are no age conditions, though the assumption is 
still that parents would normally support children at least until they leave school 
(Eardley et al., 1996a: 50-60). Korea has no lower age limit, but parents have legal 
obligation for supporting their children. In particular, parents are responsible for 
unmarried children living together at least until they reach the age of 29 (MOHW, 
2005a). The minimum age thresholds confirm parents' responsibility for supporting 
their children. In most countries, the parent's responsibility is extended to students in 
higher education. Social assistance benefits are, in general, not entitled to students 
because of the parental obligation and the availability of student loans - but any detail of 
37 There are some countries, which are not included in this chapter but set a higher age: 
25 years in Spain (except the regions of Andalucia, which has a minimum age of 35 for 
applicants who live alone) and France, and 30 years in Luxembourg, though people with 
dependent children (including those pregnant) and people with disabled dependents are 
generally not included in the formal age limit (Eardley et al., 1996a: 50-60; Guibentif 
and Bouget, 1997: 13). 
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this topic is not dealt with in this study (for further details, see Behrendt, 2002: 90-92; 
Eardley et al., 1996a: 59-60; Kuivalainen, 2004: 124-125). 
In the international context, this policy needs to be seen in the light of wider policies on 
access to non-means-tested unemployment schemes as well as youth training and labour 
market, while these sorts of provisions seem to embody some problems since 
placements are not always possible or suitable (Behrendt, 2002: 90; Eardley et al., 
1996a: 59-60). In Korea, a range of employment support programmes such as Self- 
Reliance programmes are provided for recipients and other people on low-income 
throughout all ages, but there is little special training programme focusing on young 
recipients. In the Korean context, this policy also needs to be seen in the light of family 
obligation. This topic is discussed later in the chapter. 
Nationality and residence conditions 
Parts of the population are also excluded from eligibility because of nationality and 
residence conditions. As can be seen in Table 5.4 above, all schemes considered require 
the applicants to be national, citizen or resident, and these requirements limit the 
entitlement to social assistance benefits for some groups such as recent migrants, 
particularly refugees or asylum seekers. In most countries, residence conditions are 
more important than nationality conditions. Refugees and asylum seekers are not 
eligible for general social assistance, but are covered by separate schemes with lower 
benefit levels in many countries. 
In over half the countries in the chapter, i. e. Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland 
and Portugal, eligibility for the general social assistance benefit is not strictly limited to 
nationals, but all persons legally residing in the country are eligible for it. In the UK, 
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from 1994, claimants, who have lived outside the UK during two years before the date 
of claim, must satisfy the `habitual residence test' assessing if claimants' `centre of 
interests' actually lies in the UK on the basis of previous behaviour and future intention 
(CPAGG 2004; 692-694; MISSOC, 2005: 915). 38 In Germany, nationals, citizens of the 
signatory countries to the social security agreement (e. g. all EU Member States) are 
eligible for general social assistance. The most restrictive are Japan and Korea, where 
foreign nationals are not entitled to social assistance. In Japan, however, foreigners with 
long-term residence (legal foreigners) can also receive benefit, though they have no 
entitlement in law, but illegal foreigners are not covered by social assistance (Abe, 
2002: 29). 
One of the groups most likely to be excluded from or be treated distinctively in social 
assistance is refugees and asylum seekers. In Sweden, asylum seekers are not entitled to 
general social assistance, but covered by special and reduced payments (ekonomiskt 
bistand till asylsökande) since 1988 (Behrendt, 2002: 93-94). Germany has also made 
separate provision for asylum seekers and other foreigners. Facing the pressure of rising 
number of war refugees and economic migrants, a special social assistance scheme for 
asylum seekers that is governed by the Asylum Seeker Benefit Act 
(Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) was introduced in 1993. Since then, asylum seekers and 
other persons without a residence permit no longer have access to general social 
assistance, but are covered by the Asylum Seekers Benefit with reduced benefit rates 
(Adema et al., 2003: 30-31). In Britain, refugees were generally eligible for Income 
support. Asylum seekers are not entitled to general social assistance, but may receive 
38 Habitual residence test affects entitlement to Income Support, Housing Benefit, 
Council Tax Benefit, Jobseeker's Allowance and Pension Credit. 
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Urgent Cases Payments at a reduced rate (Eardley et al., 1996b: 393; CPAG, 2004: 660- 
661). In 2000, a change was made. Asylum seekers are excluded from claiming social 
security benefits, but may receive support either from the National Asylum Support 
Service or local authorities (CPAG, 2004: 662-667). Ireland followed a similar strategy. 
Asylum seekers can no longer access full welfare benefits (Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance and Rent Allowance), but receive separate and lower level of assistance 
(Kuivalainen, 2004: 123-124). 
Finland, Japan and Korea followed different strategies. In Finland, unlike in other 
European countries considered here, asylum seekers and refugees have eligibility for 
general social assistance, but at a reduced rate (Kuivalainen, 2004: 122-123). In Korea 
and Japan, people accepted as refugees are treated as nationals and are eligible for 
claiming social assistance, but asylum seekers are not (Eardley et al., 1996b: 244; 
MOHW, 2005c). 
The labour market outcomes of immigrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers are 
generally poor because of low levels of educational attainment and language problems 
etc. The economic vulnerability of foreigners contributes to making up a considerable 
part of the social assistance caseload in some countries such as Sweden and Germany. 39 
In Sweden, one in four recipients were immigrants (see Heikkilä and Keskitalo, 2001: 
49-50), and in Germany, the proportion of foreigners among the recipients were three 
times as high as nationals (see Adema et al., 2003: 29-31). 
39 In Denmark, which is not considered in the chapter, the proportion of immigrants 
among the social assistance recipients has increased to 26 per cent in 1998, from 18 per 
cent in 1994 (Heikkilä and Keskitalo, 2001: 49-50). 
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Korea has accepted substantially lower numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and 
migrants than European countries, particularly Germany, the UK and Sweden, though 
the numbers have increased (Table 5.5). With regard to residence and nationality 
conditions, the Korean government has been criticised because foreigners and asylum 
seekers are in effect denied access to social assistance, in spite of their economical 
vulnerability and far lower numbers of refugees and asylum seekers (Moon, 2005: 262- 
265). 
Table 5.5 Refugees and asylum seekers (2002-04) 
Ger UK Swe NL Ire Jap Kor 
2002 104,000 79,200 24,900 17,200 6,500 6,500 1,200 
2004 83,300 22,200 19,400 12,800 10,800 6,100 2,200 
Notes: 
1. Most numbers have been rounded. 
2. Refugee status precedes its recognition. Most of the refugees in selected countries do not receive formal 
determinations of their status under the 1951 Convention. The numbers in each country therefore include not only 
those who are officially recognised as refugees but also asylum seekers awaiting determinations, recipients of more 
general forms of social protection granted for similar reason, and others considered as refugees by USCRI. 
3. No data available on Portugal. 
Source: USCRI (2003,2005). 
Other conditions 
Duration is unlimited in most countries in the chapter as long as the conditions of 
eligibility are met and the income of the individual/household is below the minimum 
income thresholds. The only exception is the Southern European country, Portugal, 
which imposes time limit on social assistance benefit, though it is extended if fulfilment 
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of the legal conditions is proved. 40 
In some countries, there are restrictions on work hours. In the UK, claimants working 
more than 16 hours per week cannot get Income Support. 41 In Ireland, claimants in full- 
time employment (30 hours per week or over) are not eligible for Supplementary 
Welfare Allowance. In Korea, those people working more than 18 hours a week are 
excluded from NBLS benefits. 
5.2.4 Conditions of entitlement 
Virtually all social assistance schemes in the chapter operate with the same underlying 
principle of the means-test, seeking to ensure that benefits are targeted on the most 
needy. The principle implies a set of rulings about what constitutes the resources of a 
claimant, with whom these resources are assumed to be shared, who in a family or 
household should be expected to contribute personal resources to the upkeeping of other 
individuals, and how much of the available private resources must be exhausted before 
being entitled to social assistance (Eardley et al., 1996a: 61). The conditions of 
entitlement, each country takes on, reflect the balance of responsibilities between the 
state, individual and family. The more conditions there are to be met in order to be 
entitled and the stronger family obligation and the wider resource unit, the weaker the 
social right is and consequently the less society's responsibility. 
40 Spain, France and Italy also limit the duration of entitlement to assistance benefits 
(MISSOC, 2005). 
41 This was changed in 1992 from 24 hours per week, aiming at improving links to the 
labour market (Eardley et al., 1996b: 412). 
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Benefit and resource units 
Table 5.6 summarizes information on the conditions of entitlement to social assistance 
schemes in the countries. In most countries, the benefit unit - the actual unit for whom 
benefit is payable - is the claimant, spouse and dependent children, i. e. the nuclear 
family. The exceptions are the two East Asian countries, Japan and Korea, where treat 
the households as the benefit unit. Many countries also treat the nuclear family as the 
resource unit - that is, whose resources must be taken into account. But several 
countries require an extended family support. In other words, the income of other 
people living with the claimant, or in some cases those of separate households are also 
considered for the means test. In Portugal, the means test considers the income position 
of all relatives under age, including grandchildren, stepchildren and those fostered or 
adopted (MISSOC, 2005: 920). Germany takes into account the income of parents, adult 
children and spouses (separated or divorced) (Adema et al., 2003). Japan and Korea can 
expect people of linear descent and the opposite sex who live elsewhere, and even other 
siblings to contribute to the income of a claimant, if their income warrants it (Abe, 
2002: 30; MOH W: 2005a: 5-6). 
The assumption of familial dependence is present in all the countries when entitlements 
to social assistance benefits are considered. Claims on social assistance thus may only 
be made if family (or extended family) income falls below the level set by the family 
means test. Social policy strengthens this family dependency by casting the family as 
the provider of first resort (Rake, 1999: 240). The principle of subsidiarity between 
families and the state is established by the family means testing, with claims to benefits 
only available where family support is non-existent or has been consumed (Leibfried 
and Ostner, 1991; Rake, 1999). 
122 
Table 5.6 Main conditions of entitlement 
Resource unit Income and assets disregard 
Fin I amiIN 
Swe Family 
Ger Iluusrhold (including 
other relatives 
NL Family 
UK 1 amily 
Ire Family 
Por 
jai) 
Kur 
All income and assets are taken into 
account, small parts can be disregarded 
All income and assets are taken into 
account 
Sonic pall, of income and assets are 
disregarded 
Some parts of income and assets are 
disregarded 
Sonic parts of earnings and assets are 
disregarded 
Sonic parts of assets are disregarded 
Family (and relatives Small parts of earnings are disregarded 
under ace) 
I louschold (including Small parts ot'assets are disregarded 
other relatives) 
Household (Including Small parts of earnings and assets are 
other relatiscsi dicrcvarded 
Work-testing 
Must rc isicr as unrmllu\cd ssrih 
uncmplupmrnt o ice 
Must seek work actively and accept all 
work ollered 
11uNt he looking loi werk and participate 
in achsatiun programmes 
Must seek work actively, accept suitable 
work and register at employment office 
Nunc Persons capable of \surk are entitled 
to income-based luhscckcr's Allowance 
Ihe unemployed are normally entitled to 
an unemployment payment 
\tu, i be ;i rilahic liar \iurk and activation 
programme, 
Persons capable of work are unlikely to be 
given social assistance 
%Iuä seek work actively and accept all 
work ollercd 
Source: Abe (2002): Aderaa et at. (2003): Behrendt (2002): I'; ardlcy ct at. (1996x. I996b): Kui%alaincn (2001): 
MISSOC (2005): MOIIV (2005x). 
The nature and the role of social assistance within a society or a country are contingent 
upon the extent of family support obligation and upon the role of Iamily and kinship in 
1 2: 3 
general (Kuivalainen, 2004: 61). In societies, where have a strong tradition of' family 
responsibility and obligation, social support is more supplementary to support from 
family or relatives, and the role of- family and kinship is more important than the 
societies, where place less emphasis on a maintenance or resource-sharing obligation. In 
those societies, the maximum welfare obligation is assigned to the household (I; sping- 
Andersen, 1999: 45). In Furope, the nature of' familial ism is mainly recognised in 
Conservative welfare states41, such as Germany, and southern I', iirope. Attempts to shilt 
obligation back on to the extended family have been mostly unsuccessful and difficult 
to enforce in European countries (Fardley et al., 1996a: 67, Ditch. 1999: 124). 
As shown above, the two Fast Asian countries have a wider concept of' family 
obligation than most European countries considered hereº'. The reason that Asian 
systems seem to he inlormal is due to the living arrangement on which they are based. 
Familialism is, in fact, one of the underlying principles of' Asian social policies. Rapid 
socio-economic changes in Fast and South Fast Asia have, however, resulted in the 
dramatic demographic transitions, such as changes in fertility rates and old-age 
dependency ratios, and have weakened the traditional family support. For example, the 
42 Conservative/Corporatist or Christian democratic welfare regime stresses the family 
and the social group rather than the individual, and the society rather than the state (van 
Kersbcrgcn. 1995: 178). The regime builds upon a fragmented system of status-based 
institutions and the protection of the traditional I'amily. 
a; Unlike most European countries. Swwitr. crland, not included in the chapter. may 
require parents and grandparents. and adult children and grandchildren fier their 
parents and grandparents, even potentially other siblings to support social assistance 
claimants (Eardley et al., 1996h: 374: OI. CI), I999). 
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percentage of the elderly living with one child or as least one married child has been 
falling in Japan, Korea and Taiwan over the past decades, though it remains high by 
European standards (Hermalin, 2000). In Korea, the proportion of the elderly not living 
with their children increased more than twice to 47 per cent between 1984 and 1998 
(OECD, 2000a: 123). In Japan, the figure was also 45 per cent in the mid-1990s 
(Scherer, 2003: 170). These traditional family support obligations in East and South 
East Asia have, therefore, become less effective as traditional ties have become looser 
(Scherer, 2003: 179). In this context, the Korea's wider kin obligation has been 
criticised for not reflecting the weakening family ties (see Kim, 2003; NRB, 2001; 
OECD, 2000a; Yoon, 2003). 
Resource testing 
A critical feature of social assistance is the nature of the means test, consisting of two 
facets - the extent to which earnings are disregarded and how assets are taken into 
account. The stricter income and assets tests, the weaker social rights and the more 
responsibilities are tied to the individual/family (Kuivalainen, 2004: 128-129). Basically, 
the aim of resource testing is to ensure that benefits are directed towards the poorest 
groups of the population (Behrendt, 2002: 97). Eardley et al. (1996a: 79) found that the 
level and the type of earnings, other income and assets that are exempted or discounted 
from means-testing are varied and are based on different countries' expectations of 
family responsibility, the emphasis placed on work incentives, social attitudes towards 
lone parenthood and cohabitation, and the relative position and importance of means 
tested assistance programmes within the social protection systems. 
Looking at the treatment of earnings (Table 5.6), first are those countries in which a part 
of earnings are disregarded on a regular basis, such as Germany, the UK and Portugal. 
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In Germany, earned income is disregarded up to 50 per cent of the standard benefit rate 
since 1993 (Behrendt, 2002: 99). 44 The British scheme (Income Support) allows 
claimants to retain a weekly income of £5 per individual and £10 per couple, which 
equals 10 per cent and 12 per cent of the standard rate respectively. A higher disregard 
of £20 applies to lone parents, which equals 30 per cent of the single standard rate plus 
family premium, and the same amount (£20) applies to persons receiving the disability 
premium or higher pensioner premium (Kuivalainen, 2004: 130). In Portugal, 20 per 
cent of education scholarships and earnings from work and occupational training are 
disregarded (OECD, 2002,2004c). 45 
Finland and the Netherlands constitute a second group. In both countries, some earnings 
can be disregarded if in doing so the family is more likely to become self-supporting, 
though there has been wide regional variation in the practice of disregarding earnings 
(Kuivalainen, 2004: 130). In Finland, by a new three-year pilot law introduced in 2002, 
20 per cent of earnings are disregarded up to ¬100 per month per household, and 
income related to training and rehabilitation is not taken into account. In the 
Netherlands, the local authorities have had the discretionary right concerning earnings 
disregards since 1996, and 25 per cent of earnings from part-time work can be 
as 25 per cent of the standard payment rate (¬129) is disregarded from income plus an 
additional 15 per cent up to a maximum of ¬143 per month, subject to variation across 
states. 33 per cent of the standard rate (¬95) and 25 per cent of earned income up to a 
maximum of ¬143 is disregarded for lone parents (Adema et al., 2003: 18). 
as If a claimant (or a member of his/her family) starts a new job during the receipt of 
the Social Insertion Income, earned income is disregarded up to 50 per cent during the 
first 12 months of work. 
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disregarded, if they are considered to promote the claimant's independence. Korea falls 
into another group with limited disregards. In Korea, earnings disregards are partially 
applied to social assistance clients (MOHW, 2005a). 30 per cent of earnings from 
training, rehabilitation and public works are disregarded. Students are also allowed to 
keep 30 per cent of earned income, but no disregard applies to non-students. Sweden, 
Japan and Ireland have the most stringent tests and allow the least amounts of extra 
earnings to be retained, as in principle all forms of household earnings are taken into 
account (Gough et al., 1997; Kuivalainen, 2004) 
Another important aspect of the means test is the extent to which assets are disregarded. 
Relatively strict assets tests are found in the Nordic and the East Asian countries, where 
all capital and assets are taken into account except the family dwellings, personal effects 
and equipment required for work. In Sweden, even the value of the claimant's car and 
home is fully taken into account, yet some municipalities may allow them to keep them 
(Behrendt, 2002: 97). In the same group is Finland, even though a small part of assets 
can be disregarded (OECD, 2002). In Korea, owner-occupied homes, cars and land 
below the specified levels and some amounts of capital are disregarded (MOHW, 2005a: 
72-87) 46 Japan and Portugal come into this group since it is reported that assets such as 
land, houses and farms are all counted, unless the applicant is actually living or utilizing 
them and they are not luxurious (Abe, 2002: 30; Eardley et al., 1996b). In the 
46 Households living in big cities with a home above 38 million won (equivalent to 
approximately £30,450 in 2004 purchasing power parities), or those with a car both 
above 2000cc for disabled persons and above 1500cc for non-business use are excluded 
from the NBLS entitlement. The amount of disregarded capital is x3,000,000 
(approximately £2,405). 
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Netherlands and the UK, there are relatively high disregards on assets. 47 Disregards in 
the Irish social assistance are much smaller. 48 In Germany, the amounts of disregarded 
assets are significantly smaller than the UK and the Netherlands but larger than Ireland, 
the Scandinavian and the East Asian countries. 49 
In various countries, social security benefits are, in general, taken into account, but 
some benefits are disregarded if they are payable for specific purposes and those crucial 
needs do not be met in general social assistance. Benefits that are not calculated as 
resources include: the child-raising allowance (Erziehungsgeld) and the basic pension 
according to the War Pensioners Act in Germany, child-care benefits in Korea, family 
benefits in Ireland and Portugal, contributions to private pension schemes in Britain5o 
and one-off maternity benefit in Finland (Kuivalainen, 2004: 130; MISSOC, 2005; 
MOHW, 2005a: 57). On the other hand, in all the countries, as an element within the 
general social assistance payment, all or parts of the housing costs are provided either 
47 In the Netherlands, savings over ¬10,210 for couples and lone parents and ¬5,105 
for single persons of capital are taken into account. In the UK, the first £3,000 of capital 
is ignored and a weekly income is assumed from savings of between £3,000 and £8,000 
so a deduction of £1 for every £250 is made. There are higher limits for those aged 60 
or over and people living in residential care or nursing homes (MISSOC, 2005: 621,921). 
48 The value of capital and assets is calculated according to a formula of 5 per cent of 
the first ¬50,790 and 10 per cent of the balance. The yearly value is divided by 52 to 
give the weekly income (Kuivalainen, 2004: 129). 
49 The assets ceilings are ¬1,278 for the claimant, ¬614 for the spouse and ¬250 for 
each child (Adema et al., 2003: 22). 
50 50 per cent of contributions are disregarded (Behrendt, 2002: 98). 
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only for social assistance beneficiaries, or in other separate and general means-tested 
housing benefit schemes for all people with low-income. 
5.2.5 Work and incentives 
Many countries have witnessed a significant change in social assistance during the past 
decade - the introduction and spread of work-test or work-seeking requirements into 
social assistance. This can be seen as a paradigm shift from passive to active measures 
(Lodemel and Trickey, 2001). The main idea of work requirements and activation 
policies is that recipients must work in return for social assistance (Saraceno, 2002: 92). 
These measures aim not only to boost financial means but also to prevent long-term 
dependency. 
In most countries considered here including Sweden, Finland51, Germany52, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, able-bodied working age recipients for social assistance 
benefits are required to seek work using all available means and are offered incentives 
to work. In these countries, availability to take a job is an essential requirement so as to 
S' In Finland, the obligation to register as unemployed with the unemployment office 
was introduced in 2001. Until 2001, recipients had not been requested to register with 
that or to seek work actively. While the extent of obligation remains rather narrow, 
since the recipients are only required to register with the unemployment office (see 
Kuivalainen, 2004: 133). 
52 The work-for-benefit measures in Germany remained latent until 1990s, since the 
majority of the social assistance beneficiaries had been considered unable to work 
(Voges et al., 2000: 71). 
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receive benefits - the recipients are usually registered with the employment services and 
are requested to accept offered job training or work. The exceptions to this include the 
UK and Ireland, where general assistance is only intended for those who are not 
engaged in full-time work and the work-tests are not applied to recipients for general 
assistance. Unemployed people who are capable of work are not covered by general 
social assistance but are covered by separate schemes. 53 Japan forms a distinctive group. 
As for the utilization of the ability to work, persons capable of work cannot normally 
get general social assistance, neither any unemployment payments except an 
unemployment insurance benefit (Abe, 2002: 30). 54 
Korea forms another distinctive group. Like in the majority of the countries considered 
in the chapter, people who are capable of work are required to seek work and are 
offered incentives to work, but those working more than 18 hours a week are not 
entitled to general social assistance. Yet, unlike in the UK and Ireland where those who 
are in full-time work are covered by separate schemes, in Korea people who work more 
than 18 hours are covered by neither social assistance nor any unemployment payments. 
53 In the UK, since 1996, work-test has not been applied to the beneficiaries of Income 
Support and unemployed persons are entitled to income based Jobseeker's Allowance. 
In Ireland, the unemployed are normally be entitled to Unemployment Assistance as 
distinct from Supplementary Welfare Allowance (MISSOC, 2003: 547-549). 
54 In Japan, only 0.75 per cent of the population received general social assistance in 
1998. Among them, the majority of the recipient households (87.7 per cent) did not 
have any working member (which means they are elderly households, households with 
sick or disabled members and lone parents etc. ), and households with working members 
made up only 2.5 per cent of all recipient households (Abe, 2003: 30). 
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One of the reasons for that can be strong expectation of work in Korean society (OECD, 
2000a). However, given that the low coverage of unemployment benefits (covering only 
about 20 per cent of unemployed people) and the NBLS scheme (covering three per cent 
of the total population), a large number of people with low-income seem to live without 
any support from the social protection system due to the working hour condition. 
In virtually all countries, there are some categories of recipients who are treated as 
being unavailable for work and are exempted from work-tests - people who are ill or 
disabled, or older people, and students or people who have to care for dependent 
children. The major variations relate to lone parents, especially to the age of children 
who exempt lone parents from the work-seeking requirements. 55 Germany is the most 
liberal country. Lone parents are exempt from work requirements until the child reaches 
the mandatory school age of seven, but activation measures are, in general, not targeted 
on lone parents (see Adema et al., 2003: 28). In the Netherlands, lone parents who are 
responsible for a child under five years old are not required to seek work. In Korea and 
Sweden, the qualifying age is one year old (Kuivalainen, 2004: 133; MOHW, 2005b: 
41). In the UK and Ireland, where work-tests are not applied to recipients for general 
assistance but are applied to unemployed people available for work, lone parents are not 
obliged to look for work until their children are 16 years (see CPAGG 2004: 298; Eardley 
et al., 1996b: 147-148). The situation is not clear in the case of Japan and Portugal. 
A range of activation measures or work-for-benefit programmes has been extended 
throughout the 1990s in most countries considered here and the early 2000s in Finland 
55 Eardley et al. (1996a: 147-148) also identified the way lone parents are treated varies 
across countries. 
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and Korea. Theses kinds of programmes are intended to encourage recipients to return 
to work: vocational training arrangements, job search programmes, earnings disregards 
in the means testing, loans and grants for work experiences or self-employed business 
start-up. This chapter, however, did not collect information on workfare programmes for 
social assistance beneficiaries because of the focus of this research. In most countries, 
including the UK and Ireland where unemployed people are covered by separate 
schemes, recipients must accept all jobs or job training offered to them. 56 In the 
majority of the countries, municipalities or social institutions are obliged to implement 
or provide employment schemes. Japan is the only exception to these activation 
measures, since unemployed people are normally unavailable for both general social 
assistance and unemployment assistance, and there is no obligation for social assistance 
recipients to participate in an activation programme. 
In most countries, there are sanctions, which recipients may suffer if they fail work tests 
or refuse to participate in activation programmes offered. This underpin obligation of 
unemployed recipients to seek work actively or to participate in work-for-benefit 
programmes (Kuivalainen, 2004; Spies and van Berkel, 2000). The negative incentives 
take the form of partial (in the case of Finland, Germany and Sweden) or full 
suspension (in the case of Korea, the Netherlands and the New Deal for the UK) of 
benefits until the individual complies (see Adema et al., 2003: 42; Kuivalainen, 2004: 
135-136; Lodemel and Trickey, 2000: 276-278; MOHW: 2005b: 38). The situation is 
not clear in the case of Portugal. 
56 For more detail, see Lodemel and Trickey (2000) and Kuivalainen (2004). 
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5.3 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the social assistance scheme in Korea at the institutional level, 
and compared it to social assistance schemes in eight OECD countries. Compared to the 
previous assistance scheme, NBLS is not significantly different in the conditions of 
eligibility and entitlement, although there has been a paradigm shift in the category of 
social assistance from categorical to general assistance. The conditions are still strict 
and complicated, even though there have been remarkable changes in the contents of the 
new law in comparison with the previous law. 
In each country considered here, the main aim for social assistance is to guarantee a 
minimum standard of living. With regard to the minimum standard of living, the 
countries vary in defining the minimum level to be guaranteed. In Korea, reference is 
made to minimum standards, together with Japan, the UK and Portugal. In contrast, in 
Sweden, Finland and Germany, the aims seem to provide more generous standards. 
Over half of the countries, in practice, set the minimum age thresholds mostly at the age 
of 18 years, which confirm parents' responsibility for supporting their children. Korea 
has no lower age limit, but parents have legal obligation for supporting their children. In 
particular, parents are responsible for unmarried children living together at least until 
they reach the age of 29. Germany and Japan also have no lower age limit, but parents 
have strong responsibility to support children until they leave school. In most countries, 
residence conditions are more important than nationality conditions. Refugees and 
asylum seekers are not eligible for general social assistance, but are covered by separate 
schemes with lower benefit levels in many countries. The most restrictive are Korea 
together with Japan, where foreign nationals and asylum seekers are not entitled to 
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social assistance, in spite of their economical vulnerability and far lower numbers of 
refugees and asylum seekers than other European countries. 
The most significant disparities between countries are discovered in the benefit and 
resource units and resource testing. Many countries considered here treat the nuclear 
family as both benefit and resource units, but several countries require an extended 
family support. Korea together with Japan can expect people of linear descent and the 
opposite sex who live elsewhere, and even other siblings to contribute to the income of 
a claimant, if their income warrants it. In Portugal, the means-test considers the income 
position of all relatives under age, including grandchildren, stepchildren and those 
fostered or adopted, while Germany takes into account the income of parents, adult 
children and spouses (separated or divorced). 
Earnings disregards are partially applied to social assistance clients in Korea. Some 
earnings from rehabilitation and self-reliance programmes are disregarded but those 
from general paid work are not. Sweden and Ireland have the most stringent means-tests 
and allow the least amounts of extra earnings to be retained, as in principle all forms of 
household earnings are taken into account. Relatively strict assets tests are found in the 
Nordic and the East Asian countries including Korea, where nearly all capital and assets 
are taken into account. In contrast, there are relatively high disregards on assets in the 
Netherlands and the UK. In Germany, the amounts of disregarded assets are 
significantly smaller than the UK and the Netherlands but larger than Ireland, the 
Scandinavian and the East Asian countries. In all the countries, as an element within the 
general social assistance payment, all or parts of the housing costs are provided either 
only for social assistance beneficiaries, or in other separate and general means-tested 
housing benefit schemes for all people with low-income. 
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In many countries, work-test is emphasised among able-bodied working age recipients. 
Yet in Korea, work-test is applied to able-boded recipients, but those who are engaged 
in full-time work are excluded from both the NBLS benefits and unemployment 
benefits. While, in the UK and Ireland work-test is not applied to general assistance 
recipients, people who are capable of work are not covered by general social assistance 
but are entitled to separate schemes. In Japan, persons capable of work cannot normally 
get general social assistance, neither any unemployment payments. In most countries, 
there are sanctions, which recipients may suffer if they fail work tests or refuse to 
participate in activation programmes offered. 
Table 5.7 draws together the main findings of social assistance arrangements identified 
in the chapter. This ranks countries according to their score along the seven dimensions 
shown in the table: nationality and residence conditions, duration, administrative and 
regulatory framework, narrowness of resource unit, generosity of income, assets and 
work-tests. Variables in the seven columns are weighted equally and combined into a 
single index. The most exclusionary social assistance schemes are in the East Asian 
countries including Korea and Japan, while the UK is closest to the ideal of a social 
right to social assistance, followed by Ireland and the Netherlands. In between are found 
Finland, Germany, Portugal and Sweden. The Korean scheme NBLS has strict rules 
with regard to nationality and residence as well as means and work-test, while there is 
no time limit. It is regulated and organised nationally and there are no regional 
variations in benefits. The resource unit extends beyond the nuclear family to embrace 
other household members, requiring a much wider concept of family obligation. 
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"Fable 5.7 Summary table of the conditions ofeligibility and entitlement 
Nationality/ Uuru- Regulator' Resource Incumc testing Assets Werk- Indes 
Residence tiun Administrative unit testirre test 
fr rnie irk 
SvNe 3 2I 2II III 
Fill 3 2I 23I I 13 
Ger 2 2I 132 I 12 
NI. 3 2I 223 I 1l 
( :K 2 22 233 2 16 
Ire 3 22 212 2 1.1 
I'or 3 I2 I31 I 12 
. Iap 2 2I I1 (hin I I 
Ii scrcti nary) 
Kor 1 22 121 I 10 
Notes: Column (I): I- nationals only; 3- all persons residing in the counts: 2 hemecu these too 
Column (2): I- limited: 2 = unlimited 
Column (3): I= national/local; 2= national/national 
Column (4): 2- family; I- beyond the nuclear humily 
Column (5): I applying no disregard; 2- applying only small disregard; 3- some parts of earnings are disregarded 
on a regular basis 
Column (6): I= taking into account all liquid assets; 2 -- appl ing on(v small disregard; 3 some parts of' assets are 
disregarded on a regular basis 
Column (7): 1= yes; 2= no 
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Chapter 6 Benefit levels and generosity 
The level and generosity of social assistance scheme in Korea are analysed in this 
chapter. As in earlier chapters, Korea is first examined and it is then compared with 
eight countries in this chapter. First how the level of social assistance is determined and 
administered is examined, and then the level of income provided through social 
assistance is analysed in absolute terms, followed by the benefit level relative to average 
income. Like the previous chapters, special focus is on: whether or not there has been 
any significant improvement within Korean social assistance; how far Korea differs 
from other countries considered here. 
6.1 Poverty lines and minimum living standards in Korea 
Thresholds with regard to income or resources below which people can be considered as 
poor are defined by poverty lines. Poverty lines are based on scientific measures (Veit- 
Wilson, 1998). By contrast, minimum living (or income) standards are based on 
political decisions, i. e. political consideration of acceptability (or feasibility) and cost 
although the minimum living standards could make use of scientific findings (Gordon 
and Spicker, 1999: 105; Veilt-Wilson, 1999: 82-83). In some countries, the minimum 
living standards are called official poverty lines to be applied to benefit levels for social 
security and social assistance benefits (Gordon and Spicker, 1999; Hwang, 2002; Veit- 
Wilson, 1999). Korea also belongs to the latter one. 
The way in which poverty is measured has been one of the main debates in the Korean 
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social policy because unlike some other countries57, Korea has no generally accepted 
definition of poverty or poverty standard. Yet the minimum living standards have 
customarily been accepted as an official poverty line in Korean context since the early 
1970s (Hwang, 2002: 218-220, Kim, M. G, 2000: 5, Yeo et al., 2006: 4). They are used 
as a basis of benefit scale levels not only for social assistance but also for other social 
welfare benefits and services. The minimum living standards are defined as a `minimum 
cost of living' required for citizens to maintain sound and civilized lives (LP Act, Art. 2, 
Para. 5; NBLS Act, Art. 2, Para. 6). 
6.2 Defining the level of social assistance in Korea 
In Korea, social assistance benefit scales are based on the customarily accepted official 
poverty line, i. e. the minimum living standards. They are set according to a budget 
standard on the basis of a social survey since 1989. Before 1989, the minimum living 
standards were determined according to a food share method (or Engel) on the basis of a 
social survey, which were first calculated by the Committee for Social Security in 1974 
and subsequently in 1978 (Kim, M. G., 2000: 9-10). From 1989 to 1999, the minimum 
living standards based on budget standards were calculated every five years by the 
Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHSA)58 (Kim, M. G., 2000; Yeo et 
al., 2004). Until 1994, under the previous Livelihood Protection (LP) scheme, it had not 
legally been required to announce the results of the calculation of the minimum living 
standards. From 1999, however, a public announcement is required by 1 September 
57 But the UK has also no official poverty standard. For more detail see for example 
Bradshaw (1999) and Citro and Michael (1995). 
58 The KIHSA plays a supporting role for the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
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every year by the law (Hwang, 2002: 219; Kim, M. G., 2000: 6). From 2004, the 
minimum living standards based on a budget standard are calculated every three years 
by the KIHSA (NBLS Act, Art. 6). They are set nationally and uprated annually on the 
basis of the consumer price index, by decisions of the Minister of Health and Welfare, 
through consultation and deliberation of the Central Committee for Livelihood 
Security (Kim et al., 2004: 32; Yeo et al., 2006: 18). 
The budget standard approach is based on a list or a basket of goods and services that 
are regarded to be essential and depend on consumption surveys. These are probably the 
oldest methods of exploring living standards, adopted by Rowntree (2000) in his three 
famous studies of poverty in York (1901,1941,1951) and by Beveridge (1942) in 
setting the original scales of social assistance. Budget standards involve drawing up a 
list of commodities, employing normative judgements, supported by a combination of 
scientific and behavioural evidence. The budget is then priced and used as an income 
threshold - anyone below that threshold is in poverty (Gordon et al., 2000: 75). In the 
pre-war period, budget standards became associated with concepts of minimum 
subsistence and absolute definitions of poverty. This was one of the main reasons that 
budget standards were not used in poverty research in the UK for fifty years after the 
Second World War, although they continued to be used in setting poverty thresholds in 
developing countries (Bradshaw, 1993,1999). 
During the 1990s, this budget method has been revived by Bradshaw and his colleagues 
in the Family Budget Unit, having published `modest but adequate' and `low cost' 
budgets. This approach is not as developed by Rowntree to create an impossibly low 
figure, but instead to exceed a meagre definition of either minimum subsistence or 
absolute poverty and to use the evidence from many national surveys and databases of 
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the British population's patterns of consumption of goods and services (Bradshaw, 
1993; Veit-Wilson, 2001: 24; Gordon and Pantazis, 1997: 63). In Britain, it can 
therefore be said that budget standards have been derived to represent a minimum 
adequate standard and a modest but adequate standard (Bradshaw, 1993). Such budgets 
have been used to evaluate the adequacy of the Income Support and the costs of a child 
(Oldfield and Yu, 1993). The budget method is still applied in many countries. The US 
poverty standard (from 1964) was originally based on a budget standard. In the USA the 
basket contained food items only: in order to determine the poverty line, the cost price 
of this basket was multiplied by a coefficient of three. In Germany the official poverty 
lines are determined by a budget method. The required minimum is equated to the total 
cost of a more generalised basket of goods (Atkinson et al., 2002). Swedish social 
assistance scales are partly determined by a normative family budget. In Korea, an 
estimate of the minimum standard of living, which is used for benefit rates for social 
assistance, is based on a budget standard. A recent study (Bradshaw, 2000) has explored 
the use of Eurostat harmonized budget surveys for constructing budget standards. 
The main advantage of budget standards is clear and extremely practical. Items can 
easily be put into or taken out of a budget standard. The fact that the standard is 
transparent and tangible makes it publicly and politically credible. The main 
disadvantage of this method is that it is difficult to determine which ingredients should 
be included in the basket of goods, and there is a normative judgment of experts in the 
selection of the commodities. Thus the minimum budgets obtained are almost 
unavoidably influenced by the actual living standard and the prevailing life-style in a 
particular country and at a given point in time (Atkinson et al., 2002: 86). Budget 
standards also require an enormous effort to develop and keep up to date. 
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The minimum living standards in Korea, which is used for the social assistance benefit 
rates, are set in relation to a budget standard based on the results of a social survey that 
are calculated every three years from 2004 by the KIHSA. For the calculation of the 
minimum living standards of 1999, a model family of four was chosen as a standard 
family and a basket of goods for the model family chosen was formed, and then the 
minimum living standard for the family was measured. After that, minimum living 
standards for different region and family size were measured by an equivalence scale 
calculated by a computation model (Kim, M. G, 2000). 
For selecting a model family and comprising a basket of goods for the model family 
selected, a survey of income and consumption of low-income population was carried out 
by the KIHSA (Kim, M. G, 2000). In the first phase of sampling, 15,000 households were 
selected from 125 areas (52 big citiesS9,32 medium and small size cities and 41 rural 
areas). From the first sample, a sample of 1,500 households on low-income (poorest 30 
per cent of households) was selected. In order to balance precision and representativity, a 
model family was selected on the basis of the representative values, derived from the 
survey of households with low-income: value of the poorest household - 35.4 per cent of 
households with low-income were household of four; value of the average household - 
household of 3.45 persons; value of the median - household of a couple (male aged 36 
and female aged 33) with two children (male aged 7 and female aged 5). The results are 
shown in Table 6.1. In order to examine regional variation (i. e. big cities, medium and 
small size cities and rural areas), the model family of four (couple with two children 
male aged 7 and female aged 5) was selected from different regions. The basket of 
59 Big cities refer to six major cities of which populations are more than a million 
including Seoul. 
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goods was constituted to cover expenses for food, light and fuel, health and personal 
hygiene, medical expenses, a residence tax and education tax, TV licence, furniture and 
smaller household goods, clothing, education, transport, and other personal consumption 
(Kim, M. C'z, 2000). 
Table 6.1 Model family selected for the calculation of the minimum living standards of 
1999 
Average household size Poorest household size Selected model Family 
Household of 3.45 persons Household of four (35.4%) Couple (male aged 36 and female aged 33) with 
two children (male aged 7 and female aged 5) 
Source: Kim, M. Cx (2000: 12-14). 
For the minimum living standards for different household size, an equivalence scale, 
calculated by a computation model was applied to the model family of four (see Kim, M. 
G, 2000). Consequently, an equivalence scale was produced from a survey carried out by 
the KIHSA that attaches the weight of 1 to the household of four, 0.349 for household of 
one, 0.578 for household of two, 0.795 for household of three, 1.137 for household of five, 
and 1.283 for household of six. The results of the minimum living standards of 1999 and 
the equivalence scale used in the standards are presented in Table 6.2. The equivalence 
scale applied in the minimum living standards looks similar to the `old' OECD 
equivalence scale60 and much bigger than the `modified' OECD equivalence scale61, one of 
60 This scale assumes need level of 1 to the first adult, 0.7 for the second and 
subsequent adults, and 0.5 for children living in the household. 
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the most commonly adapted in comparative studies. As can be seen in Table 6.2, there 
are regional differentiations in the minimum living standards measured by the KIHSA. 
Table 6.2 Minimum living standards by household size and region in 1999, thousand won 
Household Equivalence scale Old Modified Minimum living standards 
size used in the minimum OECD scale OECD scale pig Medium and Rural 
living standards cities small cities area 
1 0.349 (1.00) 1.00 1.00 334 315 271 
2 0.578 (1.65) 1.70 1.50 554 521 448 
3 0.795 (2.28) 2.20 1.80 761 717 617 
4 1.00 (2.86) 2.70 2.10 958 901 776 
5 1.137 (3.25) 3.20 2.40 1,089 1,025 882 
6 1.283 (3.67) 3.70 2.70 1,229 1,156 995 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in brackets are re-calculated on the basis of the household of one, that is the weight of I is attached to the 
household of one. 
2. Big cities refer to six major cities of which populations are more than a million including Seoul. 
3. Minimum living standards for families living in medium and small size cities are used for the official minimum 
living standards. 
4. Using purchasing power parities for 1999, £1 eW1,161.5. 
Source: Atkinson, et al. (1995); Kim, M. G (2000). 
61 This scale attaches the weight of 1 to the head of household (or the first adult), 0.5 
for each additional adult or each child aged 14 and over, and 0.3 for each additional 
child under 14. The scale is also used by the EU. 
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Using purchasing power parities, the minimum living standards of 1999 for four person 
households living in big cities, and medium and small cities were W958,000 and 
W901,000 respectively, approximately £825 and £776. 
Table 6.3 presents the standard LP/NBLS benefit rates by household size. The minimum 
living standards for families living in medium and small size cities are used for the 
official minimum living standards, and the social assistance benefit scales are set on the 
basis of the official standards. As shown in Table 6.2, although urban and rural areas 
Table 6.3 Monthly standard LP/NBLS rates by household size, 1999-2005, thousand 
won 
Household size 
one Two Three Four Five Six 
person persons persons persons persons persons 
1999 152 267 363 444 509 561 
2000 (Jan-Sep) 193 275 378 476 541 610 
2000 (Oct-Dec) 261 433 585 729 816 913 
2001 286 482 667 842 959 1083 
2002 304 504 693 871 991 1118 
2003 313 519 714 897 1020 1151 
2004 (A) 324 537 738 929 1056 1192 
2005(B) 343 572 777 972 1115 1264 
B-A=C 19 35 39 43 59 72 
C/A (%)* 5.9 6.5 5.3 4.6 5.6 6.0 
Source: MOHHW (2005a); Moon (2003). 
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were differentiated in the minimum living standards measured by the KIHSA, the 
regional variations were not taken into account in the official minimum living standards 
and the standard social assistance rates, announced by the government. 62 The current 
benefit levels, therefore, seem to be unfavourable to low income households living in big 
cities, who seem to need more living expenses than those living in smaller cities or rural 
areas. For example according to a survey carried out in 1999 by the KIHSA, the minimum 
living standard for big cities was six per cent higher than the official minimum living 
standard, while that for rural areas was 14 per cent lower than the official standard (SSWI, 
2005). Furthermore, the social assistance benefit rates vary by household size but do not 
reflect features of household such as a household of older people, the disabled, or of a 
lone parent etc. (Hwang, 2002; NRB, 2001; SSWI, 2005; Yeo et al., 2004). 
6.3 The level of social assistance in Korea 
Until 1999 under the previous LP scheme the benefit levels had been set at a maximum 
of 60 per cent of the customarily accepted official poverty, i. e. the minimum living 
standards (OECD, 2000a: 129). From 2000 under the current social assistance 
programme, the NBLS scheme, the benefit levels are set so that the total income of each 
household receiving social assistance benefits - including any earnings and other forms 
of assistance - reaches the minimum standards of living (OECD, 2001 a: 72-77). Thus, 
as shown in Table 6.3, the standard social assistance rates increased considerably in 
2000, while after the NBLS put into effect in October 2000 they rose gradually and 
constantly. The benefit levels increased by on average 5.7 per cent between 2004 and 
2005. Using purchasing power parities, the monthly rate in 2001 for four person 
62 For further details and argument see Hwang, 2002, Ch. 5. 
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households was W842,000, approximately US$1,106 or £690. The monthly benefit 
scale rates include cash benefits such as livelihood benefits and housing benefits63 and 
in-kind benefits64 and other costs for taxes such as council tax, residence tax, education 
tax and TV licence etc. 
The minimum living standards are uprated annually in September on the basis of the 
consumer's price index, as stated above. However those reflecting only the price index 
can be seen as having been set at a relatively lower level than the benefit level 
calculated in 1999, since the scales have gone down to 49 per cent of the average 
consumption expenditure of urban households in 2001 from 56 per cent in 1999 (NRB, 
2001). Thus the gap between the social assistance benefit levels and living standards of 
normal households appears to be widening and some recipients who received benefits in 
the calculation year for the minimum living standards might not receive benefits in non- 
calculation years. 
Table 6.4 presents net replacement rates - here the proportion of net income in-work 
that would be replaced by social assistance. The data produced by the OECD (2002) are 
used in this chapter, in order to compare the relative level of social assistance compared 
with average wages. Overall the replacement rates are low in Korea compared to other 
OECD countries (the details are displayed in the next part of the chapter). On the 
other hand, the average replacement rates for the previous and current social assistance 
63 The monthly housing benefit level in 2001 for three or four member households was 
W3,7000, approximately US$51 or £33. 
64 In-kind benefits such as health benefits and educational benefits etc. are provided in 
case those benefits are needed by the recipients. 
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Table 6.4 Net social assistance before housing costs and services as a proportion of net 
incomes of one earner on average wage (%), 1999-2002 
Single Lone parent +2 children Couple +2 children Mean 
1999 6 16 18 13 
2001 19 44 54 39 
2002 17 39 49 35 
Source: OECD (2002). 
schemes improved in 2001 - three times higher than 1999, although there was a slight 
fall in 2002. It is mainly because the benefit levels have improved to be set at 100 per 
cent of the minimum living standards since 2000, from at 60 per cent of the minimum 
standards until 1999. In particular, since 2001 under the current assistance scheme the 
replacement rates for couples with two children were 10 per cent higher than those for 
lone parents with two children, while the difference was only two per cent in 1999 
under the previous scheme. 
6.4 International comparison 
6.4.1 Determination of minimum income standards 
How the minimum income standards are determined in the countries of the chapter? 
Table 6.5 briefly considers how social assistance benefit rates are set and uprated in the 
nine countries. In the Netherlands, the level of social assistance is linked to the net 
minimum wage and is uprated twice a year (Kuivalainen, 2004: 141; MISSOC, 2005: 
619). In Finland, benefit rates are set by the law and are revised every year according to 
the national pension index. After the revision, the benefit levels are also determined in 
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line with another social security benefit - the minimum old-age pension (Kuivalainen, 
2004: 141). 
In the study, the UK is the only country where benefit rates for general assistance are 
linked to consumer prices only. 65 Since 1982, benefit rates for Income Support are 
based on the Rossi index - the Retail Price Index minus housing costs, where rent is 
fully covered by housing benefit, and they are uprated annually (Bradshaw and Lynes, 
1995: 17; Cantillon et al, 2004: 4). On the other hand, Japan is the only country where 
benefit rates are in line with consumer patterns only. The levels of social assistance have 
been maintained since the early 1980s at 69 per cent of the average household 
consumption levels. They have been indexed to national average consumption and are 
uprated annually (Eardley et al., 1996b: 245-6; Yeo et at., 2004: 11). 
In Germany, Sweden and Korea, the adjustment mechanism for social assistance is in 
line with both prices and surveys regarding consumption behaviour. In Germany, social 
assistance benefits are determined since 199066 according to the so-called `statistics 
model' (Statistikmodell), which is based on the average expenditures of households with 
low-incomes slightly above the social assistance threshold (Behrendt, 2002: 106). 
Adjustments are also based on net incomes (Ademan et al, 2003: 24; Cantillon et al., 
2004: 6). In Sweden, the level of social assistance is set since 1985 according to consumer 
65 Yet since 1999, some benefits (e. g. Pension Credit) have been linked to earnings and 
some (e. g. basic retirement pension) are linked to prices. 
66 Until 1990, standard benefit rates were based on a basket of goods. 
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Table 6.5 Mechanisms for setting and adjusting social assistance benclits 
Renclit ReguIatun/ Adjustment mechanisms 
A Iministialkc Prim index Consumer Others 
IFanrmirl. siirvr\ 
Svc Social Wclfarc Allowance Nat loc 
Fin Living Allowance Nat/loc 
Gcr Soiialhillc led'statc 
NL Algcmcnc Bijstmid Nat/loc 
UK Income Support Nat/nat 
Ire Supplementary Welture Nat/nat 
Allowance 
Por Social Insertion Income Nat/oat 
Jap Public Assistance Nat/loc 
Kor National Basic I, i'clih, od Nut/nat 
Security 
X X 
X 
xx 
Mininwm old- 
age pension 
Minimum wage 
Ad hoc 
Ad hoc 
Source: I3chrcndl (2002); CantiIlon et aL (2004,2005): I: ardle et al. ( 19%h): Kukalaincn (2004): MISSO( (2005); 
Yco et al. (2004). 
behaviour on the basis of consumer surveys. based on items of expenditure \\hich are 
included in the household budget drawn up by the National Board tier Consumer Polices 
(Cantillon et at.. 2004: 6; Fardley et at.. 1996h: 157). In Korea, social assistance benefit 
rates are set in relation to a budget standard. The budget standard is based on a 
consumption expenditure survey of loww-inconme households, which is conducted since 
11J 
200467 every three years (Yeo et al., 2006: 1). In each of the three countries, benefit 
rates are revised each year on the basis of the Consumer Price Index (Cantillon et al., 
2005: 14; Kim et al., 2004: 32; Yeo et al., 2006: 18). 
In Ireland and Portugal, there is no adjustment mechanism for social assistance benefits. 
In the two countries, benefit amounts are adjusted by ad hoc decisions (Cantillon et al., 
2004: 7; MISSOC, 2005: 319). 
6.4.2 The level of social assistance 
This section compares the level of social assistance paid in nine countries. The first part 
of the section compares the absolute level of social assistance and the relative level is 
compared in the second part. 
6.4.2.1 Absolute level of social assistance 
In order to compare absolute level of social assistance in nine countries, following 
Bradshaw and Finch (2002)68, the basic social assistance package before and after the 
impact of housing costs and services are compared. Amounts are shown in £ purchasing 
power parity per month, using model family methods. The model family method has 
been used in various comparative studies on social assistance (e. g. Behrendt, 2002; 
Eardley et al., 1996a; Kuivalainen, 2004) and family policy (e. g. Bradshaw et al., 1993; 
Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Ditch et al., 1998). It is a relatively easy and exact method 
67 Prior to 2004, the survey was conducted every five years. 
68 A study on child benefit packages in 22 countries. 
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to compare the level and structure of tax and benefit packages, controlling for some of 
the variation that exists. For this research, the following seven model families are 
chosen: 
1. Single person aged 35 
2. Couple both aged 35 (assumed to be married) 
3. Lone parent with one child aged 7 at school, no childcare 
4. Lone parent with two children aged 7 and 14 at school 
5. Couple with one child aged 7 at school, no childcare 
6. Couple with two children aged 7 and 14 at school 
7. Couple with three children aged 7,14 and 17 all at school 
The method, however, has some limitations. One weakness of the `model family' 
approach is that in the case of countries69 where assistance programmes vary from 
municipalities to municipalities and there are large regional variations in benefit levels, 
it seems difficult to discuss a national social assistance scheme and their analysis only 
applies to the particular region chosen. The selection of family type is also inevitably 
somewhat arbitrary so it is important to select such cases that represent the most typical 
and common family types receiving social assistance in most countries (Behrendt, 2002: 
128; Eardley et al., 1996a: 110; Kuivalainen, 2004: 75). There are four types of typical 
families chosen for the analysis: single, childless couple, couple with children and lone 
parent. Singles and couples without children are included to get an estimate about how 
much more or less lone parents and couples with children receive as a result of the 
69 Such as Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Italy, the Nordic countries, and Canada (to a 
lesser degree). 
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social assistance package. It is similar choice to previous studies on social assistance 
(Behrendt, 2002; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Eardley et al., 1996a; Kuivalainen, 2004), 
while the number of family size and type included in the analysis are relatively smaller. 
Information on eight countries, excluding Korea, is derived from Bradshaw and Finch 
(2002). For data on Korea, a model family matrix for social assistance case was 
completed by the author according to the instructions by Bradshaw and Finch (details 
are provided in Appendix B, Table B. 1). The baseline assumptions for costs of housing, 
school and health costs are as follows: 
Housing costs 
In fact, housing costs are one of the most difficult elements to take into account in 
comparative research. The price of housing varies both within and between countries 
according to tenure, age, size and location of dwellings. Yet, the problem is that the 
costs of housing are too important to be ignored and are a critical element in the social 
assistance package (Bradshaw et al., 1993; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Eardley et al., 
1996a; Kuivalainen, 2004). 
The OECD method of taking rent as 20 per cent of gross average earnings, regardless of 
actual income levels or employment situation is adopted in the study as the housing 
assumption. Thus housing costs do not vary with the size of dwelling and family or 
income. The method is more consistent across countries and simpler for researchers to 
handle at the analysis stage than the one used in previous studies using the model family 
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methods (e. g. Bradshaw et al., 1993 and Eardley et al., 1996a). 7° Moreover it is likely 
to give a higher and more realistic rent figure for some countries including the UK (see 
Bradshaw and Finch, 2002: 65-66). But there are some disadvantages. First, with the 
standard rent of 20 per cent of average earnings, we lose variation by family size. 
Second, in most countries considered here the standard is too high for some of the low- 
income families included in the analysis. For example, in Korea a low-income family 
would not be entitled to housing benefit and/or social assistance on that rent and be 
expected to move to lower cost housing. As can be seen in Appendix A, Table Al, the 
standard rent of 20 per cent of average earnings in 2001 is W340,000. According to a 
survey by NRB (2001), however, the most common tenure type for the low-income 
people included in the survey was a public rented (long-term low rental) flat7' and the 
national average for the people was W102,000. Japan also belongs to this case 
(Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). On the other hand, in the UK, there is an eligible rent 
ceiling for housing benefit, which might have been exceeded by the 20 per cent standard 
(Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). Nevertheless the housing costs are an important part of the 
social assistance benefit package and results without taking account of them would be 
misleading. 
This analysis uses the data on gross wage earnings of the average production workers in 
Korea from the OECD (2003) and for eight other countries the data on gross average 
70 In previous work the rents varied with household size and the size and location of the 
dwelling but not with income (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002: 65). 
71 45 per cent of the people on low-income were living in a public long-term low rental 
flat (NRB, 2001). 
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earnings from Bradshaw and Finch (2002) are used. 
School costs 
It is assumed that children attend to a state school in a local area that means basic 
education is free. They can walk to school and thus have no transport costs. Only fees or 
costs that parents must pay for compulsory school books or equipment considered 
essential are assessed. It is assumed that all parents have to pay for a midday meal at 
school or provide a packed lunch. The cash equivalent value of free school meals is then 
dealt with as a benefit. 
Health costs 
It was assumed that health care at the point of demand is free of charge, available to all 
regardless of means and of similar quality across countries, and funded by tax and/or 
social security contributions. Only health insurance premiums that are required to match 
this assumption and any costs that families have to pay for a standard package of health 
care are included in the matrix. A standard health package to be costed include the 
following: 
" No inpatient episodes 
" One visit per person per year to the dentist for a check-up and filling of one 
tooth 
" One visit per person per year to the general practitioner and one prescription for 
a standard antibiotic per person 
Charges payable after any rebates or deductions or refunds were estimated and 
expressed as a monthly sum for each family. 
Table 6.6 compares the basic social assistance package before housing costs and 
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services. The social assistance package consists of the level of social assistance minus 
any income tax or social security contributions payable plus any non-means-tested or 
means-tested child benefit payable plus child support fm lone parents plus any other 
benefits paid. 72 The figures for Korea indicate cost of' living including, housing benefit. 
I lousing benefit in Korea is not a general scheme. It is a cash benefit that is provided 
only for social assistance recipients, and is included in the standard social assistance 
scales paid. 
"fahle 6.6 Social assistance before housing costs and services, £: purchasing power 
parities in 2001 
Single Couple I. P+Ichild I. P+Zchildren Couple Ichild Couple 2childien Couple, Schildren 
Sme 559 7,16 539 649 726 836 )t, ') 
Fin 335 431 415 542 553 698 832 
Ger 196 354 312 532 459 601 792 
NI. 342 685 560 621 747 808 872 
11K 230 301 429 565 560 696 836 
Ire 315 523 871 IlOt 688 854 1052 
I'or 129 258 2218 
307 347 . 13(, 562 
. lap 370 
567 634 859 732 946 1153 
Kor* 235 394 409 560 5.37 690 78S 
Note: *The figure liar Korea includes housing benefits. Housing henelit in Korea is provided on[) Ii)r social 
assista nce recipients as a cash hehe it and is ind tided in the social assistance rotes paid. 
Sourc e: Itradshaw and Finch (2002): MUI IN' (2002c): OFC I) (2001 b), omi calculations. 
72 For more details, see Bradshaw and Finch (2002: 124). 
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There is considerable variation between countries in the social assistance scales. The 
level of social assistance paid also varies between and within countries by family type. 
Sweden, Japan and the Netherlands have the highest levels of benefits for singles and 
couples without children and Japan, Ireland and Sweden for couple families with 
children and Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden for lone parent families. 
Portugal, Germany and the UK have the lowest benefits for singles and couples without 
children and Portugal, Germany and Korea for couples with children and lone parent 
families. The majority of the countries appear to provide more generous income for 
families with children than childless families, while the Netherlands and Sweden are 
less favourable to families with children. Ireland is the only country where lone parent 
families have higher income than couples with children. Before housing costs and 
services, the overall level of the social assistance package in Korea is one of the lowest 
but very close to that in the UK. 
All the countries considered here include housing-related supplements as part of social 
assistance schemes, and Germany, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK operate separate means-tested general housing benefit schemes (OECD, 2004a: 34- 
36). In those countries where general housing benefits are provided, families on social 
assistance receive some or all of their housing costs paid in addition to social assistance 
(see Appendix B, Table B. 2). In Korea, Japan and Portugal, there is no general housing 
assistance, but there is an element included in the social assistance scales for housing 
costs. For example, housing benefit in Korea is only available to social assistance 
clients as a cash benefit and is included in the standard social assistance rates, as 
mentioned above. In Germany and the UK recipients have all their rent paid, while in 
Korea, Japan and Portugal recipients pay all their rent. In order to really compare the 
level of incomes of recipient households, one needs to take into account the differences 
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in housing costs (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002, Fardlcy et al., I996a: Kuivalainen, 20(14). 
'f'ahle 6.7 presents the results ofthe level of social assistance after housing costs. 
Table 6.7 Social assistance after housing costs , 
£. purchasing power parities in 2100 1 
single couple I. I'-+-(child I. I'+2children Couple lchild Couple 2childreu Couple 3ch ilLlrcu 
Swe 259 447 376 513 564 701 MS. ) 
Fin 205 361 345 490 501 646 780 
Ger 196 354 312 532 459 601 792 
NI, 176 482 367 444 569 631 695 
11K 221 352 420 55() 551 681 521 
Ire 261 437 742 947 587 737 916 
I'or -22 107 67 156 196 285 11(I 
Jap 72 213 280 504 377 591 798 
Kor -45 116 129 281 268 411 507 
Source: Bradshaw a nd I inch (2002); MOIIW (20))2c): OECD (2001 b). own calculations. 
As Bradshaw and Finch (20022: 126) argued, the housing costs assumptions adopted in 
this study - 20 per cent of gross average earnings are clearly not reasonable fier the 
social assistance case as it will be too high for some cif recipient households. and having 
paid their housing costs, the single persons in Korea and Portugal have the negative 
incomes. Nevertheless there are remarkable changes in ranking bel re and after housing 
costs: alter housing costs, on the whole Japan. Korea and the Netherlands move down 
the ranking and the UK improves its positions. Scrutinizing the table by family type, 
Ireland. Sweden and the UK have the highest levels of' hencfits fier almost all types of' 
families considered. Portugal, Korea and . Japan 
have the lowest henrfit levels amongst 
all family type. The Netherlands mows up and dome in the Icaiuc table by family size 
157 
and type. It has the most generous benefits Iör childless couples and couples with a 
child but less generous benefits 1'Or other family types. 
Table 6.8 Social assistance after housing costs and services, £ purchasing powwcr parities 
in 2001 
Single couple I. I'+ Ichild IT I2children Couple' child Couple 2cl, ildren Couple 3children 
Swwc 253 434 391 549 572 730 905 
Fin 205 361 389 577 545 733 9111 
(irr 196 353 312 532 159 601 702 
NI, 154 437 313 371 493 535 584 
Uh 221 352 441 595 5'2 726 860 
Ire 261 437 731 925 581 725 894 
Por -22 107 65 154 1'). 1 2Y3 10 l 
Jap 72 213 256 437 354 523 714 
Kor -45 116 158 338 296 468 592 
Source: Bradshaw and Finch (2002); M011 W (2002c); OI. ('U (2001 h(. ov n calculations. 
In Table 6.8, the costs and benefits of'services including school costs/henetits and health 
costs are taken into account. In most countries, recipients ofsocial assistance do not pay 
health costs, and in Portugal there is a small amount of' addition to income (see 
Appendix 13, Table ß. i). I lowever, there are some health charges to he paid for even 
Iamilies on social assistance in Sweden and the Netherlands. "There are costs associated 
with education in Japan, the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal (see Appendix 13, Tahle 
13.4). Finland, Korea, Sweden and the I JK provide school meals subsidies (free school 
meals) or educational allowances or grants. The impact of these costs and benefits is not 
as much as housing costs, while the incomes of' lämilics dependent on social assistance 
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have changed. After school costs and health charges the overall position has not 
changed. The only exception is Finland where comes first for couples with over one 
child. 
6.4.2.2 Relative level of social assistance 
In this part, the relative benefit level of social assistance is compared through the 
calculation of replacement rates. The replacement rate shows what proportion of 
earnings in employment is replaced by social assistance. It is here estimated by 
comparing disposable net incomes of households receiving social assistance with net 
incomes of the same household type where the head is earning average production 
worker's wage earnings, thus by the following formula: Net income on social 
assistance/Net income in work* 100. Here the calculation is based on a given level of 
wage earnings so it will probably understate the real replacement rate of a family who is 
actually receiving or can receive social assistance (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002: 155; 
Eardley et al., 1996a: 158). Moreover, it is expected that the source of income that 
would be doing the replacing is social assistance benefits, while, in many countries, it 
would be more likely to be contribution-based unemployment benefits which are in 
general higher than social assistance (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002: 155). Thus the 
replacement rate used in this section is the minimum notional one. 
The data on net income on social assistance in Korea are derived from the matrix table 
for social assistance case used in previous section and those in eight other countries 
from Bradshaw and Finch (2002). There are no completely satisfactory data on earnings 
for Korea and the other eight countries of this chapter. Net income on social assistance 
is here compared to the net income in work in each country - the net income of the 
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average production worker produced by the OECD (2001 b, 2003). This study does not 
use the half average earnings because the OECD does not provide data on it for the 
OECD member nations including Korea. The OECD data do not include fringe benefits, 
such as provision of food or housing73 for the calculation of average earnings. In this 
section thus the data on the following three types of families in work and on social 
assistance, collected from the OECD, before housing costs and services are used: 
singles without children, married couples with two children and lone parents with two 
children. For lone parents net income on social assistance is compared to both two- 
thirds (67 per cent)74 and 100 per cent of average wage and for other family types 100 
per cent of average wage. 
Table 6.9 presents the relative level of social assistance before housing costs and 
services. Replacement rates for all the three family types are high in Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Finland's replacement rates are also high for singles without children and 
couples with two children but they are comparatively low for lone parents with two 
children. Japan has one of the highest replacement rates for couples and lone parents, 
except for singles. Germany and the UK have the lowest replacement rates through all 
the three selected family types. Portugal has comparatively low replacement rates for 
singles and lone parents but one of the highest rates for couples with two children. By 
contrast Korea has one of the lowest replacement rates for singles and couples but the 
rates are comparatively high for lone parents. For the lone parents there is no dramatic 
73 It is because these types of benefits would be inconsistent to evaluate and rarely 
account for more than 1 per cent of gross wage earnings. For more detail see OECD 
(2003: 118). 
74 It partly refers to female earnings (Kuivalainen, 2004: 159). 
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change in the position when the comparison is made in relation to 67 per cent of' the 
average wage earnings. 
Table 6.9 Net social assistance before housing costs and services as a proportion of net 
incomes ol'one earner on average wage (%). 2001 
Single 1.11 t2children ('Oniplc i 2chihirrn Aran 
S%ke 62 54 (86) 91 66 
Fin 34 12 (61) 63 46 
(icr IR 39 (511) "lO 32 
NL 43 55 (72) 61 53 
11K 19 II) (-IS) . Fl 36 
Ire 28 42 (56) 55 42 
Pol 2.4 15 (il) 711 13 
Jap 28 65 (94) 69 54 
Kur 19 . 14 (65) 54 39 
Note: Numbers in brackets are replacement rates fin lone parents with mo children earning 67 per cent ofthe , i\eragr 
production worker's wages. 
Average replacement rates rcvcal three groups of' countries. At the top come Sweden, 
Japan and the Netherlands. Korea, the UK and Germany have the lo est relative 
income level of social assistance. In between are found Finland, Purtuial and Ireland. 
The overall position would he changed to some extent IC hewer wage level rather than 
100 per cent of average wage were used (Kuivalainen, 2004: 160). A study ºrl'Bradshaw 
and Finch (2002), using the net income of' one earner on half average earnings shows 
that the replacement rates in the right countries considered in this chapter, excluding 
Korea, increase to some extent. 
INI 
6.5 The implied equivalence scales in social assistance 
In this chapter, it has been seen that the level of social assistance in the countries 
considered varies by family types, meaning countries treat different types of family 
differently. This variation implies a judgement has been made in each country about the 
relative needs of families of different kinds (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002: 128). Thus the 
implied equivalence scale of social assistance in each country is compared in Table 6.10 
and 6.11. The implied equivalence scales presented in the two tables are calculated on 
the basis of Table 6.6 and 6.8. In this analysis the base family is a couple without a 
children set at 1.00. 
It can be seen that there is a considerable variation in the level of benefit paid to a single 
person compared with a childless couple. Before housing costs, a single person in 
Portugal and the Netherlands receives 50 per cent of the benefit paid to a couple, and in 
Finland and Sweden over 70 per cent of that of a couple, while in Korea and Ireland 60 
per cent of that to a couple. 
There are also considerable variations in the implied equivalence scale for couples with 
children. Before housing costs, the UK is the most generous to couples with children 
compared with couples without children. Following the UK, Korea is the second most 
generous to couples with one child or two children, while Germany and Portugal come 
after the UK for couples with three children. By contrast, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Finland value the relative needs of couples with children least generously. Among the 
latter, Sweden paid less for a couple with one child aged seven, relative to a childless 
couple. 
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Moving to lone parent families, the general pattern found here was that lone parents on 
social assistance receive less than couples with the same number of children. Only 
Ireland paid more for lone parent families. On the other hand, compared with a childless 
couple, the needs of a lone parent vary between countries rather more. 13eli0re housing 
costs, the extra amount payable for a lone parent with one child, relative to a childless 
couple, varies from minus 28 per cent in Sweden, minus 16 per cent in Portugal, minus 
löur per cent in Finland to four per cent in Korea, 19 per cent in the t JK and 67 per cent 
in Ireland. The majority of the countries assess the needs of a lone parent with two 
children higher than it childless couple. The exceptions include Sweden (bel'ore housing 
costs) and the Netherlands. For two children, before housing costs, the extra payable 
varies From minus 13 per cent in Sweden to 19 per cent in Portugal, 42 per cent in 
Korea, 57 per cent in the UK and Ill per cent in Ireland. 
Table 6.10 Eq uivalence scale ot'social assistance before housing costs, 200I 
Single Couple IT f lchild 1,11 2children ('oupic Ichild Couple { 2children Couple s Schildren 
Sý c 0.75 100 0.72 0.87 0.97 1.12 1.311 
Fin 0.78 1.00 0.96 1.26 1.28 1.62 1.93 
(icr 0.56 1.00 0.88 1.50 100 1.711 2 2.1 
NI. 0.50 1.00 0.82 0.91 1.09 1.18 1.27 
I'h 0.61 1.011 I. I') 157 I. S5 193 2 12 
Ire 0.60 1.00 1.67 2.11 1.32 1.63 2.01 
Pof Il. 5ll I I)U 0,8 1 I I') I; I I )) 2 18 
. 
lap 0.65 1.00 1.12 1.51 1.29 1.67 2.03 
Kur 0.6)) 1.00 1.0W 1.42 1 1'1 1.75 1.91 
Source: own calculations. 
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After housing and services, compared with a childless couple, the relative needs of' a 
single person appear to reduce and those of' lamilics with children tend to improve. The 
UK and Ireland paid around 60 per cent ot'the benefit paid to a couple. while Korea and 
Portugal paid minus 39 and minus 21 per cent of' that of' a couple. By contrast. Korea. 
Portugal and Japan are the most generous to couples with children, relative to a 
childless couple. For lone parents, the relative position of lone parents against childless 
couples is the highest in Korea and Ireland. But that does not mean their benefit levels 
are the most generous in equivalent cash terms, but in fact in their case the amounts paid 
to a childless couple are very low, except Ireland. 
Table 6.11 Implied equivalence scale of, social assistance aller housing costs and 
services, 2001 
Single Couple I. Ff -Ichild LI'2childrrn Couple ichild ('muple 2childrrn ( uuhlr'? ih ildren 
Sýw 0.5% 1.00 0,90 1.27 1.32 1.68 2.08 
Fin 0.57 1.00 1.08 1.60 1.51 2.03 2.52 
(icr 0.56 1.00 0.88 1.50 1.30 1.711 2.2.1 
NI, 0.35 1.00 0.72 0.85 1.13 1.22 1.34 
UK 0.63 1.0)) 1.25 1.69 1_63 22.06 
2.46 
Ire 0.60 1.00 1.67 2.12 1.33 1.66 2.05 
I'on' -0.21 1.110 0.61 1.1.4 151 2.6.1 3.77 
Jap 0.34 1.00 1.21 2.05 1.66 2.46 3.36 
Igor -0.39 1.00 1.36 2.91 2 Si ( 113 5.10 
Note: l'he implied equivalen ce scale liar sing les in Korea a nd Portugal is nega liýr because haying paid their ho using 
costs and services. the single s in both countries have the uegati%e incomes. Vor further detail. see 'I able 6.8. 
Source: assn calculations. 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the level and generosity of social assistance in Korea and 
compared them with eight other OECD countries. Compared with the previous 
categorical assistance scheme, the level and generosity of the current general assistance 
scheme NBLS increased in 2000 in both absolute and relative terms, while after 2000 
the social assistance benefit rates rose gradually and constantly. However, it can be 
argued that the standard social assistance scales announced by the government vary by 
household size but not by household types. Furthermore, the benefit levels are set on the 
basis of the minimum living standards for families living in medium and small size 
cities but there is no regional variation in the benefit rates. Thus the current benefit 
levels appear to be unfavourable to low income households living in big cities, who 
seem to need more living expenses than those living in smaller cities or rural areas. 
Table 6.12 presents the results of the analysis based on the mean values of each 
comparison and a simple attempt at an overall ranking. To obtain an index based on the 
ranking from 1 to 9, an index value of 9 is given to a country having the highest rank 
and a value of 1 to a country having the lowest rank. Following Kuivalainen's (2004) 
view, the values of the replacement rates are weighted twice because they are the only 
measure used in the analysis to assess the relative level of social assistance. The index is 
the sum of each column. 
It can be seen from Table 6.12 that compared with other countries, the overall level of 
the social assistance package in Korea is the lowest together with Germany and Portugal, 
while it is highest in Sweden, followed by Ireland, Japan and the Netherlands, and the 
UK comes sixth. It is unexpected result that Finland and Germany have lower benefit 
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levels than might be expected given their economic position and w ell`are state regimes, 
representing the Nordic and conservative welfare state regimes respectively. By contrast, 
Ireland representing the liberal regime comes second in the league table. These results are 
much in line with the ones by Bradshaw and Finch (2002: 124-127). Yet they do partially 
not correspond with the ones by Kuivalainen (2004: 151-161) with respect of the results 
of Finland .7 
This may be partly due to the difference in the methods of comparing the 
value of benefits across countries - PPPs and exchange rates. The second possible reason 
is that there is a disparity in the types of model families on which data were collected. 
While this study chose only one single person household and four diflcrcnt couple 
households (childless, couple with one, two and three children). Kumalaincn selected three 
Table 6.12 Social assistance package. Mean value (£ PPI's per nmonth) and ranking. 
13cliirc housing Aller After housing Replacement 
and services Rank housing Rank and services Rank rates I%) Rank Indcv 
Swc 718 3 531 2 548 2 66 I . 11 
Fin 544 5 . 175 5 531 1 46 -1 28 
( icr 464 8 464 6 -164 5 32 13 
NI. 662 4 481 1 . 112 h 53 3 31) 
UK 525 6 514 3 539 3 36 8 22 
Ire 772 I 661 I 651 I 0 tS 
I'or 322 9 171 ) 161) v I; ; Ii 
lap 752 2 . 1115 7 367 7 51 2 311 
Kor 517 7 238 8 275 8 39 7 13 
7' In her study, Finland comes second in the league table alter Sweden. 
I (i (i 
different single person households (young, adult and elderly) and only two types of 
couple households (without a child and with two children). This could also affect the 
different results as the level of social assistance paid could vary by different family type. 
It is found in this chapter that there are considerable variations in the level of social 
assistance between countries and even within countries, according to different family 
size and type, comparison made before or after housing costs and the way in which each 
country treats the relative needs of families of different kinds. With regard to the 
implied equivalence scales, Korea with Portugal and Japan is relatively the most 
generous to lone parent and couples with children. But that does not mean Korea is the 
most generous in equivalent cash terms. As Bradshaw and Finch (2002: 128) argues, it 
is just that Korea's social assistance scales are internally more generous to families with 
children. In fact, the benefit levels are the least generous amongst the countries 
considered here. 
6.7 Locating Korea within social assistance regimes 
Table 6.13 presents the overall ranking of three dimensions identified in the previous 
chapters. The dimensions selected do not include all aspects of social assistance 
arrangements but they are regarded as the most significant measures for categorising the 
countries. In addition, there are little clear-cut cases and the cases must be clustered in 
the most suitable way. The three dimensions are the following: 
" extent: social assistance expenditure as a percentage of total social expenditure. 
" programme structure: conditions of eligibility and entitlement 
" generosity: the relative level of social assistance benefits 
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Another important feature, not recalled in this table, is the numbers of social assistance 
recipients as a proportion of national population. It is not used as a measure of the 
extent simply because, as outlined in Chapter 4, the figures are not wholly comparable. 
In addition, Portugal is not included in the dimension of the extent since no information 
or data on the extent of general social assistance of the country was available, thus the 
ranking of the extent is only concerned with eight countries without Portugal. The 
measure of programme structure refers to the conditions of eligibility and entitlement. It 
consists of the seven dimensions shown in Table 5.7. As a measure of generosity, the 
relative level of social assistance benefits, i. e. disposable net incomes on households 
receiving social assistance (before housing costs) as a proportion of net incomes of the 
average production worker is used. 
Table 6.13 Ranking of extent, structure and generosity of social assistance programmes 
Extent of social assistance* Eligibility and Entitlement rules** Level of benefits*** 
Korea 6.8 United Kingdom 16 Sweden 66 
United Kingdom 5.0 Ireland 14 Japan 54 
Germany 3.9 Netherlands 14 Netherlands 53 
Netherlands 3.5 Finland 13 Finland 46 
Japan 2.3 Germany 12 Portugal 43 
Ireland 2.0 Portugal 12 Ireland 42 
Sweden 1.4 Sweden II Korea 39 
Finland 1.3 Korea 10 UK 36 
Japan 9 Germany 32 
Notes: * See Table 4.12; ** Table 5.7; *** Table 6.9. 
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On the basis of the three dimensions above, certain overall pattern can be detected, 
while it is not simple and depends on which aspects of assistance programmes are 
regarded as the most salience (Gough et al., 1997: 34). In this section, groupings like 
countries together are attempted to locate Korea within social assistance regimes and to 
see how far Korea constitutes a unique case or how far it differs from other countries 
considered. One thing that should be borne in mind is that the result of the groupings is 
mainly based on general social assistance in each country. 
Sweden and Finland form a group. This is consonant with previous studies (Eardley et 
al., 1996a; Gough et al., 1997; Kuivalainen, 2004). In the Scandinavian countries, 
benefit levels are nationally set, but locally administered with different eligibility 
criteria and payment levels according to different local law and arrangements. The two 
Nordic countries have relatively strict means and work tests but generous nationality 
and residence conditions. In fact, Sweden has even stricter entitlement rules than 
Finland. Benefit levels are relatively high for both countries, while the extent of social 
assistance is marginal. 
Previously the Netherlands has been grouped together with the continental countries 
(Dual social assistance) or with the Nordic countries. In this study, the Netherlands is 
much closer to the Nordic countries. After unemployment assistance was replaced by 
general assistance in 1996, the role of categorical assistance is much limited than before, 
instead that of general assistance is considerably larger. The Dutch scheme thus cannot 
be classified into the Dual social assistance. Some local variations remain but are 
constrained within a national regulatory framework. The Dutch scheme provides 
relatively high benefit levels and assets-tests are relatively flexible, while the extent of 
social assistance is at the medium. 
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The UK and Ireland form a distinctive group. This is in line with the typologies of 
Eardley et al. (1996a) and Gough et al. (1997). In the two countries, social assistance is 
organised and regulated nationally. These countries have the most generous entitlement 
conditions, while Ireland has rather stricter means-tests than Britain. Benefit levels are 
relatively low in both countries, but when housing costs and services are included they 
produce one of the highest benefit levels in absolute terms among the countries 
considered in the study. In both countries, those who are in full-time employment and 
considered able-boded are mainly not covered by general assistance but by separate 
categorical assistance. Social assistance is still extensive in the UK, although the role of 
general assistance has been decreased because of the introduction of income-based 
Jobseeker's Allowance for unemployed people in 1996. The extent of social assistance 
is rather marginal in Ireland in terms of general assistance, but when categorical 
assistance is included the Irish system can be considered as extensive. 
In the previous studies, the classification of Germany was always problematic. It is not 
the exception in this study. Germany is the closest to the British model. Benefit levels 
are nationally set and some local discretion remains but only marginally. The extent of 
social assistance is relatively high and means-tests are lavish but benefit levels are very 
low. However, the country has a distinguishing feature. Unlike other European countries, 
but like Portugal, kin obligations extend beyond the nuclear family. 
Portugal forms a Southern European model. The country has nationally-set benefit 
levels and imposes time limit (12 months), though there is a possibility to be extended if 
fulfilment of the legal conditions is proved. It shares with Germany an extended family 
support. Income-tests are relatively generous but assets-tests appear to be stringent. 
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Benefit levels are around average but when housing costs and services are included the 
levels are very low in absolute terms. 
Japan is put in a different group from the European groups above. The country has a 
nationally regulated social assistance system with only moderate regional variations in 
relation to living standards. Nationality/residence conditions as well as mean-testing are 
strictest and kin obligations are wider than Germany and Portugal. The role of social 
assistance is marginal, while benefit levels are relatively high but when housing and 
services are included they tend to be much lower. 
The Korean model contains elements of both British and Japanese models. On the one 
hand, it has a single general assistance scheme with relatively low benefit levels. The 
extent of social assistance is largest amongst the countries considered. Social assistance 
is organised and regulated at the national level. On the other hand, the Korean and 
Japanese last resort social assistance schemes are similar in that eligibility and 
entitlement conditions are strictest amongst the countries considered. In fact, Korea has 
the toughest nationality/residence conditions, stringent means and work-tests and the 
widest family obligations - even a wider concept than Germany, Portugal and Japan. 
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Chapter 7 Characteristics of social assistance recipient and non- 
recipient households 
As stated in Chapter 2 and 4, in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis, the problem of 
poverty has come to the fore in the Korean context as one of the main social agendas 
needing urgent attention. With the realisation that the problem of poverty is not just 
limited to a small group of people with low-income but there are many potentially poor 
people excluded from social assistance. While it is generally agreed that the Korean 
economy has recovered since the early part of 1999, the poverty rates have not yet 
retrieved from before the economic crisis in 1997, over which time income inequality 
has been worsened, as shown in Chapter 4. Nevertheless the coverage rates of Korean 
social assistance have, in fact, remained at only around three per cent of total population 
since 1994, in spite of the far higher rates of poverty than before the crisis. 76 This 
means certain sectors of low-income groups in Korea, possibly four to six million 
people, have been excluded from the final social safety net, i. e. social assistance, which 
is responsible for protecting the poor from hardship. What are the main characteristics 
of assisted and non-assisted poor people? Are there any distinctions or similarities 
between recipient and non-recipients? Are there any differences in the determinants of 
poverty between the two low-income groups? Do we need different approaches or 
policies for each group? This chapter seeks to answer theses questions by using micro- 
data. 
76 The poverty rate based on 40 per cent of the median income was 11.6 per cent in 
2003, while the rate based on 50 per cent of the median was 15.5 per cent (Yeo et al., 
2005). 
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7.1 Comparing recipients and non-recipients 
A study of the National Basic Livelihood Security Programme Review Board (NRB) 
(2001) argues that in 2001,77 per cent of households with low-income disqualified 
from the NBLS benefits were living below the minimum living standards that are used 
for the social assistance benefit scales. Moreover, of those who were excluded from 
NBLS, households whose monthly incomes were less than half the minimum living 
standards represented 24 per cent. The study also points out 64 per cent of non-assisted 
poor households answered they find it so difficult to make ends meet that they need to 
become social assistance recipients. 77 This means although the majority of individuals 
or households excluded from NBLS are in poverty, they are not covered by the NBLS 
scheme because of strict eligibility and entitlement conditions, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
The people with low-income who are excluded from the NBLS benefits are, thus, likely 
to be in most need of social assistance provision. 
Certainly, the main aim of income support policy is to cover the financial needs of poor 
households. Therefore, as Saraceno (2002: 176) argues, to evaluate whether an income 
support policy gives good coverage, counterfactual information drawn from a control 
group of non-assisted poor would be useful since there may be similarities and 
differences in terms of behavioural characteristics between the recipient and non- 
recipient groups. Those excluded from social assistance have increasingly become the 
focus of policy concerns in the Korean context, particularly in relation to the issue of 
77 30 per cent of the non-recipients felt they just need health or education benefits of the 
seven NBLS benefits. Respondents who answered they do not need any benefits from 
government represented only six per cent (NRB, 2001). 
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poverty and social safety net, due to the following three reasons. First, as mentioned 
above, high rates of people with low-income who seem to be living in poverty, tend to 
be excluded from social assistance in Korea due to the stringent conditions of eligibility 
and entitlement, i. e. criteria of income, assets and, in particular, absence of private 
supporter. Second, they are potentially one of the most likely groups to be social 
assistance recipients at any time and certainly those in most need. Third, the new social 
assistance law specifies that `a survey of people just above the social assistance 
recipients shall be carried out by local authorities or local welfare offices in order to 
estimate the numbers of recipients for the following year' (NBLS Act, Clause 24, 
Article 1). By the law, people just above the recipients are defined as `people who are 
disqualified from social assistance and whose actual income is less than 120 per cent of 
the benefit scales, i. e. minimum living standards'. Yet, in practice, they receive little 
benefits or support from the government, except the Self-reliance scheme in which 
about 20,000 unemployed people participated in 2005 (see Chapter 5). 
Despite the above significance, however, there is little information about the 
characteristics of the non-assisted poor, and most previous studies of social assistance 
and poverty in Korea have focused only on the recipients of social assistance benefits. 
This chapter's first objective is therefore to analyse the characteristics of two groups - 
recipients and low-income non-recipients who are excluded from social assistance, in 
order to explore whether there are differences or similarities between the two low- 
income groups. For this objective, the first part of the chapter will compare recipient 
and non-recipient households in terms of health, education, economic situation and 
behavioural characteristics with regard to labour participation. Our interests go beyond a 
description of the comparison of the characteristics. Rather, the chapter's focus is on the 
factor(s) associated with the existence of poverty between recipients and non-recipients. 
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To compare the determinants of poverty between the two groups with low-income, 
statistical analysis will be conducted using logistic regression in the second part of the 
chapter. 
7.2 Data and methods 
In this chapter, data from the NRB are used. The survey for the NRB data was carried 
out in 2001 by the NRB, consisting of a group of independent experts in social policy 
and economics, recruited from universities and research institutes. The data were 
originally designed for the study of `Reform Measure of National Basic Livelihood 
Security Scheme', which was initially commissioned in 2001 by the MOIIW. The 
central aim of the study was to investigate the problems with which the new social 
assistance programme, NBLS scheme, put into effect from 2000 is confronted and to 
develop the scheme. 
The NRB data provide information on social assistance recipient and non-recipient 
households. However, the data do not encompass all non-recipient households but 
include only low-income non-recipient households who were excluded from the NBLS 
benefits by eligibility criteria. Thus hereafter `non-recipient' is used as a shorthand term 
for `non-recipient on low-income'. Likewise the term `population' is shorthand for 
`low-income population' rather than the whole population. Samples were selected based 
on probability sampling. In the first phase of sampling, fifty of all 251 cities, towns, 
counties and districts in South Korea were selected as sampling areas. From these fifty 
areas, 5,000 addresses of the recipients and non-recipients, which were registered in the 
local welfare offices, were selected with probability proportionate to size. 2,300 cases 
were interviewed and a sample of 2,008 people and their households, containing a total 
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sample of 5,168 individuals, was achieved in the end. The sample was stratified to be 
representative of the people assisted and non-assisted in South Korea with respect to 
region - big cities78, medium and small size towns, and rural communities. 
The following five categories of recipients and non-recipients were selected from the 
fifty areas: 
" General recipients (30.3 per cent of total samples, N=609): recipients of NBLS 
benefits who are unable to work. The recipients are not obliged to take part in 
the Self-reliance scheme including job search activities and vocational training.. 
" Conditional recipients (25.2 per cent of total samples, N=506): people receiving 
NBLS benefits on condition that they participate in the Self-reliance scheme. 
People in this category are primarily recipients over 18 under 60 and having 
ability to work. 
" Recipients exempted from the Self-reliance scheme (15.5 per cent of total 
samples, N=311): recipients in this category are exempted from participating in 
the employment promotion programmes as they are already employed (over 18 
hours a week), or have responsibility for the running of a household or the care 
of dependents, or having to work would endanger the proper upbringing of a 
child etc. 
0 Low income people who failed to be entitled to NBLS benefits (15.4 per cent 
N=309): people with low income who were excluded from the NBLS benefits 
by the eligibility criteria. People in this group are treated as `people placed just 
above the recipients', i. e. people in danger of being NBLS recipients at any 
78 Big cities refer to six major cities of which populations are more than a million 
including Seoul. 
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time, with the following group of people - participants in the Self-reliance 
scheme. In case of need, the non-recipients are also entitled to participating in 
the Self-reliance scheme. 
" Low-income participants in the Self-reliance scheme (13.6 per cent of total 
respondents, N=273): people in this category include low-income participants in 
the employment promotion programmes who were excluded from the NBLS 
benefits (thus participants receiving the NBLS benefits were excluded). These 
people are also treated as `people (or households) placed just above the 
recipients'. 
Interview was basically conducted with the household reference person, who is the 
householder responsible for the accommodation, or if this involves more than one 
person, the oldest person with responsibility. Individuals for interview were asked in 
detail about their circumstances and their views on a range of issues associated with the 
NBLS scheme that replaced the previous LP scheme (details are provided in Appendix 
Q. Interviews were carried out face-to-face with the selected respondent and had a 
median length of one hour. The fieldwork was undertaken in August 2001. With regard 
to the income variables provided by the NRB data, Livelihood and Housing Benefits 
which are both cash benefits are included, and the other five in-kind benefits79 which 
are provided for the NBLS recipients are excluded from the variables. 
For this research, the five separate groups of low-income shown above have been 
identified within each of the low-income: beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The 
79 In-kind benefits include Health Benefit, Educational Benefit, Maternity Benefit, Self- 
reliance benefit, and Funeral Benefit. For more information, see Chapter 4 and 5. 
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subjects of this chapter therefore are 2,008 people and their households, of whom 71 per 
cent (N = 1,426) were social assistance recipients and 29 per cent (N = 582) were non- 
recipients. In this NRB sample, recipient households outnumber non-recipient 
households by a ratio of 2.5 : 1. Comparisons and analyses of the two groups with low- 
income are made at the level of household rather than individual as the eligibility and 
benefit unit for the NBLS scheme is normally established on a household base (except 
in special circumstances, in which case individuals may be treated as separate units). 
Accordingly, the characteristics of the household reference person are mainly used 
alongside variables that express household structure. 
Table 7.1 shows the percentage distribution of household heads receiving NBLS 
benefits and those excluded from the benefits by sex, four age groups, marital status and 
family size. As can be seen in Table 7.1, the majority of the household heads of both 
low-income groups (87 per cent) were aged 41 or more. 55 per cent of recipients and 
65.5 per cent of non-recipients were aged between 41 and 64, and 31 per cent of 
recipients and 25 per cent of non-recipients were aged 65 and over. Heads of household 
under 41 represented less than 20 per cent of the sample population. About 55 per cent 
of each group were separated or divorced households and 30 per cent of each group 
were lone parent households80, while 36 per cent of both groups were married 
households. In terms of family size, single adults represented 27.3 per cent of recipients 
and 18.6 per cent of non-recipients, and about 75 per cent of both groups were 
households of two or more. This table indicates that there is no clear or significant 
difference between the two groups with regard to sex, age and family type and size. 
80 There is some overlap (about 450 samples) between separated/divorced and lone 
parent households. 
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There was no significant association between the variables of respondent's type 
(recipient or non-recipient) and sex, and respondents' type and family type / marital 
status. 
Table 7.1 Percentage distribution of respondents in low-income groups by sex, age and 
family type and size 
Recipients Non-recipients All N 
Gender 
Male 50.4 50.3 50.3 1,011 
Female 49.6 49.7 49.7 997 
Age group*** 
Under 31 2.2 1.5 2.0 41 
31-40 11.7 7.7 10.6 212 
41-64 55.0 65.5 58.0 1,165 
65 and over 31.1 25.3 29.4 590 
Family type/ marital status 
Lone parent 28.7 31.4 29.5 592 
Separated / divorced 57.2 55.0 56.5 1,135 
Married 35.1 39.5 36.4 730 
Family size*** 
1 27.3 18.6 24.8 498 
2 or more 72.7 81.4 75.2 1,510 
Significance: *** p<0.001. 
Source: NRB (2001), Author's calculations. 
Poverty can be measured in a number of ways, but this study uses an absolute definition 
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of poverty based on a budget standard. There are two apparent reasons for adopting the 
budget-standard based definition for this study rather than a relative one more 
commonly used in the majority of studies. First, as mentioned in earlier chapters (e. g. 
Chapter 4 and 5), social assistance benefit rates in Korea are based on the customarily 
accepted official poverty line, i. e. minimum living standards, and the minimum 
standards are set according to a budget standard. Second, in Korea, the minimum living 
standards based on a budget standard are used not only for the social assistance benefits 
rates but also for other social welfare benefits, and the budget-standard based poverty 
line is used in eligibility criteria for social assistance recipients (Kim, M. G, 2000). For 
these reasons, the absolute definition of poverty based on a budget standard has often 
been adopted in studies of social assistance and poverty in Korea. 81 The budget- 
standard based poverty line for four-person households was just below 40 per cent of the 
median income adjusted for household size, before housing costs in 2000 (Ku, 2004; Park 
et al, 2002), and 49 per cent of the average consumption expenditure of urban households 
in 2001 (NRB, 2001). 
The choice of equivalence scale can have a large impact on the level of measured 
poverty (Buhmann et al., 1988; Bradshaw, 1999; Behrendt, 2002; Förster and 
Vleminckx, 2004). This analysis adopts an equivalence scale shown in Table 6.2, which 
has been used in the calculation of the minimum living standards in 1999 and 2004, 
carried out by the KIHSA. The equivalence scale attaches the weight of I for household 
of one, 1.65 for household of two, 2.28 for household of three, 2.86 for household of four, 
3.25 for household of five, and 3.67 for household of six. This scale looks very similar to 
81 This group of studies includes Choi, H. S. (2002), Hong (2002), Ku (2002) and Park 
et al (2002). 
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the old OECD equivalence scale and much bigger than the modified OECD equivalence 
scale. The results of the budget-standard based poverty line adjusted for household size 
and the equivalence scale used are presented in Table 7.2. Using purchasing power 
parities for 2001, the poverty line for four person households is W956,000, 
approximately £846. 
Table 7.2 Definition of poverty line and equivalence scale (2001) 
Household Won Equivalence scale used in the Old Modified 
size (thousands) poverty line OECD scale OECD scale 
1 334 0.349 (1.00) 1.00 1.00 
2 553 0.578 (1.65) 1.70 1.50 
3 760 0.795 (2.28) 2.20 1.80 
4 956 1.00 (2.86) 2.70 2.10 
5 1,087 1.137 (3.25) 3.20 2.40 
6 1,227 1.283 (3.67) 3.70 2.70 
Notes: 
1. Poverty line based on a budget standard and refers to monthly income. 
2. Numbers in brackets are re-calculated on the basis of the household of one, that is the weight of 1 is attached to the 
household of one. 
3.1 Households of over six are excluded from the NRB data. 
4. Using OECD purchasing power parities for 2001, if -W 1,129.5 
Source: Atkinson, et al. (1995); MOIIW (2002c); Park et al. (2002). 
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7.3 Characteristics of recipient and non-recipient households 
7.3.1 Behavioural characteristics with regard to labour participation 
Table 7.3 provides information on current main economic activity of total NRB samples 
available including heads and other household members. The results indicate that non- 
recipient households tend to have higher rates of employment than recipient households, 
though both groups of low-income people tend to have low rates of employment: less 
than 50 per cent. It also shows many people with low-income, in particular, recipients 
(51 per cent), are not in employment because of illness or disability, or caring for 
children or relatives, or participating in the Self-reliance scheme. 20 per cent of both 
low-income groups were unemployed people. 
Table 7.3 Main economic activity of total samples, by type of respondent (% 
Recipients Non-recipients All 
Employed 30 48 36 
Unemployed 19 21 20 
Others 51 31 44 
N 2,545 1,225 3,770 
Note: * Economically inactive people who are ill, or caring for or nursing dependants, or on a government scheme. 
Significance: *** p<0.001. 
Source: NRB (2001), Author's calculations. 
Table 7.4 indicates behavioural characteristics between recipient and non-recipient 
households. With regard to the number of household members capable of work, 
recipient households are less likely to have household members capable of work than 
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non-recipient households: 40 per cent of recipient households were unable to work, but 
only 12 per cent of non-recipient households were unable to work. 88 per cent of non- 
assisted households had one or more persons able to work, as compared with 60 per 
cent of assisted households. 
With regard to the number of unemployed people wanting to work, on average, the 
majority of low-income households (72 per cent) reported not wanting to work. But 
those excluded from social assistance are more likely to want to participate in the labour 
market than those included: 39 per cent of non-assisted households, compared with 24 
per cent of assisted households. 
Table 7.4 Behavioural characteristics between recipients and non-recipients (%) 
Recipients Non-recipients All 
No. of people capable of work*** 
0 40 12 32.3 
1 41 45 42.2 
2+ 19 43 25.5 
No. of people who are unemployed but want to work*** 
0 76 61 72 
1 20 29 23 
2+ 4 10 5 
N 1,426 582 2,008 
Significance: *** p<0.001. 
Source: NRB (2001), Author's calculations. 
Table 7.5 shows information on whether unemployed people had tried to seek work over 
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the past six months. It indicates that, on average, nearly half (49 per cent) of the low- 
income households included in that survey reported `yes', among whom more non- 
recipient households (52 per cent) had tried seeking work during the past six months, 
compared to recipient households (45 per cent). Only 20 per cent of both low-income 
groups had not tried to find a job. 30 per cent of recipients and non-recipients were 
incapable of trying to seek work due to having disability or long term illness, or caring 
dependants or running a household. 
Table 7.5 Whether having tried to seek work for income during the past six months, by 
household type (%) 
Yes No Incapable of trying to seek work* N 
Recipients 45 23 32 506 
Non-recipients 52 20 28 582 
All 49 21 30 1,088 
Note: * Due to having disability or long term illness, or caring dependants or running a household etc. 
Significance: t p<0.10. 
Source: NRB (2001), Author's calculations. 
7.3.2 Economic situation 
In this section, the economic circumstances of both groups of low-income households 
will be analysed, using information on income, assets, savings, debts, and housing 
tenure. Table 7.6 indicates that non-recipient households have more mean income, 
assets and savings, but more debts. Scrutinizing the table by dimension, there are some 
notable things. First, non-recipient households have higher mean income and assets 
than recipients, but on the basis of the budget-standard based poverty line (i. e. 40 per of 
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Table 7.6 Income, assets, savings and debts, by household type 
Recipients Non-recipients 
Gross household income (monthly) 
Mean (Won thousands) 465.1 525.9 
S. D. 351.1 378.9 
P "" "" 
% who are poor 87.8 75.7 
Gross household assets 
Mean (Won ten thousands) 1,682.9 2,627.1 
S. D. 1,1143.4 1,2370.4 
P t t 
% with assets 78.3 87.6 
Gross household savings 
Mean (Won ten thousands) 42.4 102.0 
S. D. 330.2 560.0 
p ** a. 
% with savings 17.0 20.1 
Gross household debts 
Mean (Won ten thousands) 1,281.9 1,511.9 
S. D. 4419.2 2606.5 
P n. s. n. s. 
% with debts 46.4 48.8 
N-2,008 (for mean income, assets and savings); Na 945 (for mean debts). 
Significance: t p<O. 10; 4+ p<0.01; n. s. Not significant. 
Source: Own calculation from NRB (2001). 
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equivalent median income before housing costs) the proportions of people who are poor 
are considerably high for both groups: 88 per cent for recipients and 76 per cent for non- 
recipients. In the case of recipient households, there seems to be a probability that gross 
income could be raised up to the level of the poverty line, if in-kind benefits, such as 
Health, Educational and Self-reliance Benefits that are provided only for those who 
want them, are included (this topic is discussed in detail in Chapter 9). However, the fact 
that a huge proportion of non-recipient households are living in poverty implies that 
those who should be covered by social assistance are excluded from it due to the strict 
eligibility. In fact, these people run a higher risk to be poor than recipients, and if they 
are confronted with other unfavourable conditions such as restricted access to the labour 
market or specific needs, their lack of any social safety net increases their poverty risk 
(Behrendt, 2002: 100). Therefore, while non-recipient households have an income and 
assets advantage over recipient households, a large proportion of those excluded from 
social assistance seem to suffer from poverty. 
Second, those excluded from NBLS have higher savings than those included: over two 
times higher. Yet the percentage of households who have savings is only about 20 per 
cent for both groups, on the contrary, the majority of the low-income households (80 per 
cent) have no savings at all. Considering that 86 per cent of whole households in Korea 
have savings (NSO, 2000), the rate of savings of non-recipient households (20 per cent) 
is far lower than that of the total households of Korea. This implies that although non- 
assisted poor households have more savings than assisted households, the income from 
the savings of low-income households seem not enough to serve as a shock absorber in 
preventing or reducing poverty. 
Third, non-recipient households have slightly higher debts than recipients, while about 
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half of both groups have debts. Table 7.7 shows the reasons for debts among low- 
income households. The main reason was living cost (31 per cent), followed by fees for 
medical treatment (16 per cent), housing cost (13 per cent), getting working expenses 
(12.5 per cent), and education fees (9 per cent). There was relatively little difference 
between recipient and non-recipient households, except slightly higher rates of fees for 
medical treatment for recipient group and those of housing cost for non-recipients. The 
fact that living cost is the most important reason for debts for recipient households 
implies the social assistance benefit levels in Korea do not seem to secure an adequate 
standard of living for all households. In terms of regional difference, low-income 
households in rural areas reported significantly higher rates for farming cost (13 per 
cent) than other regions. 
Table 7.7 Main reasons for debts, by household type and regions (%) 
Type of respondents' Regions*** 
Recipients Non-recipients Great cities Middle & small towns Rural areas 
Living expenses 32 28 33 33 22 
Fee for medical treatment 17 13 18 15 15 
Housing cost 11 17 13 11 16 
Business 13 12 14 13 11 
Education 9 11 7 11 11 
Farming cost 4 4 3 13 
Other 14 15 15 14 12 
All 100 100 100 100 100 
N 661 284 389 365 191 
Significance: * p<0.05; *** p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculation from NRB (2001). 
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Table 7.8 shows housing tenure by household type. It can be seen that although non- 
recipient households are more likely to be homeowners (25 per cent) than recipient 
households (14 per cent), this represents only a quarter of total non-recipient households. 
As shown in Table 7.7, a large proportion of low-income households, in particular, the 
higher rate of non-recipient households reported one of the major reasons for debts as 
housing costs. Housing Benefits of NBLS are, however, currently provided only for 
recipient households and no benefits for non-recipient households. The results presented 
in Table 7.7 and 7.8 support previous research claiming that the housing problems seem 
to make the economic situation of low-income households worse and the households 
live longer at poverty (Lee, 1999a). 
Table 7.8 Type of housing tenure, by household type (%) 
Own house Rented private Hosing Assoc. rented Other rented (inc. free) 
Recipients 14 27 46 13 
Non-recipients 25 23 43 9 
All 17 26 45 12 
N 346 513 909 240 
Significance: F" p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculation from NRB (2001). 
7.3.3 Health and education 
Three variables were used from NRB data to examine issues of health status and 
educational attainment: firstly, the presence of long-term illness; secondly, having a 
disability or not; and one variable to determine educational status: attendance of upper 
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secondary education. The reason for including these data is that long-term illness and 
having a disability are likely to limit usual daily activities and affect a person's earning 
potential, and lower educational attainment is likely to restrict job security in the labour 
market. Table 7.9 indicates some differences in health status between the two low- 
income household groups. Those in receipt of social assistance are more likely than 
those excluded from it to suffer both long-standing illness and disability, implying 
higher proportion of recipients are confronted with restricted access to the labour market 
and specific needs. On the other hand the table shows there is little difference in terms 
of educational attainment between the two kinds of poor households, while there was no 
significant association between the variables of respondent's type and educational status. 
Four in five of the low-income people are below upper secondary education. 
Table 7.9 Health status and educational qualifications, by household type (%) 
Suffering long-term Having Educational qualifications 
illness*** disability*** 
Yes 
Recipients 58 
Non-recipients 48 
All 55 
N 1,099 
No 
42 
52 
45 
Yes No Upper secondary Below upper 
education & over secondary education 
25 75 20 80 
16 84 20 
22 78 20 
909 444 1,564 410 
N=2,008 (for long-term illness and disability); N=2,006 (for educational qualification). 
Significance: ** p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculation from NRB (2001). 
80 
80 
1596 
The NRB data have provided valuable information on the current status and situation of 
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both recipient and non-recipient households. Analysis will now be conducted on the 
factors associated with the existence of poverty and whether the patterns of poverty of 
assisted households differ from those of non-assisted poor households. 
7.4 The determinants of poverty 
This section uses logistic regression based on indicators of demography, health, 
education, employment and benefit status to analyse the probability of an individual 
living in a household with an income below the budget-standard based poverty line (i. e. 
40 per cent of median income). The dependent variable for the logistic regression is 
binary; that is, a person (householder) in the survey is given a score of I if his or her 
household lives with a gross household income below the poverty line and a score of 0 
if his or her household lives with a gross household income above the poverty line. 
Secondary analysis will be conducted on data on income of the two low-income groups 
- here those who are in receipt of NBLS benefits and are excluded from the benefits. 
Logistic regression is an appropriate statistical technique for this type of data and can be 
used to estimate which combination of explanatory variables gives a good prediction of 
the odds of a household living with an income less than the poverty threshold. The 
choice of explanatory (independent) variables will be limited to those which can be 
replicated using NRB data. The explanatory variables used for assessing the weight of 
the factors in explaining the determinants of poverty of recipient and non-recipient 
households are presented in Table 7.10, with the rationale for choosing them as possible 
predictors. These variables are drawn from the comparison of the socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of the two low-income groups, examined in the previous 
section, with additional analysis from the findings of Saraceno (2002), NRB (2001), 
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Table 7.10 Variables used in logistic regressions of the determinants of being poor 
Independent variables (coding) Reason for inclusion 
Number of persons in household 
Age of household head 
Under 40; 40-59; 60 and more 
Single adults without children (yes=1) 
Lone parenthood (yes=1) 
Separated or divorced (yes=1) 
Sex of householder (female=1) 
Health: household containing any member who has any 
long-term illness or disability (yes=1) 
Educational attainment: householder attended below 
upper secondary education (yes=1) 
Housing tenure: Housing Association rented or other 
rented including free rented (yes=1) 
Low-income households with a higher number of 
members are likely to have insufficient incomes for 
supporting the household. 
Older people are likely to have lower incomes. 
Singles without children, traditionally regarded as 
'undeserving', are more likely to live in poverty. 
Lone parents are likely to have lower incomes. 
Separation/divorce is likely to be more disadvantaged in 
the labour market. 
Women are likely to have lower incomes. 
Long-term illness is likely to limit usual daily activities 
and affect a person's earning potential. 
Lower educational attainment is likely to restrict job 
security in the labour market. 
People living in a house housing association rented or 
other rented including free rented are more likely to have 
lower incomes than those living in a house owned and 
rented private. 
Labour market detachment: economically inactive or Economically inactive or unemployed people are more 
unemployed household (yes=1) likely to experience poverty. 
Household receiving NBLS benefits (yes=1) Those in receipt of social assistance benefits are likely to 
live with lower incomes. 
Residential area (region): households living in a rural People living in rural areas are likely to have lower 
area (rural areas=l, urban areas=O) incomes than those in urban areas. 
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Huby et al. (1998), Jeong et at. (2001), and Whelan et at. (2003). It may be interesting 
to merge lone parenthood and separation/divorce into one variable, but as mentioned 
above there is an overlap of 450 samples between the two, thus they are separated in 
this analysis. 
The results of an analysis of the determinants of poverty of three different groups, i. e. 
recipients, non-recipients and both low-income groups are listed in Tables 7.11. In the 
analysis, a variable indicating `age of respondent (household head)' has been recorded 
into three binary variables by three age groups - under 40,40 to 59, and 60 and over - 
in order to test whether there is any specific effect of age groups on being poor. A 
variable indicating `receiving NBLS benefits' has been used only for the analysis of 
both low-income groups (column 1) and excluded from that of recipients (column 2) 
and non-recipients (column3). 
Table 7.11 shows that the odds of being poor vary by type of low-income group. In the 
first column, the best-fitting model selected six variables which contribute to the odds 
of low-income people including both recipients and non-recipients being poor. 
Receiving NBLS benefits, labour market detachment, living in a rural area, 
householder's highest qualification, age under 40 and the number of persons in 
household are the strongest predictors of poverty. Receiving social assistance benefits 
increases the likelihood of experiencing poverty by three times (3.04***). Labour 
market detachment also has a significant effect on their chances of being in poverty. 
Those who are unemployed or inactive are almost 2.5 times (2.36***) more likely to be 
poor than other people with low income. Those living in a rural area (1.51 *) and whose 
education status are below upper secondary education (1.41 *) are almost 1.5 times more 
likely to experience poverty, while those aged under 40 are two times less (0.5**) likely 
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to be poor than others. Every additional person in the household increases the risk of 
being poor by 1.1 times (1.14*). 
Some of these effects remain significant when analysis is conducted on recipient 
households. In the second column, the best-fitting model selected four variables: 
labour market detachment, living in a rural area and the number of persons in household, 
which were included in the model for both low-income groups, and single adults. In this 
model, educational attainment and age under 40 no longer have an impact on those in 
receipt of NBLS benefits being in poverty. Single adults without children are almost six 
times (5.92***) more likely to be poor than other recipient households. Those who are 
unemployed and inactive are over 2.5 times (2.69***) and people in rural areas are 
about two times (2.08**) more likely to experience poverty. The number of persons in 
the household increases the likelihood of being in poverty by almost 1.5 times (1.32*). 
Table 7.11 Odds ratios from logistic regression of being poor 
Recipients and Recipients Non-recipients 
non-recipients 
Labour market detachment 
Region 
Educational attainment 
2.36*4* 
1.51 " 
1.41" 
1.14+ 
n. s. 
3.04*** 
0.50** 
2.69*** 2.12** 
2.08** n. s. 
n. s. n. s. 
1.32* n. s. Number of persons 
Single adults 
Receiving NBLS benefits 
Age under 40 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Source: NRB (2001). 
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5.92*** 0.36** 
n. s. 0.35* 
The third column in Table 7.11 shows the odds of the non-recipient households in the 
NRB data being poor. Labour market detachment and age under 40 once again have an 
impact on the risk of being in poverty. Those detached from the labour market are over 
two times (2.12**) more likely to experience poverty, while those age under 40 are 
almost three times (0.35*) less likely to be poor. Unlike in the model for recipient 
households, single adults not receiving the social assistance benefits are almost three 
times (0.36**) less likely to experience poverty than other non-recipients. This may be 
because of better economic and health circumstances and behavioural characteristics of 
those excluded from the NBLS benefits being more likely to seek labour participation 
than those included. In relation to the age groups, only one group, i. e. age under 40 was 
included in the models presented in this chapter. This indicates that those under 40 are 
less likely to be poor than older people. Other variables which were expected to have 
significant effects on being in poverty, such as lone parenthood, long-term illness, age 
over 60 etc., do not appear to be associated with the propensity to experience poverty in 
this research. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has started from the fact that a large number of people are excluded from 
Korean social assistance although they seem to be live in poverty. Also there was a 
suggestion from Saraceno (2002) that to evaluate if an income support scheme gives 
good coverage, those excluded from social assistance would be a useful control group 
since there may be similarities and differences with regard to behavioural characteristics 
between assisted and non-assisted low-income groups. The features of recipients and 
non-recipients were thus compared in the chapter to explore whether there are 
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similarities or distinctions between the two groups and to seek adequate policies for 
each group. 
The empirical results presented in the chapter show that, notwithstanding the similarity 
of the two groups that live on low-income, there are significant differences. With regard 
to behavioural characteristics of labour participation, those excluded from NBLS tend to 
have higher rates of employment because of better economic and health circumstances, 
and to have a stronger desire to work, while there is little difference in terms of 
educational attainment between the two groups. The analysis of the determinants of 
being in poverty reveals that labour market detachment has a strong impact on the risk 
of experiencing poverty for both recipient and non-recipient households. In other words, 
low-income people who are outside the labour force are more likely to be in poverty. 
These findings suggest those who are employable and have a desire to work need to be 
more closely and systematically linked with an active labour market policy to help them 
escape from poverty and to promote autonomy and reintegration. 
The poverty of recipients is most strongly influenced by living alone as well as labour 
market detachment. This suggests that raising NBLS levels may be a well-targeted 
way of relieving poverty for singles without children, on the one hand. On the other 
hand, the result also implies, as in most OECD countries (Adema et al., 2003: 46), 
setting social assistance payment rates for single (and possibly couple) families 
without children needs to give such clients stronger financial incentives to work, while 
the financial incentive structure for families with children tends to be weaker. The 
findings from the chapter show that the poverty of recipients is also influenced by 
living in a rural area. Previous studies on benefit levels suggest that the current benefit 
rates in Korea seem to be unfavourable to low-income households living in large cities, 
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who seem to need more living expenses than those living in smaller cities or rural 
areas (e. g. SSWI, 2005; also see section 6.2, Chapter 6). Thus the evidence drawn 
from this chapter does not seem to support the previous research. This study cannot 
tell us why this inconsistence occurs. Further in-depth studies on this issue would 
require an evaluation of the minimum living standards and living costs for different 
household type and size, as well as different regions that would go far beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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Chapter 8 Effectiveness of the social assistance scheme in Korea 
Means-tested social assistance benefits are the basic and final safety net and play a 
crucial role for the alleviation of poverty. Given that means-tested benefits are explicitly 
designed to alleviate poverty, the effects of social assistance schemes can be evaluated 
by the effectiveness of poverty reduction. As stated and argued in previous chapters (e. g. 
Chapter 2,4 and 7), a large number of people in receipt of social assistance benefits in 
Korea seem to be living below the minimum living standards, which are benefit levels 
for social assistance. As shown in Chapter 7, about 80 per cent of recipients live below 
the benefit scale rates. Is the Korean social assistance benefit effective in protecting the 
poor from hardship? How effectively does the means-tested benefit reduce poverty? In 
this chapter, the effects of the Korean social assistance programme, the NBLS scheme is 
evaluated on the basis of a comparison between incomes before and after transfer, using 
data from the NRB (2001). 
8.1 Assessing the effectiveness of social policies 
The evaluation of the impact of taxes and transfers largely follows Beckerman's (1979) 
influential approach, based on a comparison of poverty measure before and after 
redistribution. Figure 8.1 provides a way of illustrating the approach. The non-social 
security income and post-social security income is given by the bold lines. The areas 
marked A and B represent total social security transfers. With the poverty line indicated, 
the extent of pre-transfer poverty is represented by the areas A and C, whilst the area 
C represents post-transfer poverty, and A the sum of poverty reduced by transfers. The 
effectiveness of transfers can be measured as the ratio A/(A+C) - poverty alleviated as a 
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proportion of pre-transfer poverty. 82 
Figure 8.1 Beckerman ratios 
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Source: Beckerman (1979: 53), Behrendt (2002: 19) 
There is a widespread perception that means-tested social assistance is growing in 
importance since the interest in targeting, selectivity and means-testing continues to 
grow in the international context, and rising long-term unemployment in Europe has 
caused more people to rely on social assistance benefits (Eurostat and European 
Commission. 2000, quoted in Hölsch and Kraus, 2004: 144). However, relatively little 
scholarly attention has been devoted to the effects of means-tested benefits on poverty 
(except Behrendt, 2000,2002; Sainsbury and Morrissens, 2002: Ilälsch and Kraus. 
2004). although a number of studies have scrutinized the effects of taxes and social 
82 Poverty reduction efficiency can be measured as the ratio A/(A+B) - poverty 
prevented as a proportion of the total social security transfer expenditure spent. 
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security systems as a whole (e. g. Beckerman, 1979; Mitchell, 1991; Förster, 1994). The 
measured effectiveness of social transfers (i. e. Beckerman ratios) fails to provide clear 
explanation of why welfare states fail to effectively alleviate poverty (Mitchell, 1991: 
156-159; Behrendt, 2002: 18-32), although the measure allows a relatively 
straightforward analysis of re-distributional effects of transfers across time and 
countries, by comparing pre- and post- transfer poverty rates. 
A number of studies on poverty in Korea have addressed the effectiveness of Korean 
social security transfers as a whole together with private income transfers83 on poverty 
reduction, most of which used Beckerman's approach. Analyses on the impact of social 
and private transfers have been made by Choi (2002) and Kim (2002) for the population 
as a whole, by Hong (2002) for elderly/non-elderly and lone parent households and 
Kwon (2001b) for the elderly. Park et al. (2002) have attempted to analyse the effects of 
redistribution through taxes and non-means-tested/means-tested benefits for the 
population as a whole as well as for employed and unemployed households. The 
previous studies have identified that the level of the effectiveness of social transfer 
systems in Korea is very low, wherein means-tested social assistance is most effective 
among all types. Rather, they find private income transfers contribute more to 
mitigating poverty than non-means-tested and means-tested benefits (Son, 1999; Choi, 
2002; Hong 2002; Kim, 2002; Kwon, 2001b; Park et al., 2002), even though the 
effectiveness of social security systems has been improved since the new NBLS social 
assistance programme was established in 2000 (Hong, 2002). The existing Korean 
studies, however, have not revealed specific patterns of poverty alleviation through 
social assistance, which is the most effective social safety net to reduce poverty in 
83 For example, financial support from family and relatives 
199 
Korea. Moreover, most of the previous literature has indirectly tested the effectiveness 
of the former categorical social assistance scheme in the analyses of total redistribution, 
and little analyses have been done on the new general assistance scheme (except Choi, 
2002; Hong, 2002). 
Given that one of the main purposes of social assistance schemes is poverty alleviation, 
a question arises of how effective social assistance programmes are in achieving their 
purpose of reducing poverty. The persistence of poverty in welfare states means the 
basic and final safety net of the welfare states is ineffective in eradicating poverty. A 
detailed assessment of the bottom safety net of welfare states can offer useful insight to 
the causes and the conditions of an effective alleviation of poverty (Behrendt, 2000, 
2002). 
8.2 Evaluating the effectiveness of social assistance in Korea 
In this chapter, the NRB data are used. Information on the data was presented in Chapter 
7 and Appendix C. The NRB data allow us to examine poverty among social assistance 
recipients in Korea and to evaluate the effectiveness of one single programme, in this 
case, social assistance in Korea (NBLS) on poverty reduction. The subjects of this 
chapter are 1,426 social assistance recipients and their households - 71 per cent of the 
total NRB sample of 2,008 people and their households. Like in Chapter 7, in this 
chapter, comparisons and analyses of the recipient group are made at the level of 
household rather than individual as the eligibility and benefit unit for the NBLS is 
normally established on a household base (except in special circumstances, in which 
case individuals may be treated as separate units). The characteristics of the household 
reference person are therefore used alongside variables that express household structure. 
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It is clear that the poverty rate is sensitive to the threshold used, but like the previous 
chapter, this study uses a budget-standard based poverty threshold, i. e. 40 per cent of the 
equivalent median income before housing costs. This chapter adopts the equivalence 
scale used in Chapter 7, attaching the weight of 1 for household of one, 1.65 for 
household of two, 2.28 for household of three, 2.86 for household of four, 3.25 for 
household of five, and 3.67 for household of six. As shown in the previous chapter, this 
scale looks very similar to the old OECD equivalence scale and much bigger than the 
modified OECD equivalence scale. The results of the budget-standard based poverty line 
adjusted for household size and the equivalence scale used are listed in Table 7.2 in 
Chapter 7. 
Poverty rates based on equivalent gross income before housing costs are used as a 
measure for post-transfer. Poverty rates based on market income including earnings 
from labour and capital as well as occupational and private benefits are used as a 
measure for pre-transfer. Income before means-tested benefits is calculated by 
subtracting all means-tested benefits from the gross income. With regard to the income 
variables provided by the NRB data, Livelihood Benefit and Housing Benefit which are 
both cash benefits are included, and the other five in-kind benefits84 which are provided 
for the NBLS recipients are excluded from the variables. Therefore this study is limited 
to income poverty of recipient households. 
To assess the effectiveness of social assistance benefits on poverty, in this chapter, 
84 In-kind benefits include Health Benefit, Educational Benefit, Maternity Benefit, Self- 
reliance benefit, and Funeral Benefit. 
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incomes of recipient households (N = 1,409) before and after means-tested transfers are 
compared in terms of incidence and intensity of poverty. The incidence of poverty 
indicates how many poor we find in a population, whereas the intensity of poverty deals 
with the question of how far the income of the poor is below the specified poverty 
threshold (Hölsch and Kraus, 2004: 153). For this study, the incidence of poverty is 
measured by the reduction of poverty rates, so-called head-count measure (i. e. the 
number of people or households who are lifted out of poverty), which is the most simple 
and commonly used measure in the poverty study (Mitchell, 1991). The head-count 
measure assesses the extent to which means-tested benefits reduce the number of 
households in poverty by giving the share of poor in the population being considered. 
However, this does not assess the degree to which incomes fall below the poverty line in 
the pre- and post- transfer situation (Beckerman, 1979; Hölsch and Kraus, 2004; 
Mitchell, 1991). Thus in combination with the head-count measure, the poverty gap 
method is used to evaluate the intensity of poverty and the extent to which people are 
lifted up the income scale by social assistance benefits. 
The impact of means-tested transfers is addressed by the effectiveness of social 
assistance benefits in poverty reduction across a range of groups. Recent literature on 
poverty in Korea (Hong, 2002; Kim, 2002) noted that the effectiveness of social 
transfers on poverty varied by family types. While the aggregate poverty rate and 
poverty gap measures give an overview of the impact of transfer systems, they do not 
give information on the spread of the outcomes across the population, or concentration 
in particular areas (Mitchell, 1991: 45). The following groups have been adopted in this 
chapter: Elderly households (singles and couples); non-elderly households 
(unemployed/economically inactive households, the employed, lone parents and single 
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adults) 85; large households (households of four and over and five and more)86. 
8.3 Poverty reduction effectiveness 
Table 8.1 presents the effects of means-tested social assistance benefits in Korea on 
poverty rates across various poverty brackets. It focuses on households that receive any 
sort of means-tested benefits; households not receiving benefits are excluded. Almost all 
recipient households in Korea (96.5 per cent) had an income below the budget-standard 
based poverty line, as such very high levels of poverty rates were displayed even aller 
transfers - 87.8 per cent of recipient households were still in income poverty. Only a 
small fraction of the poor (8.7 per cent) were actually lifted over the poverty line after 
means-tested benefits including Livelihood Benefits and Housing Benefits. Poverty 
rates for the extreme poverty bracket, i. e. below 60 per cent of the poverty line, were 
considerably reduced to 31.7 per cent after transfer from 82.9 per cent before transfer. 
The fifth and sixth columns in Table 8.1 present absolute and relative measures of 
poverty reduction effectiveness for social assistance transfer. The absolute measure is 
the percentage point difference between the pre-transfer and post-transfer poverty rates. 
The relative measure indicates the proportion of pre-transfer poor lifted above the 
poverty line through social assistance transfer. Means-tested social assistance benefits 
have reduced poverty by 8.7 percentage points in absolute terms and by 9 per cent in 
85 Some samples of lone parents and single adults overlap with those of unemployed or 
employed. Non-elderly couples without children are excluded from this study because 
of too small sample size for the NRB data. 
86 Include both elderly and non-elderly households. 
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relative terms. A close look reveals an outstanding reduction of poverty rates for the 
lowest poverty bracket. The share of the low-income population living in extreme 
poverty was reduced by 51 percentage points or by 62 per cent. 
Table 8.1 Poverty rates before and after social assistance and reduction through social 
assistance (as a percentage of all receipt households), 2001 
Poverty Poverty status Poverty status Percentage point Percent 
before SA benefits after SA benefits reduction reduction 
Extreme poverty Y<60% 82.9 31.7 -51.2 -61.8 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 96.5 87.8 -8.7 -9.0 
100%) 
Notes: N-1,266. Y= gross household income adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals 
the budget-standard based poverty line. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
The fifth and sixth columns in Table 8.1 present absolute and relative measures of 
poverty reduction effectiveness for social assistance transfer. The absolute measure is 
the percentage point difference between the pre-transfer and post-transfer poverty rates. 
The relative measure indicates the proportion of pre-transfer poor lifted above the 
poverty line through social assistance transfer. Means-tested social assistance benefits 
have reduced poverty by 8.7 percentage points in absolute terms and by 9 per cent in 
relative terms. A close look reveals an outstanding reduction of poverty rates for the 
lowest poverty bracket. The share of the low-income population living in extreme 
poverty was reduced by 51 percentage points or by 62 per cent. 
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8.4 Evaluating the poverty gap 
The impact of transfer policies in alleviating poverty may be measured by the size of 
poverty gap as well as by numbers of households (or people) who are in poverty. The 
poverty gap assesses the resources needed to eradicate poverty by summing the gaps 
between household income and the given poverty line. For the average poverty gap 
reduction, each family's gap is separately calculated as a percentage of the budget 
standard based poverty line adjusted for household size and the resulting estimates are 
averaged (Buhmann, et al., 1988; Mitchell, 1991). Poverty gaps are negative if the 
average income of households after transfers is higher than the poverty line. 
Table 8.2 presents the results of the average poverty gap before and after social 
assistance benefits. After transfers, poverty gap is positive, thus implying that, on 
average, household incomes of the poor are still lower than the budget-standard based 
poverty line. The average poverty gaps were reduced to W181,000 (using the OECD 
Table 8.2 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for households who were poor before having received social assistance, 2001 
(thousand won or percentage) 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 422 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits 181 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -241 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -57 
N 1,266 
Note: Using the OECD purchasing power parities for 2001, f I -W1,129.5. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
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purchasing power parities, approximately £160) after transfers from W422,000 
(approximately £373) before transfers. 
The absolute reduction of poverty gap was W241,000 (approximately £213) and the 
relative reduction of poverty gap was 57 per cent. Consequently, the poverty gap before 
social assistance transfers has been large, but its reduction was not effective enough for 
the poor to eradicate poverty. 
From the results of the study, it is shown that many beneficiary households are likely to 
live below the poverty line even after social assistance transfers. The aggregate poverty 
measures shown above however do not give information on whether there is variation in 
the head-counts and the poverty gaps for household types. Previous studies on poverty 
(e. g. Beckerman, 1979; Mitchell, 1991) argue there is considerable variation in the 
poverty rates and the size of poverty gaps of different household types and these 
variations are concealed when aggregates only are taken into account. A more detailed 
analysis, breaking down the aggregate measures into the disaggregated measures by 
household types may thus reveal a clearer picture of the impact of social assistance 
benefits on poverty. 
8.5 Disaggregation of the poverty reduction and the poverty gap 
This section examines the extent to which the social assistance benefits favour particular 
groups by analysing the pre- and post- transfer head-counts and poverty gaps for the 
following household types: elderly, non-elderly and large households. For each of the 
household types, the head-counts are analysed in the same ways as above, i. e. the 
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estimates of poverty rates and the poverty reduction effectiveness, and then the average 
poverty gap before and after social assistance benefits including the Livelihood Benefits 
and the Housing Benefits. 
8.5.1 The elderly 
The elderly have been included in many poverty studies as a vulnerable group since 
their economic well-being largely relies on the social security systems (Beckerman, 
1979; Hong, 2002: 70; Kim, 2002; Ku, 2002: 96; Mitchell, 1991; Sainsbury and 
Morissens, 2002: 319). They are also exhibited as one of the household types which is 
in higher risk of poverty amongst the recipient households from the NRB data, while 
there seems to be considerable differences between elderly singles and elderly couples 
in terms of incidence and intensity of poverty. 
Table 8.3 shows the incidence of poverty amongst recipient households headed by the 
elderly aged 60 and over on the basis of the budget-standard based poverty line. The 
pre- and post- benefit incidence of poverty amongst elderly singles is slightly lower than 
amongst elderly couples. Pre-transfer, 98.3 per cent of elderly singles lived in poverty, 
while all of elderly couples were in poverty. Post-transfer, there is less poverty amongst 
elderly singles (89.5 per cent) than amongst elderly couples (94.3 per cent), although the 
post-benefit incidence of poverty amongst the all elderly recipients is still substantial. 
The reduction of poverty rates for elderly singles is also more marked than that for 
elderly couples - 8.8 percentage points in absolute terms and 9.0 per cent in relative 
terms for elderly singles, and 5.7 percentage points and 5.7 per cent for elderly couples. 
In particular, the share of the low-income population living in the lowest poverty 
bracket has been considerably reduced by 74.8 percentage points and 78.8 per cent for 
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elderly singles, while 48.1 percentage points and 54.4 per cent for elderly couples. 
Table 8.3 Poverty rates before and after social assistance and reduction through social 
assistance (as a percentage of all elderly recipient households), 2001 
Poverty Poverty status 
before SA benefits 
Poverty status after 
SA benefits 
Percentage point 
reduction 
Percent 
reduction 
Sing Coup Sing Coup Sing Coup Sing Coup 
Extreme poverty Y< 60% 94.9 88.5 20.1 40.4 -74.8 -48.1 -78.8 -54.4 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 98.3 100.0 89.5 94.3 -8.8 -5.7 -9.0 -5.7 
100%) 
Notes: Sing - singles aged 60 and over (N - 239); Coup - couples aged 60 and over living alone (N i 104); Y 
gross household income adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals the poverty line. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
Table 8.4 shows the results of the average poverty gaps for the elderly pre- and post - 
transfers. The poverty gaps for elderly singles both before and after benefits were much 
smaller than those for elderly couples, although post-benefit household incomes of all 
elderly households are still lower than the budget-standard based poverty line. This 
means elderly singles are likely to be better off than elderly couples, though the poverty 
gaps were still negative. Considering the reduction of poverty gaps, the social assistance 
benefits in Korea display smaller decrease in poverty gaps for elderly singles 
(W253,000) than for elderly couples (W301,000) in absolute terms, while they are 
slightly more effective for elderly singles (61 per cent) than elderly couples (57 per 
cent) in relative terms. 
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Table 8.4 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for elderly households who were poor before having received social assistance, 
2001 (thousand won or percentage) 
Single Couple 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 418 530 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits 165 229 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -233 -301 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -61 -57 
N 239 104 
Note: Using the OECD purchasing power parities for 2001, fI-W1,129.5. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
8.5.2 Working-age adults 
Unemployed/economically inactive and employed people 
Unemployed or economically inactive people who are ill, disabled, and caring for or 
nursing dependents, are often deemed as vulnerable groups to poverty, because they are 
detached from the labour market (Ku, 2002; Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002; Son, 1999; 
Whelan et al., 2003). Table 8.5 shows the importance of the means-tested benefits in 
alleviating poverty among households headed by working-age adults, i. e. aged below 60. 
97.4 per cent of all unemployed or economically inactive households in receipt of social 
assistance had an income below the budget-standard based poverty line before transfers 
and 88.9 per cent of them were in extreme poverty. The Korean social assistance 
benefits have reduced poverty by 6.8 percentage points in absolute terms and 7 per cent 
in relative terms after transfers, but 90.6 per cent of them still lived in poverty after 
having received the benefits. The share of the low-income population living in extreme 
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poverty was reduced by 51.6 percentage points and 58 per cent, but 37.3 per cent of 
the population remained in the lowest poverty bracket. 
Recipient households headed by the employed had much lower poverty rates both 
before and after transfers - 92.9 per cent and 78.9 per cent respectively. Actually, the 
pre- and post- benefit incidence of poverty amongst the employed is second lowest 
amongst all types of households discussed in the chapter. The reduction in the incidence 
of poverty for the group is in fact greatest among all household types, although many of 
the employed remain in poverty after social assistance transfers. Means-tested benefits 
have reduced poverty by 14 percentage points in absolute terms and 15.1 per cent in 
relative terms. 
Table 8.5 Poverty rates and poverty reduction for households headed by the 
unemployed/economically inactive and employed having received social assistance, 2001 
Poverty Poverty status Poverty status Percentage point Percent 
before SA benefits after SA benefits reduction reduction 
Une Emp Une Emp Une Emp Une Emp 
Extreme poverty Y< 60% 88.9 63.6 37.3 21.4 -51.6 -42.2 -58.0 -66.3 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 97.4 92.9 90.6 78.9 -6.8 -14.0 -7.0 -15.1 
100%) 
Notes: Une = unemployed or economically inactive people who are ill, disabled, caring for or nursing dependents, or 
on a government scheme (N = 386); Emp - employed people (N - 341); Y- gross household income adjusted for 
household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals the poverty line. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
In Table 8.6, the results of the estimates of the average poverty gaps and the reduction in 
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the poverty gaps pre- and post- transfers for unemployed and employed households are 
presented. The poverty gap estimates show the average size of the poverty gap before 
transfer for unemployed or economically inactive households is much greater than that 
for employed households, which means the social assistance benefits had a larger gap to 
fill: W491,000 for the unemployed/inactive, and W355,000 for the employed. Post- 
transfer, the poverty gap measure tells a similar story to the pre-transfer - W226,000 for 
the unemployed/inactive, and W157,000 for the employed. There is not much difference 
between the two groups with regard to the relative reduction of poverty gaps, while the 
absolute reduction of poverty gaps for the unemployed is larger than that for the 
employed, even though the labour market detached are more likely to be poor post- 
transfer. 
Table 8.6 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for households headed by working-age adults in receipt of social assistance 
(thousand won or percentage) 
Unemployed or economically inactive Employed 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 491 355 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits 226 157 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -265 -198 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -54 -56 
N 386 341 
Note: Using the OECD purchasing power parities for 2001, f 1- W1,129.5. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
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Lone parents and single adults (working-age) 
Lone parents have been a significant group in the poor population in many studies (e. g. 
Hong, 2002; Ku, 2002; Mitchell, 1991). They are also a very vulnerable group to 
poverty in the NRB data, although the incidence of poverty amongst the group is not the 
highest. Table 8.7 shows the incident of poverty among households headed by working- 
age lone parents and single adults without children. Over 95 per cent of the lone parent 
households lived in poverty before benefits and the post-benefit incident of poverty 
among the group was still high - 84.1 per cent. The reduction in poverty amongst the 
lone parents in Korea is relatively high - the social assistance benefits have reduced 
poverty by 11.7 percentage points in absolute terms and 12.2 per cent in relative terms. 
With regard to the lowest poverty bracket, the Korean means-tested benefits have reduced 
poverty amongst lone parents by 61.2 per cent (or 47.3 percentage points). 
Table 8.7 Poverty rates before and after social assistance and reduction through social 
assistance for working-age lone parents and single adults without children, 2001 
Poverty status Poverty status Poverty status after Percentage point Percent 
before SA benefits SA benefits reduction reduction 
Lone Sing Lone Sing Lone Sing Lone Sing 
Extreme poverty Y<60% 77.3 69.0 30.0 17.2 -47.3 -51.8 -61.2 -75.1 
Poverty (less Y< 100% 95.8 90.5 84.1 78.4 -11.7 -12.1 -12.2 -13.4 
than 100%) 
Notes: Lone - working-age lone parents (N a 309); Sing 0 working-age single adults without children (N - 116); Y 
gross household income adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals the poverty line. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
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The incidence of poverty amongst working-age single adults without children both 
before and after transfer is lowest among all groups, and poverty reduction was second 
greatest after the employed. Indeed, 90.5 per cent of all single persons had an income 
below the poverty line based on the budget standard before transfer, and 78.4 per cent of 
the group lived in poverty after transfer. Poverty rates for the extreme poverty bracket 
(below 60 per cent of the poverty line) were significantly reduced to 17.2 per cent after 
transfer from 69 per cent before transfer. The social assistance benefits have reduced 
poverty among single adults by 13.4 per cent and 12.1 percentage points. The share of 
the population living in extreme poverty among single adults has considerably declined 
by 51.8 percentage points or 75 per cent, but 17.2 per cent of households remained in 
this bracket in spite of social assistance transfers. 
To give a clearer picture of the impact of social assistance benefits across lone parents 
and single adults, Table 8.8 shows the average poverty gap and its reduction pre- and 
Table 8.8 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for lone parents and single adults who were poor before having received social 
assistance, 2001 (thousand won or percentage) 
Lone parents Single adults 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 399 201 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits 172 40 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -227 -161 
Relative poverty gap reduction -57% -80% 
N 309 116 
Note: Using the OECD purchasing power parities for 2001, £1 -W1,129.5. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
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post- transfer. Of all household types considered in this chapter, the poverty gaps for 
single persons were the smallest both before and after the social assistance transfers; in 
other words, the social assistance benefit had the smallest gap to fill for the group - Pre- 
transfer W201,000 (using purchasing power parities, approximately £178) and post- 
transfer W40,000 (approximately £35). The relative reduction of the poverty gaps for 
the group has been greatest amongst all groups - 80 per cent in relative terms, and 
W161,000 in absolute terms. There is no big difference in the reduction in the poverty 
gap for lone parents, compared to other types of recipient households. The reduction of 
poverty gap was W227,000 in absolute terms and 57 per cent in relative terms. 
8.5.3 Large households 
Low-income households with a higher number of members are likely to have 
insufficient incomes for supporting the household so they have poverty rates that often 
rival or exceed those of other vulnerable groups such as lone parents (Sainsbury and 
Morissens, 2002: 317; Saraceno, 2002). Table 8.9 shows, the incidence of poverty 
amongst recipient households of four and over, and five and over. Households of five 
and over had a higher poverty rate (97.9 per cent) than other household types except 
elderly singles and couples before transfer, and second highest post-benefit poverty rate 
(90.8 per cent) after elderly couples; even slightly higher than unemployed households. 
The poverty rate has been reduced by 7.1 percentage points in absolute terms or by 7.3 
per cent in relative terms. The percentage of households of five and more living in 
extreme poverty has been reduced by 36.7 percentage points and 45 per cent, but 45 per 
cent of the large households were still in the lowest poverty bracket after transfers. 
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Table 8.9 Poverty rates before and after social assistance and reduction through social 
assistance for large households, 2001 
Poverty Poverty status before 
SA benefits 
Poverty status 
after SA benefits 
Percentage 
point reduction 
Percent 
reduction 
4+ 5+ 4+ 5+ 4+ 5+ 4+ 5+ 
Extreme poverty Y<60% 81.5 81.6 40.4 44.9 -41.1 -36.7 -50.4 -45.0 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 96.8 97.9 90.8 90.8 -6.0 -7.1 -6.2 -7.3 
100%) 
Notes: 4+ = household of four or more (N - 282); 5+ - households of five or more (N - 98); Y- gross household 
income adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals the poverty line. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
Table 8.10 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for large households who were poor before having received social assistance, 
2001 (thousand won or percentage) 
4+ 5+ 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 610 671 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits 328 372 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -282 -299 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -46 -45 
N 282 98 
Note: Using the OECD purchasing power parities for 2001, f 1- W 1,129.5. 
Source: NRB (2001), own calculations. 
Table 8.10 shows households of five and over recorded the largest poverty gaps 
amongst all groups both before and after social assistance benefits. In other words, the 
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means-tested assistance benefits had the largest gap to fill for the group. Pre-transfer, it 
was W671,000 and the post-transfer poverty gap was W372,000. The reduction of 
poverty gaps for the large households is one of the greatest in absolute terms 
(W299,000) after elderly couples, but least in relative term (45 per cent). 
8.6 Summary 
Table 8.11 breaks down all results of the effects of the Korean social assistance benefits 
shown above into household types used in this study. It can be seen that over 80 per cent 
of the total population having received social assistance benefits live in poverty after 
transfer. Elderly couples without children exhibit the highest poverty rates amongst all 
groups discussed both before and after benefits. Large households (i. e. households of 
five and over), unemployed/economically inactive households (working-age), and 
elderly singles are also significant groups in the pre- and post-transfer poor population. 
The incidence of pre- and post-transfer poverty amongst working-age single adults 
without children and employed households is lowest, but many of them still remain in 
poverty after transfers. Poverty reduction is greatest among the employed both in 
absolute and relative terms, followed by single adults and lone parents. Poverty rate 
reductions are least in elderly couples and unemployed/economically inactive people 
both in absolute and relative terms. 
In terms of poverty gaps, the post-transfer average incomes of all recipient households 
are still lower than the poverty line of 40 per cent of median. The pre- and post-transfer 
poverty gaps for large households are greatest, and those for single adults are smallest. 
Elderly couples and unemployed/inactive households also record large poverty gaps. The 
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Table 8.11 Effects of social assistance benefits by household types, 2001 (percentage or 
thousand won) 
Elderly Elderly Unemployed Employed Lone Single 5+ All 
single couple /inactive parent adult recipients 
Pre-transfer pov. rate 98.3 
Post-transfer pov. rate 89.5 
Absolute pov. reduction - 8.8 
(percentage points) 
100.0 97.4 92.9 95.8 90.5 97.9 96.5 
94.3 90.6 78.9 84.1 78.4 90.8 87.8 
-5.7 . 6.8 -14.0 -11.7 -12.1 -7.1 -8.7 
Relative pov. reduction (%) - 9.0 -5.7 -7.0 - 15.1 - 12.2 - 13.4 -7.3 -9.0 
Pre-transfer pov. gap 418 530 491 355 399 201 671 422 
Post-transfer pov. gap 165 229 226 157 172 40 372 181 
Absolute pov. gap reduction -253 -301 -265 - 198 -227 - 161 . 299 . 241 
Relative pov. gap reduction (%) -61 - 57 - 54 . 56 - 57 - 80 - 45 - 57 
N 239 104 386 341 309 116 98 1,266 
relative impact of the benefits on working-age single adults is greatest, followed by 
elderly singles, and lowest on large households. Single adults, however, display smallest 
decrease in the absolute reduction of poverty gaps. This is simply because the poverty 
gaps for this group before benefits are much smaller than for the other household types, 
which means the benefits had a smaller gap to fill. It is elderly couples and large 
households whose poverty gaps are most reduced by the social assistance benefits in 
absolute terms, even though they are more likely to be poor post-transfer than the other 
groups. Part of the explanation for this is that these groups start from the lowest pre- 
transfer income position. 
The newly-established social assistance scheme in Korea, NBLS does not radically 
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alleviate poverty, although there is a reduction from 96 per cent to 88 per cent and 
recipients' income positions are improved after social assistance transfers in both head- 
count and poverty gap terms. Whereas it is also shown that there is considerable 
variation between different household types regarding the degree to which the social 
assistance benefits protect people from poverty. The picture of the impact of the Korean 
social assistance scheme on poverty may be revealed more clearly by being compared 
with that of other countries. Thus, in Chapter 9, to obtain a comparative perspective, the 
effectiveness of social assistance benefits in Britain on poverty alleviation is evaluated 
and compared with the Korean scheme. 
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Chapter 9 Effectiveness of the social assistance scheme in Britain 
In Chapter 8, the effectiveness of the Korean social assistance scheme on poverty 
reduction was evaluated, using household data from the NRB. In this chapter, to obtain 
a comparative perspective, the effectiveness of social assistance benefits in Britain on 
poverty alleviation is assessed on the basis of a British dataset, the Family Resources 
Survey of Great Britain (FRS). The incidence and the intensity of poverty for a range of 
household types are analysed in the same ways as Chapter 8, i. e. the estimates of 
poverty rates and the poverty reduction effectiveness, and then the average poverty gap 
before and after social assistance benefits in Britain. 
9.1 Evaluating the effectiveness of social assistance in Britain 
In this chapter, the impact of social assistance benefits on poverty in Britain is analysed 
on the basis of the FRS database (2001/02), which is a continuous cross-sectional 
survey with a sample of some 24,000 households. The FRS data contain information on 
the incomes and circumstances of private households in Great Britain. The data include 
household characteristics; income and receipt of social security benefits; tenure and 
housing costs; assets and savings; carers and those needing care; and employment. The 
FRS database includes information on households receiving various means-tested social 
assistance benefits. In Chapter 8, the effectiveness of two cash assistance, the 
Livelihood and Housing Benefits, were assessed. In this chapter, therefore, households 
receiving any or all of three means-tested benefits, i. e. Income Support, Housing 
Benefit and Council Tax Benefit have been selected as British counterpart. The rationale 
for choosing not only Income Support and Housing Benefit but also Council Tax 
Benefit is that, in effect, council tax has been extended from the housing benefit scheme 
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(Hill, 2000: 116). 87 The subjects of the study are 5,826 social assistance recipient 
households - 23 per cent of the total sample out of 25,320 people and their households. 
The budget-standard based poverty line in Korea for four-person households, which was 
adopted in Chapter 8 for analysing the effects of the Korean social assistance scheme, was 
just below 40 per cent of the median income adjusted for household size, before housing 
costs, in 2000 (Ku, 2004; Park et al, 2002: Yeo et al., 2006). Therefore, in this chapter, a 
poverty line of 40 per cent of the median equivalent income is applied to evaluate the 
impact of the British social assistance scheme. Additional poverty lines of 50 and 60 per 
cent of the median equivalent income, which are used by the OECD and Eurostat, are 
used to check for the sensitivity test. 88 
Like in Chapter 8, poverty rates based on equivalent gross income before housing costs 
are used as a measure for post-transfer. Poverty rates based on market income including 
earnings from labour and capital as well as occupational and private benefits are used as 
a measure for pre-transfer. Income before means-tested benefits is calculated by 
subtracting all means-tested benefits from the gross income. In addition, the equivalence 
87 It is a system of domestic rates on property, with the number of adult occupants of 
the property partly taken into account. Council tax payers with low-income can have a 
reduction in their payments, calculated in a similar way to Income Support and Housing 
Benefit. 
88 The detailed results for the additional poverty lines are included in Appendix B. 
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scale applied to the budget-standard based poverty line in Korea89 is also used in this 
chapter to adjust the gross income for household size for the British population in the 
FRS data. The poverty line of 40 per cent of the median equivalent monthly gross 
income before housing costs is £377 90 
To assess the effectiveness of means-tested social assistance benefits in Britain on 
poverty alleviation, in this chapter, incomes of recipient households before and after 
social assistance transfers are compared in terms of incidence and intensity of poverty. 
Following Behrendt's (2002) approach, the incidence of poverty is measured by the 
head-counts across poverty brackets to assess different intensities of poverty and to 
illustrate the extent to which social assistance benefits contribute to total income for the 
poor. In the chapter, the poverty brackets are re-defined as incomes lower than 60 per 
cent of the budget-standard based poverty line ('extreme poverty'), between 60 and 80 
per cent ('severe poverty'), between 80 and 100 per cent ('moderate poverty'), between 
100 and 120 per cent ('near poverty') and over 120 per cent ('no poverty'). 100 per cent 
of the poverty line thus equals 40 per cent of the median gross household income. The 
intensity of poverty is measured by the poverty gap method that evaluates the extent to 
which people are lifted up the income scale by means-tested social assistance benefits. 
The pre- and post transfer head-counts and poverty gaps are examined for the household 
89 It attaches the weight of 1 to the one-person household, 1.65 for household of two, 
2.17 for household of three, 2.86 for household of four, 3.25 for household of five and 
3.67 for household of six. For more detail, see Chapter 4. 
90 The poverty line of 40 per cent of the median equivalent monthly gross income after 
housing costs is £338. 
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types identified in Chapter 8, i. e. elderly, non-elderly and large households. 91 
9.2 The Poverty reduction and the poverty gap for recipients 
Table 9.1 presents the effectiveness of the British social assistance schemes on poverty 
rates across various poverty brackets. As in Chapter 8, it focuses on households that 
receive any sort of means-tested benefits and households not receiving benefits are 
excluded. Over a half of all recipient households were living below the poverty line of 
40 per cent of the median gross income before having received some kind of means- 
tested benefits, but only 10.4 per cent did so after social assistance transfers. The 
reduction of poverty rates by social assistance transfers in Britain is considerably marked - 
43.3 percentage points and 80.6 per cent respectively. There was an outstanding 
reduction of the poverty rates for the three lower poverty brackets. The share of the 
population living in extreme poverty was reduced by 96.9 per cent; and by 67.2 per cent 
and 47.4 per cent in the severe and the moderate poverty brackets respectively. 
91 As mentioned in Chapter 8, some samples of lone parents and single adults overlap 
with those of unemployed or employed. Non-elderly couples without children are 
excluded from this study because of too small sample size for the NRB data. Large 
households include both elderly and non-elderly households. Unlike in Chapter 8, only 
unemployed households are included and economically inactive households are 
excluded in Chapter 8, in order to avoid overlap of non-elderly samples. 
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Table 9.1 Poverty rates before and after social assistance and reduction through means- 
tested social assistance (as a percentage of all recipient households), 2001/02 
Poverty status Poverty status Poverty status Absolute poverty Relative 
before SA after SA reduction poverty 
benefits benefits (percentage points) reduction 
(percent) (percent) (percent) 
Extreme poverty Y< 60% 33.3 1.0 -32.3 -96.9 
Severe poverty 60%: 5 Y< 80% 6.7 2.2 -4.5 -67.2 
Moderate poverty 80%: 5Y< 100% 13.7 7.2 -6.5 -47.4 
Near poverty 100%: 5 Y< 120% 12.3 16.0 3.7 30.1 
No poverty Y>120% 34.0 73.5 39.5 116.1 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 53.7 10.4 -43.3 -80.6 
100%) 
Notes: N=5,778; Y= gross household income adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals 
40 per cent of the median gross household income. 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
Table 9.2 presents the results of the average poverty gaps for all recipient households 
before and after social assistance benefits. As stated in Chapter 8, poverty gaps are 
negative if the average income of households after transfers is above the poverty line. 
After transfers, the poverty gap in Britain is negative, thus implying that, on average, 
household incomes of the poor are above the poverty line of 40 per cent of the median - 
average income increased to £121 above the poverty line after social assistance transfers 
from £208 below the poverty line before transfers. The poverty gaps in Britain were 
reduced by £329 in absolute terms and 158 per cent in relative terms. Consequently, 
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Table 9.2 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for households who were poor before having received social assistance, 
2001/02 (sterling or percentage) 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 208 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits -121 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -329 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -I58 
N 3,017 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
with regard to the 40 per cent poverty line, the aggregate measure shows poverty gap 
before social assistance transfers has been large in Britain, and its reduction was 
effective enough for the poor to eradicate poverty. 
9.3 Disaggregation of the poverty reduction and the poverty gap 
The pre- and post- social assistance transfer head-counts and poverty gaps for various 
households are examined in this section. Table 9.3 shows the incidence of poverty 
among recipient households headed by the elderly aged 60 and over on the basis of the 
poverty line of 40 per cent of the median. The pre-benefit incidence of poverty 
amongst the elderly singles in Britain (33.8 per cent) is slightly higher than amongst 
elderly couples (26.8 per cent), but post-transfer, less poverty amongst elderly singles 
(1.1 per cent) than amongst elderly couples (3.4 per cent). Poverty has considerably 
been reduced for elderly singles by 32.7 percentage points and for elderly couples by 
23.4 percentage points in absolute terms. In both groups, the relative reduction in 
poverty brought about by the benefits is the greatest amongst all the groups discussed 
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- 96.7 per cent for elderly singles and 87.3 per cent for elderly couples. In particular, 
the share of the population living in the lowest poverty bracket has been significantly 
reduced by 97.3 per cent for elderly singles and by 97 per cent for elderly couples in 
relative terms. 
Table 9.3 Poverty rates before and after social assistance and reduction through social 
assistance (as a percentage of all elderly households receiving social assistance benefits), 
2001/02 
Poverty status Poverty status Poverty status Absolute poverty Relative poverty 
before SA after SA reduction reduction 
benefits benefits (percentage (percent) 
(percent) (percent) points) 
Sing Coup Sing Coup Sing Coup Sing Coup 
Extreme poverty Y< 60% 7.5 10.0 0.2 0.3 -7.3 -9.7 -97.3 -97.0 
Severe poverty 60%: 5 Y< 80% 3.0 5.4 0.2 0.9 -2.8 -4.5 -93.3 -83.3 
Moderate poverty 80%<Y < 100% 23.3 11.4 0.7 2.2 -22.6 -9.2 -96.9 -80.7 
Near poverty 100%<Y< 120% 21.4 20.1 5.2 10.1 -16.2 -10.0 -75.7 -49.8 
No poverty Y>120% 44.8 53.1 93.7 86.5 48.9 33.4 109.1 62.9 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 33.8 26.8 1.1 3.4 -32.7 -23.4 -96.7 -87.3 
100%) 
Notes: Sing = singles aged 60 and over (N - 1,656); Coup Q couples aged 60 and over living alone (N - 772); Ys 
gross household income adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals 40 per cent of the median 
gross household income. 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
In Table 9.4, the results of the estimates of the average poverty gaps and the reduction in 
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the poverty gaps pre- and post- transfers for recipient households headed by the elderly 
are presented. The poverty gaps in Britain for elderly singles were smaller than elderly 
couples before transfers and average income for elderly singles was also larger than 
elderly couples after transfer. Elderly singles have far more reduction in their poverty 
gaps than elderly couples both in absolute and relative terms, as shown in Table 9.4. 
Table 9.4 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for elderly households who were poor before having received social assistance, 
2001/02 (sterling or percentage) 
Single Couple 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 94 139 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits -236 . 121 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -330 -260 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -351 -187 
N 555 203 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
Table 9.5 presents the effects of means-tested social assistance benefits in Britain on 
poverty rates amongst recipient households headed by unemployed and employed adults 
aged below 60. With regard to the 40 per cent poverty line, the incidence of poverty 
amongst the unemployed group is highest both pre- and post- benefits. Indeed, 94.8 per cent 
of all unemployed households in receipt of social assistance benefits lived in poverty 
before transfers, and in particular 83.3 per cent of them were in extreme poverty. After 
transfers, the British social assistance benefits have reduced poverty for the labour 
market detached by 62.8 percentage points in absolute terms and by 66.2 per cent in 
relative terms, but 32 per cent of them remained in poverty. The share of the population 
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living in extreme poverty decreased considerably by 4 per cent after social assistance 
transfers. 
The pre- and post- benefit incidence of poverty amongst non-elderly employed 
households is lower than amongst unemployed households, but higher than elderly 
households. The reduction of poverty rates for the labour market detached is slightly 
higher than that for the employed in absolute terms, but lower in relative terms. 
Table 9.5 Poverty rates and poverty reduction for households headed by working-age 
adults in receipt of social assistance, 2001/02 
Poverty Poverty status Poverty status Absolute poverty Relative poverty 
before SA after SA reduction reduction 
benefits benefits (percentage (percent) 
(percent) (percent) points) 
Une Emp Une Emp Une Emp Unc Emp 
Extreme poverty Y<60% 83.3 50.1 4.0 1.4 -79.3 -48.7 -95.2 -97.2 
Severe poverty 60%: 5 Y< 80% 8.5 8.8 7.9 3.2 -0.6 -5.6 -7.1 -63.6 
Moderate poverty 80%: 5 Y< 100% 3.0 10.0 20.1 11.1 17.1 1.1 5.7 11.0 
Near poverty 100%: 5 Y< 120% 0.6 6.5 30.7 22.7 30.1 16.2 5,016.7 249.2 
No poverty Y>120% 4.6 24.6 37.4 61.6 32.8 37.0 713.0 150.4 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 94.8 68.9 32.0 15.7 -62.8 -53.2 -66.2 -77.2 
100%) 
Notes: Une = unemployed people (N - 329); Emp - employed people (N - 2,859); Y- gross household income 
adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals 40 per cent of the median gross household income 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
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In Table 9.6, the results of the estimates of the average poverty gaps and the reduction in 
the poverty gaps pre- and post- transfers for unemployed and employed households are 
presented. The pre-benefit poverty gap for unemployed households is highest (£303) 
amongst all household types discussed in this chapter. Poverty gap for unemployed 
households was markedly reduced by the social assistance benefits in absolute terms 
(£348), but post-benefit poverty gap for the group is still one of the lowest (-£45). While 
post-benefit household incomes of both unemployed and employed groups are higher 
than the 40 per cent poverty line. 
Table 9.6 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for households headed by unemployed and employed adults, 2001/02 (sterling 
or percentage) 
Unemployed Employed 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 303 235 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits 45 -100 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -348 -335 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -113 -142 
N 297 1,907 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
Table 9.7 shows the incident of poverty among households headed by working-age lone 
parents and single adults without children. Before social assistance benefits, lone parent 
households in Britain are one of the most vulnerable groups in the sense that they 
exhibit high poverty rate (85.2 per cent). The post-benef it poverty rate among the group 
is still over 20 per cent, although the social assistance benefits have reduced poverty by 
more than half (75.2 per cent). With regard to the lowest poverty bracket, the reduction of 
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poverty rates among lone parent households is very impressive - 98.5 per cent in 
relative terms and 74.4 percentage points in absolute terms, whereas the share of the 
population living in the moderate poverty bracket increased. 
Table 9.7 Poverty rates before and after social assistance and reduction through social 
assistance for working-age lone parents and single adults without children, 2001/02 
Poverty status Poverty status 
before SA 
benefits 
(percent) 
Poverty status 
after SA 
benefits 
(percent) 
Absolute poverty 
reduction 
(percentage 
points) 
Relative poverty 
reduction 
(percent) 
Lone Sing Lone Sing Lone Sing Lone Sing 
Extreme poverty Y<60% 75.5 48.4 1.1 2.0 -74.4 -46.4 -98.5 -95.8 
Severe poverty 60%: 5 Y< 80% 5.5 10.9 4.1 3.8 -1.4 -7.1 -25.4 -65.1 
Moderate poverty 80%: 5Y< 100% 4.2 17.3 15.9 3.2 11.7 -14.1 278.5 -81.5 
Near poverty 100%: 5Y< 120% 4.7 6.2 37.9 11.8 33.2 5.6 706.3 90.3 
No poverty Y>120% 10.0 17.2 40.9 79.3 30.9 62.1 309.0 361.0 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 85.2 76.6 21.1 9.0 -64.1 -67.6 -73.2 -88.2 
100%) 
Notes: Lone - working-age lone parents (N a 1,157); Sing - working-age single adults without children (N - 791); Y 
- gross household income adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals 40 per cent of the 
median gross household income. 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
Poverty reduction by social assistance benefits is greatest among single adults in 
absolute terms (67.6 percentage points), and second highest (88.2 per cent) after elderly 
singles in relative terms. The British means-tested benefits have considerably reduced 
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the percentage of the population in extreme, severe and moderate poverty. The 
magnitude of the reduction is similar to that for lone parent households in relative terms 
(over 95 per cent), but much smaller in absolute terms (46 percentage points). 
To give a clearer picture of the impact of social assistance benefits across lone parents 
and single adults in Britain, Table 9.8 shows the average poverty gap and its reduction 
pre- and post- transfer. Poverty gaps in Britain for non-elderly lone parents have been 
one of the largest both before and after social assistance transfers, whereas post-transfer 
average incomes for the group were above the 40 per cent poverty line. Non-elderly 
single adults without children have far more reduction in their poverty gaps than non- 
elderly lone parents both in absolute and relative terms, as shown in Table 9.8. 
Table 9.8 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for working-age lone parents and single adults without children, 2001/02 
(sterling or percentage) 
Lone parents Single adults 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 273 236 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits "57 -186 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -330 -422 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -120 -178 
N 941 601 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
Table 9.9 shows the incidence of poverty amongst recipient households of four and over, 
and five and over in Britain. The post-benefit incidence of poverty amongst households 
of five and more is substantial. This group had the second highest poverty rate (30.3 
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per cent) of all types of households after transfers. Poverty reduction brought about by 
the means-tested benefits is lowest amongst large households - 58 per cent in absolute 
terms and 42 percentage points in relative terms. The reduction in poverty for the 
extreme poverty bracket by the benefits is very great (97 per cent or 53 percentage 
points), but 24 per cent of the large households still lived in moderate poverty (i. e. 
between 80 and 100 per cent of 40 per cent of the median income). 
Table 9.9 Poverty rates before and after social assistance benefits and reduction through 
social assistance for large households, 2001/02 
Poverty Poverty status Poverty status Absolute poverty Relative 
before SA after SA reduction poverty 
benefits benefits (percentage points) reduction 
(percent) (percent) (percent) 
4+ 5+ 4+ 5+ 4+ 5+ 4+ 5+ 
Extreme poverty Y<60% 52.9 55.0 1.7 1.6 -51.2 -53.4 -96.7 -97.1 
Severe poverty 60%: 5 Y< 80% 10.4 9.1 4.2 4.6 -6.2 -4.5 -59.6 -49.5 
Moderate poverty 80%: 5Y< 100% 7.8 8.6 23.9 24.1 16.1 15.5 206.4 180.2 
Near poverty 100%: 5 Y< 120% 5.4 6.2 27.6 31.4 22.2 25.2 411.1 406.4 
No poverty Y>120% 23.5 21.2 42.7 38.3 19.2 17.1 817.0 80.6 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 71.1 72.7 29.8 30.3 -41.3 -42.4 -58.1 -58.3 
100%) 
4+ = household of four or more (N a 830); 5+ = households of five or more (N - 373); Y- gross household income 
adjusted for household size; 100 per cent of the poverty line equals 40 per cent of the median gross household income. 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
Table 9.10 shows post-benefit poverty gap for households of five and more is lowest (- 
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£17) among all household types, which means post-benefit household incomes of the 
group are just higher than the 40 per cent poverty line. The reduction of poverty gaps 
for households of five and more is also least in both absolute (£243) and relative (107 
per cent) terms. 
Table 9.10 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for large households, 2001/02 (sterling or percentage) 
4+ 5+ 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 227 226 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits -21 -17 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -248 -243 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) -109 -107 
N 557 254 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
9.4 Summary 
Table 9.11 breaks down all results of the effects of the British social assistance benefits 
shown above into household types used in this chapter. With regard to the 40 per cent 
poverty line, it can be seen that about 10 per cent of the total population having received 
social assistance benefits live in poverty after transfer. Non-elderly unemployed 
households are the most vulnerable group in Britain in the sense that they exhibit the 
highest poverty rate of all types of households considered both before and after transfers. 
Large households (i. e. households of five and over) and households headed by non- 
elderly lone parents are also significant groups in the pre- and post- transfer poor 
population. The incidence of pre- and post- transfer poverty amongst elderly households 
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is lower than amongst non-elderly households. Generally, the British social assistance 
benefits reduce the incidence of poverty among elderly households more than among 
non-elderly households in relative terms, but they reduce poverty among elderly 
households less than among non-elderly households in absolute terms. Poverty 
reduction amongst single adults without children is highest both in absolute and relative 
terms. The absolute reduction of poverty among elderly singles and couples is lowest 
but the relative reduction in poverty among the groups is very great. 
Table 9.11 Effects of social assistance benefits by household types (percentage or sterling) 
Elderly Elderly Unemployed Employed Lone Single 5+ All 
single couple parent adult recipients 
Pre-transfer pov. rate 33.8 26.8 94.8 68.9 85.2 76.6 72.7 53.7 
Post-transfer pov. rate 1.1 3.4 32.0 15.7 21.1 9.0 30.3 10.4 
Absolute pov. Reduction -32.7 -23.4 -62.8 . 53.2 -64.1 -67.6 -42.4 
43.3 
(percentage points) 
Relative pov. Reduction (%) -96.7 -87.3 -66.2 -77.2 -75.2 -88.2 -58.3 -80.6 
Pre-transfer pov. gap 94 139 303 235 273 236 226 208 
Post-transfer pov. gap -236 -121 -45 -100 -57 -186 -17 -121 
Absolute pov. gap reduction -330 -260 -348 -335 -330 422 -243 -329 
Relative pov. gap reduction (%) -351 -187 -115 -142 -120 -178 -107 -158 
N 1,656 772 329 2,859 1.157 791 373 5,778 
In terms of poverty gaps, the post-transfer average incomes of all recipient households 
are higher than the poverty line of 40 per cent of median. Income position of elderly 
households is more advantageous than that of non-elderly households. The most 
favourable income position was reached by elderly singles whose average income 
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increased to as much as £236 above the poverty line, followed by single adults and 
elderly couples. The reduction in the poverty gaps for each household type is similar to 
the picture presented by the head-count measure. The relative impact of the benefits on 
elderly households is greater than on non-elderly households, but elderly households 
have less reduction in their poverty gaps in absolute terms. Large households including 
both elderly and non-elderly households benefit less in poverty gap terms. 
9.5 Comparison of the results of the effectiveness of social assistance in Korea and 
Britain 
Compared to Korea, Britain achieved marked success of means-tested social assistance 
benefits with a high degree of effectiveness, especially among the extreme and the 
severe poverty brackets. This finding is consistent with Behrendt (2002), Mitchell 
(1991) and Sainsbury and Morissens (2002), which claimed the British social security 
benefits were very effective in the lower poverty sphere, but less effective in reducing 
moderate poverty. 
It is shown in Chapter 8 and 9 that there are variations between different household 
types regarding the incidence and the intensity of poverty before and after transfer. In 
Korea, elderly households, large households and non-elderly unemployed/inactive 
households are significant groups in the pre- and post-transfer poor population in head- 
count terms. Poverty reduction is greatest among the employed both in absolute and 
relative terms, followed by working-age single adults and lone parents. Poverty rate 
reductions are lowest in elderly couples and unemployed/economically inactive 
households both in absolute and relative terms. The post-transfer average incomes of all 
recipient households are still lower than the poverty line of 40 per cent of median. It is 
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elderly couples and large households whose poverty gaps are most reduced by the social 
assistance benefits in absolute terms, even though they are more likely to be poor post- 
transfer than the other groups. 
In Britain, non-elderly unemployed households exhibit the highest poverty rate of all 
types of households discussed, and large households and households headed by lone 
parents are also significant groups in the pre- and post- transfer poor population. The 
incidence of pre- and post- transfer poverty amongst elderly households is lower than 
amongst non-elderly households. In general, elderly households experience a greater 
reduction in the incidence of poverty than non-elderly households do in relative terms, 
but it is quite opposite in absolute terms. Poverty reduction amongst single adults 
without children is highest both in absolute and relative terms. The absolute reduction of 
poverty among elderly singles and couples is least but the relative reductions in poverty 
among the groups are remarkable. The poverty gap measures tell a similar story to the 
head-count measures, but the biggest contrast is that unlike in Korea, the post-transfer 
average incomes of all recipient households in Britain are higher than the 40 per cent 
poverty line. 
9.6 Discussion 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the social assistance benefits in Korea on the 
basis of the NRB data has revealed the receipt of NBLS benefits is no guarantee for 
escaping poverty in all types of households considered. In broad terms, the findings 
drawn from this study are consistent with the previous Korean literature on poverty (Choi, 
2002; Hong, 2002; Kim, 2002; Park et al., 2002) in that sense that the level of impact of 
social transfers in Korea on poverty alleviation is very low. Instead, it is believed that 
235 
the private income transfers are more effective in alleviating poverty than social 
transfers including social assistance benefits, even though the effectiveness of social 
transfers has improved after the establishment of the NBLS scheme in 2000. 
The new social assistance scheme NBLS is designed to protect fundamental human 
rights and to secure the minim living standards. The benefit rates for NBLS are to be set 
so that the total income of each household receiving social assistance benefits - 
including any earnings and other forms of assistance - reaches the minim living 
standards (OECD, 2001a: 72-77). From the results of the study, however, it is evident 
that the Korean social assistance scheme is not effective enough in alleviating poverty, 
since many beneficiary households seem to live below the budget-standard based 
poverty line after social assistance transfer. What can explain the apparent 
ineffectiveness of social assistance in Korea? 
There seems to be probability that gross income of recipient households could be raised 
up to the level of the budget-standard based poverty line, if in-kind benefits, such as 
Health Benefit and Educational Benefit provided only for those who want them, are 
included. How much would the benefits in-kind push up the incomes of the poor? It can 
be answered from Table 9.12 and 9.13 shown below. Table 9.12 shows expenditure on 
Health Benefit and on Educational Benefit as a share of total NBLS expenditure 
represent 48.6 per cent and 3.7 per cent respectively in 2001, compared to that on cash 
social assistance, Livelihood Benefit and Housing Benefit is 44.7 per cent. 
Table 9.13 presents the majority of beneficiaries for the Health Benefit are NBLS 
recipients. Indeed, 94 per cent of NBLS recipients in 2001 are in receipt of Health 
Benefit. Of the beneficiaries for the Health Benefit, 89 per cent are NBLS recipients in 
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Table 9.12 Expenditure on Health and Educational Benefits, 2001-02 (billion won) 
2001 2002 
Expenditure on Health Benefits (A) 1,590 1,690 
Expenditure on Educational Benefits (B) 120 107 
Expenditure on Livelihood and Housing Benefits (C) 1,461 1,443 
Total expenditure on NBLS (D) 
A/D(%) 
B/D(%) 
3,270 3,396 
48.6 49.7 
3.7 3.2 
C/D(%) 44.7 42.1 
Source: Table 4.6 in Chapter 4. 
2001 and 11 per cent are not NBLS recipients such as patriots, veterans, and refugees 
from North Korea. By contrast, only 11.6 per cent of NBLS beneficiaries are in receipt 
of the Educational Benefit. From Table 9.12 and 9.13, the extent to which NBLS 
recipients are lifted up the income scale by the two benefits in-kind can be expressed in 
cash per person per month. First, the total expenditure on the in-kind benefits is divided 
by number of recipients for the benefits. Second, the average benefit levels for the in- 
kind benefits are divided by 12 (months). The average benefit level drawn from the 
above method for the Health Benefits is W88,20092 (approximately £78), and that for 
the Educational Benefit is W60,60093 (approximately £54). Thus, it can be said that on 
average, NBLS recipients having received both Health Benefit and Educational Benefit 
could benefit W148,800 and those in receipt of either the Educational Benefit or Health 
Benefit could benefit x60,600 and x88,200 respectively. 
92 W1,058,000 / 12 months = 88,200 
93 W727,000 / 12 months = 60,600 
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Considering that the average poverty gap for all NBLS recipients after social assistance 
transfers was W 181,000 (Table 8.2), the poverty gap for beneficiaries having received 
both the Educational Benefit and Health Benefit could be reduced by between 
W32,200 (approximately £28) and W120,400 (£106). This is, in fact, a much smaller 
gap to fill, compared to the poverty gap before the in-kind benefits. However, the in- 
kind benefits are not provided for all recipient households but only for those who need 
them, and even after the benefits in-kind, their income scale still remain under the 
poverty line. 
Table 9.13 Number of recipients of Health and Educational Benefits, 2001-02 (in 
thousands, rounded) 
2001 2002 
Total beneficiaries for Health Benefits 1,502 1,420 
NBLS beneficiaries in receipt of Health Benefits (A) 1,335 1,253 
Beneficiaries for Educational Benefits (B) 165 157 
Total beneficiaries for NBLS (C) 1,420 1,351 
A/C (%) 94.0 92.7 
B/C(%) 11.6 11.6 
Source: MOHW (2004). 
There is a further substantial factor that may account for this ineffective alleviation of 
poverty. The Korean social assistance scheme has adopted a unique and complicated 
`cash benefit standard' which is calculated and set on the basis of the minimum living 
standard (Kim et al., 2004). The cash benefit standards are the cash benefit rates. In 
other words, they are the maximum amount of cash benefits in total that recipient 
households can receive. The cash benefit standards are currently calculated by taking 
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the minimum living standards and subtracting the minimum costs of Health Benefit and 
Educational Benefit, and other financial support such as TV licence payments and local 
council tax (MOHW, 2004: 99-100). The calculation of the cash benefit standard is 
summarised in Figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1 Calculation of the cash benefit standards 
Cash Benefit Standards = minimum living standards - minimum costs of Health Benefit 
and Educational Benefit - other forms of assistance (i. e. TV licence and local tax) 
Table 9.14 presents the minimum living standards and the cash benefit standards by 
household size. The amount of cash benefits that each household can receive is 
calculated by taking the minimum living standards and subtracting total income of each 
household, the minimum costs of the Health Benefit and the Educational Benefit, and 
other forms of assistance. For example, assuming that income of a household of four is 
zero, the household can receive W842,000 at the most by the cash benefit standard for a 
household of four, rather than W956,000 by the minimum living standard for the 
household, since the in-kind benefits such as the minimum cost of the Health Benefit 
(W45,000), the minimum cost of the Educational Benefit (W45,000) and other financial 
support (W24,000) are also deducted. 
The minimum living standards, which are used for the NBLS benefit scales, are made up 
of the cash benefit standards, in-kind benefits and other financial support. They thus 
include both cash benefits94 and in-kind benefits95, and the NBLS benefits are designed 
94 Theses include Livelihood Benefit and Housing Benefit. 
95 Theses include Health Benefit and Educational Benefit. 
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to guarantee the minimum living standards. When the cash benefit standards are 
calculated, however, the minimum costs of the in-kind benefits are also taken away, as 
shown in Figure 9.1, although, in practice, some of the benefits in-kind are not provided to 
recipient households. For example, expenses for some medicines and medical supplies 
and those for schooling (such as text books and stationary) are deducted from the 
minimum costs of the benefits because they are included in the list of items for the Health 
and the Educational Benefits. Yet, although part or all of the expenses are apparently not 
delivered to recipients, they are designed to be deducted. Furthermore, according to the 
NRB (2001), only 75 per cent of the benefits in-kind are provided for people in need. 
Thus the cash benefit standards for the NBLS benefits have been criticized, and it is 
Table 9.14 Minimum living standards and cash benefit standards, 2001 (thousand won) 
Household MLS (A) CBS (B) Minimum cost of Minimum cost of Other forms of 
size I Iealth Benefit (C) Educational Benefit (D) assistance (E) 
1 334 286 16 16 16 
2 553 482 26 26 19 
3 760 667 36 35 22 
4 956 842 45 45 24 
5 1,087 959 52 51 26 
6 1,227 1,083 58 57 28 
Notes: 
1. Other forms of assistance (E) = council tax + TV licence. 
2. Educational Benefit (D) for one-person household is provided for household headed by children 
3. Minimum living standards (A) =B+C+D+E 
4. Cash benefit standards (B) =A-C-D-E 
Source: MOHW (2002c); NRB (2001). 
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argued that the expenses for certain items which are, in practice, not provided to recipients 
need to be included in the cash benefit standards (Kim et al., 2004: 36-38; NRB, 2001; 
Son, 2001: 12). 
For this reason, the current cash benefit standard seems to be set at a lower level, and 
consequently, the current benefit level for NBLS also appears to be set lower than the 
minimum living standard. The cash benefit standards partly contribute to explaining 
why the benefit level of the NBLS benefits is lower than the minimum living standards 
and the Korean social assistance scheme is not effective in alleviating poverty. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion 
This thesis has focused on the new general social assistance scheme in Korea, which 
replaced previous categorical assistance. It sought to explore whether or not there has 
been a regime shift within Korean social assistance and to locate Korea within social 
assistance regimes. Furthermore this study compared the features and determinants of 
poverty between recipients and non-recipients, and assessed the effectiveness of Korean 
social assistance on poverty reduction in comparison with that of British social 
assistance. This study combined qualitative information on the institutional frameworks 
and quantitative methods to gain a comprehensive picture of social assistance in Korea. 
10.1 Mending the holes in the last-resort social safety net in Korea 
Despite the caseload numbers of cash benefits increased after the implementation of the 
general assistance scheme, there is little expansion in the total number of beneficiaries. 
In order to target benefits at the poorest group of the population, the Korean social 
assistance scheme uses a much wider kin obligation, strict means-tests, the lack of 
income and assets disregards and tough nationality/residence rules. This kind of strategy 
tends to deter many justified claims (Behrendt, 2002: 206). A large proportion of people 
on low-income are excluded from the Korean social assistance benefits, possibly some 
million people seem to remain in poverty because of this strategy. Given the Korea's 
lowest spending on social protection amongst the OECD area and the limited coverage 
of social insurance and the unemployment benefit, there is a need for more generous 
eligibility and entitlement rules and both expenditure on social assistance and the 
number of claimants should increase considerably. 
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Social assistance is organised and regulated nationally and there is no geographical 
variation. The benefit rates are set on the basis of the minimum living standards for 
families living in medium and small size cities and they do not reflect the needs of 
claimants of different regions. Thus the standard benefit rates seem to be unfavourable 
to low-income households living in big cities who need more living expenses than those 
living in smaller cities or rural areas. They vary by household size but do not reflect the 
needs of special groups such as a household of older people, the disabled, or a lone 
parent etc. The benefit rates therefore need to vary by family type and region in the 
Korean context. 
As noted above, a large number of people are excluded from Korean social assistance. 
The features of recipients and non-recipients were thus compared in this thesis to 
explore whether there are similarities or differences between the two groups and to seek 
adequate policies for each group. The empirical results presented in this study show that 
there are significant differences in the behavioural characteristics of labour participation 
between the two groups. Low-income people who are excluded from social assistance 
tend to have higher rates of employment, better health and a stronger desire to work 
than recipients. The analysis of the determinants of poverty reveals that labour market 
detachment has a strong impact on the risk of poverty for both low-income groups. In 
other words, low-income people who are outside the labour force are more likely to be 
in poverty. These findings suggest those who are employable and have a desire to work 
need to be more closely and systematically linked with an active labour market policy to 
help them escape from poverty and to promote autonomy and reintegration. While the 
poverty of recipients is most strongly influenced by living alone and labour market 
detachment. This implies, as in most OECD countries (Adema et al., 2003: 46), setting 
social assistance payment rates for single (and possibly couple) families without 
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children needs to give such clients stronger financial incentives to work, while the 
financial incentive structure for families with children tends to be weaker. 
Currently the main clients of the Self-Reliance scheme are unemployed people with 
low-income. Spending on the scheme, however, consisted of only four per cent of total 
NBLS expenditure in 2003 and the proportion of NBLS recipients involved in it 
remained at 40,000 persons since 2001 - 13 per cent of all employable recipients (SSWI, 
2005: 56; see also Chapter 4). While the number of non-recipient participants in the 
scheme increased steadily from 10,000 persons in 2001 to 20,000 in 2005. Moreover a 
large number of recipients and non-recipients who are in minor employment, including 
part-time workers and wage earners in unstable jobs such as temporary or daily workers, 
are excluded from the scheme. Thus, in practice, the role of the Self-Reliance scheme is 
limited to a work-for-benefit measure for a small proportion of unemployed people. To 
improve employment re-integration for both unemployed and employed people with 
low-income, the coverage and expenditure on the scheme should increase and activation 
programmes need to be provided differently in relation to the characteristics of low- 
income people. 
The empirical evidence shows that with regard to the reasons for debts, the main reason 
was living cost, followed by fees for medical treatment and housing cost, while there 
was little difference in the reasons between recipients and non-recipients. The fact that 
living cost is the most important reason for debts for recipient households implies the 
social assistance benefit levels in Korea do not seem to secure an adequate standard of 
living for all families. As argued in Chapter 6, Korea has one of the lowest benefit levels 
amongst the nine OECD countries considered, both in absolute and relative terms. 
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In addition to the low level of the social assistance benefits, this study assessed how the 
Korean benefits are effective in reducing poverty amongst recipients. The assessment of 
recipients' benefit packages reveals that the receipt of social assistance benefits is no 
guarantee for protecting recipients from poverty in both Korea and Britain. The means- 
tested benefits in Korea are not generous enough to push claimants over the poverty line. 
The benefits leave many recipients at an income level below the poverty line of 40 per 
cent of median income after social assistance transfer and the post-transfer average 
incomes of all recipient households are lower than the poverty line. Therefore the social 
assistance benefits are not effective enough in alleviating poverty. These findings 
confirm earlier accounts of poverty research and the redistributional impact of the 
Korean welfare state claimed that the extent of impact of social transfers including the 
social security benefits on poverty alleviation is low, instead, private income transfers 
are more effective in mitigating poverty (Choi, 2002; Hong, 2002; Kim, 2002; Park et 
al., 2002). The effectiveness of the Korean social assistance benefits is improved to 
some extent when in-kind benefits such as Health Benefit and Educational Benefit arc 
included. However these benefits are not provided for all recipient households but only 
for those who need them. The study argued one key factor that may account for the 
cause of the ineffectiveness of the Korean social assistance benefits is the existence of 
the unique and complicated cash benefit standards. Poverty amongst the recipients can 
effectively be alleviated when the level of the cash benefit standards is generous enough 
to meet the social assistance benefit levels. 
In contrast, it is also found in this study that, compared with Korea, Britain achieved 
marked success of means-tested social assistance benefits with a high degree of 
effectiveness, especially among the extreme and the severe poverty brackets. The Post- 
transfer average incomes of all recipient households in Britain are above the 40 per cent 
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poverty line, although not all households receive a sufficient level of benefits to pass the 
poverty line. When the benefit rates are compared to the net income of the average 
production worker produced by the OECD, in fact, both Korea and Britain belong to the 
countries which have the lowest levels of benefits amongst the countries considered in 
Chapter 6. While the empirical evidence presented in this thesis shows the British 
means-tested benefits are very effective in reducing harsh poverty, but less effective in 
mitigating moderate poverty. These findings confirm earlier insights into poverty rates 
and the redistributional impact of the British welfare state (Behrendt, 2002; Mitchell, 
1991; Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002). 
10.2 Has there been a regime shift within Korean social assistance? 
Foregoing chapters sought to answer this question. An overall judgement based on what 
comparable data are available is attempted in Table 10.1. The indicators selected are 
based on the three dimensions used for the country groupings: extent and salience; 
eligibility and entitlement rules including work-testing; and generosity. 
The lists of change and no/little change indicators are equal in length. There are a 
number of indicators of change or improvement. Categorical assistance that had had a 
Poor Law tradition for about forty years was replaced by general assistance NBLS in 
2000. As a measure to stabilize housing for people with low-income, Housing Benefit 
has newly been established in the NBLS scheme. After the social assistance reform, 
spending on social assistance and the number of beneficiaries of cash benefits increased 
sharply. With regard to the adjustment mechanism, the minimum living standards arc 
surveyed every three years and the benefit rates based on the minimum standards are 
publicised every year under current general assistance, while it had not legally been 
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required to announce the results of the calculation of the minimum living standards and 
the benefit rates under previous categorical assistance. To prevent long-term 
dependency and to enhance financial incentives to work, claimants of NBLS have to be 
available for work and actively seeking it, and working age recipients capable of work 
are required to participate in the Self-Reliance scheme under the NBLS scheme. 
All the generosity indicators have improved. Under current general assistance, the 
benefit levels are set so that the total income of each household receiving social 
assistance benefits reaches the customarily accepted official poverty line, i. e. the 
minimum living standards, while the benefit levels had been set at a maximum of 60 per 
cent of the minimum living standards under the previous scheme. Moreover, the average 
replacement rates (the proportion of net income in-work that would be replaced by 
social assistance) for the current assistance scheme have considerably improved 
compared with the previous scheme, although Korea has relatively low replacement 
rates, compared with other OECD countries. 
On the other hand, there are a large number of indicators of no or little change. There is 
little change in the total number of beneficiaries, while the number of cash benefits rose 
after the implementation of general social assistance. Compared to previous categorical 
assistance, there are slight changes in the family support obligations, income and assets- 
tests and nationality/residence rules, but they are still relatively strict. There is little 
change in the regulatory and administrative framework. Social assistance is organised 
and regulated nationally, but the benefit rates do not vary by family type and region. On 
balance, this study's judgement is that there was a shift in the form of Korean social 
assistance from categorical to general assistance and much has changed after the 
institutional change. However, it is difficult to conclude that there has been an evident 
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regime shift, since there are still far many indicators, which have not or little changed. 
Future reforms should focus on improving these unchanged indicators and mending the 
holes in the last resort social safety net. 
Table 10.1 Assessment of trends in previous and current social assistance in Korea 
Change No or little change 
" Type of assistance (demographic conditions) 
" Types of benefits provided 
" Expenditure as % of total social expenditure 
" Cash assistance beneficiaries 
" Adjustment mechanism 
" Work-testing 
" Benefit levels (absolute and relative terms) 
" Total bcncliciarics as % of total population 
" Regulatory. /administrative framework 
" Nationality/residcnce 
" Bcncfit/resource unit 
" Incomc-test 
" Asscts-test 
10.3 Locating Korea within social assistance regimes 
This study argued that though as a form of social security, means-tested social 
assistance has acquired an increasing importance in the comparative literature on 
welfare states, relatively little attention has been paid to that in East Asia. This thesis 
draws on a cross-national study of social assistance schemes in nine OECD countries, 
which has attempted to fill some of the gaps in comparative poverty research in East 
Asia. Korea was compared with eight OECD countries representing different welfare 
state regimes and social assistance regimes to locate the study within social assistance 
regimes and to see how far Korea constitutes a unique case or how far differs from other 
countries. A broad variety of sources, including national and comparative studies on social 
assistance schemes and welfare states in general, and national and international data and 
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statistical sources were used to identify social assistance regimes. The nine countries were 
compared in terms of social assistance expenditure; conditions of eligibility and 
entitlement; benefit levels and generosity. 
A number of key indicators were selected from the above three dimensions and a 
grouping of different countries were attempted. On this basis, wide differences and 
similarities were found between the countries considered, and the following seven types 
of social assistance regimes were identified: Sweden and Finland; the Netherlands; 
Britain and Ireland; Germany; Portugal; Japan; Korea (these were discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6). This study found that the Korean social assistance scheme contains 
elements of both the British and Japanese models. The Korean scheme resembles the 
British model in that the role of social assistance is large, benefit levels are relatively 
low and benefit rates are uniform throughout the country. On the other hand it shares 
with the Japanese model tough nationality/residence rules, relatively stringent income 
and assets-tests and wider family support obligations (even a wider concept than 
Germany and Portugal). In addition to the elements of both models, the country has 
strict work-tests. Thus the Korean model can be characterised by an extensive national 
model with strict eligibility and entitlement rules and relatively low benefit levels. 
Despite the relatively large role of Korean social assistance within the social security 
system with regard to expenditure, the Korean scheme can be considered as rather 
marginal amongst the eight countries included in Chapter 4, considering the number of 
social assistance recipients as a proportion of the total population. This shows the 
characteristics of the Korean welfare regime: spending relatively less on social 
protection; largely depending on social insurance schemes for which there is relatively 
small commitment from the State; placing the burden on the corporate sector and family. 
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Thus given the weakening of family tie and enterprise welfare benefits, as well as the 
limited coverage of the social insurance schemes and unemployment benef its, there is a 
need for more comprehensive and extensive social assistance as a last-resort safety net. 
With regard to the claimant numbers, Korea comes sixth out of the eight countries in 
Chapter 4, while the UK and the Netherlands stand out. As mentioned in earlier chapters, 
the recipient populations were not used as an indicator of the extent and salience 
because the figures were not wholly comparable. 96 
10.4 Implications for comparative studies on social assistance 
If we all recognize that one of the primary aims of modern welfare states is alleviation 
of poverty, the role of social assistance is most important amongst all types of financial 
resources since it is an ultimate safety net in society. When other incomes, such as 
income from earnings or capital, social insurance, tax benefits and other social security 
benefits except social assistance, are lacking, social assistance steps in as a final safety 
net. Therefore if social assistance fails to protect people from poverty, there is no other 
96 In addition, Portugal was excluded from the comparison of the extent or salience of 
social assistance, since no data or statistics on spending on general assistance or the 
recipient population in Portugal were available, except the information from Eardley et 
al. (1996a; 1996b) resting on 1992 data, which is too old for this study. If the 
comparable data on the recipient populations and the data on Portugal were available, 
the Portuguese scheme might present a different picture from the Portuguese model 
suggested in the study. 
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filter to hold back and they will fall into poverty. For these reasons, as a form of social 
security, means-tested social assistance is growing in importance in nearly all 
industrialised countries (Behrendt, 2002; Eardley et al, 1996a; Kuivalainen, 2004). 
This study has found that given the Korea's low level of spending on social protection, 
the limited coverage of social insurance and the unemployment benefits, and the 
weakening of family support and enterprise welfare benefits (which have traditionally 
been important providers of social benefits) in the Korean context, there is a need for a 
more extensive social assistance as a last resort both in terms of expenditure and the 
number of claimants, with a narrow kin obligation, less strict means-tests, more 
generous benefit levels and a higher degree of effectiveness on the poverty alleviation. 
External factors such as focusing on labour market integration measures for social 
assistance recipients, budgetary constraints and political acceptance of benefit support 
have contributed to the patterns and trends in the extent and salience of social assistance 
in Korea and to the tightening of conditions of eligibility and entitlement. 
The aim of this study was to contribute to enriching existing comparative knowledge on 
social assistance and our understanding of East Asian social policy. The analysis of 
social assistance in Korea in comparative perspectives, combining qualitative 
information on the institutional frameworks and quantitative methods, enabled us to 
gain a comprehensive and comparative picture of Korean social assistance. First, by 
comparing the previous and current assistance schemes, it is possible to answer whether 
there has been a regime shift within Korean social assistance. Second, the Korean 
scheme has been compared with social assistance schemes (mainly general assistance) 
in eight countries representing different welfare state regimes and social assistance 
regimes. In previous comparative studies on social assistance (Bradshaw and Finch, 
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2002; Eardley et al., 1996a; Gough et al., 1997), Japan was the only representative of 
the Pacific Rim/Confucian model. By including both Korea and Japan, this study 
presents various aspects and characteristics of East Asian and European social 
assistance regimes. As a consequence, it is possible to create a new typology of social 
assistance regimes, which is mainly consonant with previous efforts, but in some 
respects cuts across them. Third, the effectiveness of Korean social assistance in 
reducing poverty has been assessed by family size and type and it was compared with 
British means-tested social assistance, using micro-data. Finally, the comparisons of the 
characteristics and determinants of poverty between recipients and non-recipients 
enabled us to explore whether there are differences or similarities between the two 
groups with low-income and to seek adequate anti-poverty measures for both. 
The lack of cross-national comparable data is crucial for comparative research on 
poverty and social assistance. In particular, there are hardly available data for 
comparative social assistance research on East and South-east Asia. Social Expenditure 
Database (SOCX) from the OECD is the only exception. It provides information on 
social assistance expenditure for Korea and Japan, but does not offer detailed 
information on general or categorical assistance for each country. Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) datasets provide quantitative data on income for Taiwan but does not offer 
information on other Asian countries. In fact, a lot of efforts have been put into the 
harmonisation of official statistics and building-up comparative database on income at 
the European and OECD level. However, relatively little efforts have been made at the 
East and South-east Asian level. The lack of comparable information, both quantitative 
and qualitative data, on this region is one of the main reasons why the majority of the 
Asian countries have been excluded from comparative research on poverty and social 
assistance. This is a huge blot for comparative social research on this area at the 
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international level as well as the Asian level. Future reforms should be made with a 
view to enhancing cross-national comparability of social research and survey data at 
both the Asian and international level. The inclusion of the East and South-east Asian 
countries could contribute to presenting more various aspects and features of social 
assistance schemes and creating a new typology of social assistance regimes. Moreover, 
identifying Asian social assistance regimes would be also possible. 
The results of the benefit levels and the effectiveness of Korean social assistance on the 
poverty reduction and the comparison of recipients and non-recipients, which is 
presented in this study, are based on 2001 - only after a year of the implementation of 
the new general assistance in Korea. The micro-dataset used in this study was the only 
one available at the time of starting this research for assessing the performance of the 
Korean scheme. Now there are some more improved data available in terms of the 
sampling and interviewing process to cover lower income strata (including social 
assistance recipients and non recipients) more completely. A slightly different picture 
might be given if analysis is done using the more recent income data. 
In the Korean context, longitudinal analyses are lacking in the area of research on 
poverty and social assistance because of the lack of data and statistics available. Static 
information does not allow an adequate assessment of the efficacy or effectiveness of 
policies (Saraceno, 2002: 173), while it, of course, provides useful information. By 
contrast, dynamic research reveals a degree of mobility in and out of policies (Behrendt, 
2002: 208). Thus to overcome the limits of static analyses and to understand the 
dynamic patterns of social assistance receipt and poverty, longitudinal analyses are vital, 
and doing so, social research should devote time and attention to building-up 
quantitative longitudinal data. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A Purchasing power parties and exchange rates 
Table A. 1 Exchange rates and purchasing power parities, July 2001 
Country Currency Exchange rates 
to the USD 
Purchasing power 
parities 
USD=1 
Purchasing power 
parities as % 
exchange rates 
Purchasing power 
parities 
GBP-1 
Finland FIM 7.04 5.99 85 9.23 
Germany DM 2.32 1.85 80 2.85 
Ireland IEP 0.93 0.751 81 1.16 
Japan JPY 124.64 150 120 231.12 
Korea KRW 1290.99 761 59 1219.55 
Netherlands NLG 2.61 2.06 79 3.17 
Portugal PTE 237.30 132 56 203.39 
Sweden SEK 10.88 9.48 87 14.61 
United Kingdom GBP 0.71 0.649 91 1 
Source: OECD (2001 c and 2006). 
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Appendix B Structure of the social assistance package 
Table 13.1 Model Families Matrix, July 2001 
Country: Korea 
Case: No earnings receiving social assistance in national currency (K R\V ) 
Single Couple 1.1' !I I I' .2 "upli "I "uple -2 Couple' 3 
1. Social assistance 286000 482000 498300 683300 6670(1(1 8.12000 459000 
2. Income tax 0 0 0 0 u u u 
3. Omplovee social security 
contributions 
0 0 0 0 0 0 (I 
4. Income related child benefit 16300 16300 0 0 0 
5. Non income related child 
benefit 
0 0 0 
ýý 
u (I 
6. Gross rent (very unlikely! ) 340470 3404711 340470 340470 340170 3401'U 
1 
1.1017(1 
7. Net rent -340470 -340470 -340470 -340470 -340470 .1 . 10 1'0 -34n l'0 
8. Gross local tax 0 0 (1 0 (1 un 
9. Net local tax u (I n n 
10. Childcare costs 
II. School costs/benefits (I )) L(070 (ß')31u freu rý lip lululu 
12.1lealth costs 1) (1 (1 (I (I oO 
13. Guaranteed child support 
14. Other )) 0 u 0 0 u u 
net disposable income after 
taxes and benefits 
286000 482000 49831111 6833(1(1 667000 842(01(() 9590(1(1 
ndi after housing -54470 141530 157830 342830 326530 5(1153(1 618530 
ndi after services 286000 482000 532970 752640 701670 9I 13.10) I l0s}(II0 
net disposable income aller all -54470 14 1i30 I925)))) 112170 3012(1(1 57087(( 722c)(( 
Notc: 
I. The levels of social assistance indicate munthll cash henrtit including costs of li% ing and housing aaa>Iance 
2. The Ie%eIs of health costs are based on Class I beneliciarics (unable to %%ork). %%[m haue Irre access to health 
services. About half of recipients on social assistance in 2001 were ('lass I beneficiaries. ('lass 2 beneficiaries hav ing 
ability to work are charged WI500 (around 0.2) Iür one visit to it general practitioner and one prc. cnption lot a 
standard anti-biotic per person per Vicar. 
3. Using the Of; CD purchasing pincer parities Ir 2001. £IW1,219.5. 
Source: NRI3 (2001 ): OECD (2001 h), own calculations. 
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Table B. 2 Net rent as proportion of gross rent for families on social assistance (%), 2001 
Single Couple Lone parent 
+l child 
Lone parent 
+2children 
Couple 
+I child 
Couple 
+2children 
Couple 
+3childrcn 
Fin -50 -27 -27 -20 -20 -20 -20 
Swe -100 -100 -54 -45 -54 -45 -38 
Ger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NL -46 -56 -53 -49 -49 -49 -49 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ire -18 -30 -46 -56 -36 42 -49 
Por -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
Jap -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
Kor -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
Source: Bradshaw and Finch (2002); OECD (2001b), own calculations. 
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Table B. 3 Health costs and benefits on social assistance (£ PPPs), 2001 
Single Couple Lone parent 
+lchild 
Lone parent 
+2children 
Couple 
+lchild 
Couple 
+2childrcn 
Couple 
+3childrcn 
Fin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Swe -6 -13 -6 -6 -13 -13 -13 
Ger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NL -22 -45 -22 -22 -45 45 -43 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Por 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Jap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Bradshaw and Finch (2002); OECD (2001 b), own calculations. 
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Table B. 4 School costs and benefits on social assistance (£ PPPs), 2001 
Lone parent Lone parent Couple Couple Couple 
+1child +2children +1child +2childrcn +3children 
Fin 43 87 43 87 130 
Swe 21 42 21 42 63 
Ger 0 0 0 0 0 
NL -32 -51 -32 -51 -66 
UK 21 45 21 45 45 
Ire -11 -22 -6 . 12 -22 
Por -2 -2 -2 -2 -7 
Jap -23 -68 -23 -68 -84 
Kor 28 57 28 57 85 
Source: Bradshaw and Finch (2002); OECD (2001 b), own calculations. 
258 
Appendix C NRB data 
The NRB dataset covers the following topics: 
" Household composition 
" Housing (including the conditions of accommodation) 
" Finance, debts and savings 
" Behavioural characteristics with regard to labour participation 
" Education 
" Health (including disability) and the usage of health services 
"A broad range of policy issues of the NBLS scheme (including eligibility criteria, 
income and assets test and work incentives etc) 
The questionnaire is divided into six sections: 
1. General matters of individual household members 
2. Common questions (asked all (five) categories of households) 
2.1 Actual conditions of dwelling, education, and health 
2.2 Incomes and expenditure 
2.3 Debts and Savings 
2.4 NBLS scheme 
3. Recipient households of NBLS benefits (asked the following three categories of 
households having: general recipients, conditional recipients, and recipients exempted 
from the self-reliance programmes) 
4. Conditional recipient households and households placed just above the recipient 
households (asked the following three categories of households having: conditional 
recipients, low income people who failed to be entitled to NBLS benefits, and 
participants in the self-reliance programmes) 
5. Conditional recipient households (questions asked conditional recipient households 
only) 
6. Households placed just above the recipient households (questions asked the two 
categories of households having: low income people who failed to be entitled to NBLS 
benefits and participants in the self-reliance programmes) 
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List of variables (and label) on the working files are as follows: 
1. General matters of individual household members 
ID Household identification number 
A8 Number of persons in household 
A9 Household type 
A10 Whether participating in services for promoting self-reliance such as vocational 
training or special work schemes 
A 11 Person number 
A12 Relationship to householder 
A13 Sex 
A 14 Age (as of July 2001) 
A16 Highest academic qualification 
A 18 Marital Status 
A19 Whether living with householder 
A20 Previous occupation 
A22 Current occupation 
A24 Current main economic activity 
A26 Whether having a disability (degree of disability) 
A27 Whether having a chronic disease 
A28 Are you a recipient of the previous social assistance scheme (Livelihood 
Protection) 
A 29 Type of respondent (choosing one of the above five categories of recipients and 
non-recipients) 
" Same questions as A11-A28 for second household member: A29-46 
" Same questions as A 11-A28 for third household member: A47-A64 
" Same questions as A11-A28 for fourth household member: A65-A82 
" Same questions as A11-A28 for fifth household member: A83-A100 
" Same questions as A11-A28 for sixth household member: A101-A118 
2. Common questions (asked all five categories of households) 
2.1 Actual conditions of dwelling, education, and health 
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B6 Housing tenure 
B7 If you are living with a Housing Association (HA) or a Local Authority (LA) rented 
house, when have you moved into the rented house 
B 11 If you are not living with a Housing Association or a Local Authority rented house, 
do you intent to move into a HA or LA house in the future 
B 12 Current price of owned house as his/her home 
B24 How much do you pay the rent monthly 
B29 Net monthly housing costs for summer time 
B32 Net monthly housing costs for winter time 
B35 Number of children in full-time education (until high or secondary school) in 
household 
B36 Fee for private education, except benefits from government 
B39 Fee for medical treatment including the charge for medicine for past six months, 
except contributions to the National Health Insurance 
B42 Are there any household members who could not see a doctor or gave up medical 
treatment for the last three months, despite the member absolutely needed doctor's help 
If yes, what were the reasons for that (choose two main reasons of the reasons listed in 
B43, B44) 
B43 First reason 
B44 Second reason 
B46 Whether having a home computer connected with Internet 
2.2 Incomes and expenditure 
B47 Monthly household gross income for last three months 
B51 Monthly household gross expenditure for last three months 
B54 Monthly minimum cost of living for minimum living 
B57 Monthly household earned income for past three months 
B60 Whether household income for the last six months has changed compared with the 
latter half of the last year 
B61 Whether receiving (or received in the past) any financial support (either in cash or 
in kind) from parents, children and relatives, or neighbours, and friends, or government 
(including Local Authorities), or voluntary organisations etc. 
B62 Regarding B61, if you are receiving (or received) any cash support, how much is it 
(B65, B68, B71) 
B65 Benefits from government (inc. LA) 
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B68 Financial support from voluntary organisations (inc. religious groups, NGOs) 
B71 Financial support from family, relatives 
2.3 Debts and Savings 
B74 Whether having debts 
If yes (B75, B79), how much is it (B75) 
B79 Reason for debts (choose only one) 
B81-84 All savings in accounts 
B81 Fourth digit (in thousands won) 
B82 Third digit (in hundreds won) 
B83 Second digit 
B84 First digit 
B85 Total assets 
B90 Whether having a car 
B91 How long have you possessed a car 
B93 Main purpose (use) of a car owned 
2.4 NBLS scheme 
B94 Whether thinking the new social assistance scheme, NBLS has improved compared 
to the previous LP programme 
B95 If you applied for entitlement to NBLS, how did you know about the NBLS 
benefits 
B96 Which benefit do you need most (choose one out of the seven NBLS benefits) 
B97 Number of household members capable of work 
B98 Number of household members who are unemployed at the moment but want to 
work 
B99 Is there someone disabled or who is in poor health that may be difficult to move 
If yes, who does care for the person(s) (B 100) 
B 101 Experience of discontinuance of working in order to care for the person(s) 
B 102 Whether participating in the self-reliance programme or wanting to participate in 
it in the future 
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3. Recipient households of NBLS benefits (asked the following three categories of 
households having - general recipients, conditional recipients, and recipients exempted 
from the self-reliance programmes) 
C6 Whether benefits provided from government (inc. LA) are helpful to maintain 
minimum living standards 
C7 Difference between the benefits paid for NBLS and previous LP 
C8 Difference between the payments for NBLS in June and July 2001 
If yes, who do you think it has changed in your opinion (C9) 
Regarding C8, if your benefits have been reduced how have you reacted to the reduction 
(CIO) 
C12 Do you think how exactly your local authority (or welfare office) knows about your 
income and assets 
C13 Difference between the income and assets calculated by social welfare officer from 
the local authority and the real income and assets of claimant 
C15 Do you know your benefits would be reduced if your income increased 
C16 Whether would actively participate in the self-reliance programmes even if earned 
income increased and the benefits for NBLS decreased as much as the income rose 
C17 Have you ever consulted a social welfare officer in the local authority about the 
entitlement to the NBLS benefits or any other matter 
If yes, it was useful to you (C 18) 
Regarding C 17, if no, what is the reason (C 19) 
C20 Do you think you need a consultation (or advice) with voluntary organisations or 
other NGOs in terms of the NBLS benefits 
4. Conditional recipient households and households placed just above the recipient 
households (asked the following three categories of households having - conditional 
recipients, low income people who failed to be entitled to NBLS benefits, and 
participants in the self-reliance programmes) 
C21 Whether satisfied with the current selection criteria for becoming a self-reliance 
participant 
C22 If you are not satisfied with the criteria, what is the reason for that 
C23 Things need to improve for the current self-reliance programmes 
C24 Whether having tried seeking a job for past six months 
C25 Do you want to work if any job is offered 
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Regarding C24, if you have not tried seeking a jog for the past six months, what is the 
reason for that (C26) 
C27 If you are offered a job which is unpopular, such as dirty, dangerous or difficult, do 
you want to accept it 
Regarding C27, condition of getting the job above (C28) 
For a participant of the self-reliance programme (C29-36) 
C29 Institution or agency which recommended to participate in the self-reliance 
programmes 
C30 The programme a respondent is taking part in 
C32 Programme detail a respondent is taking part in 
C34 Whether satisfied with the current self-reliance programme provided 
C35 If unsatisfied with the programme, what is the reason 
C36 Whether the services for promoting self-support is useful for the participant's self- 
reliance 
For a respondent who is not taking part in the self-reliance programme (C37-44) 
C37 Reason for not participating in the programme 
C38 A programme most wanting to participate in 
Programme detail most wanting to participate in (choose two of the programmes listed, 
C40,42) 
C40 First programme 
C42 Second programme 
C44 Most needed for self-reliance of the respondent's family 
5. Conditional recipient households (questions asked conditional recipient households 
only. In case of participating in the self-reliance programmes, answered only by the 
participants, not by other household members) 
C45 Type of conditional recipient (available for work or not) 
C46 Recipient's ability to work 
C47 If your working ability is not reached to normal person, what is the reason 
C48 Whether taking part in the self-reliance programme 
If yes, how long have you done it (C49) 
How many days a month (C51) 
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6. Households placed just above the recipient households (questions asked the two 
categories of households having - low income people who failed to be entitled to NBLS 
benefits and participants in the self-reliance programmes) 
C53 Whether having knowledge of NBLS 
C54 Whether having ever consulted a social welfare official about becoming a NBLS 
recipient or any other matter 
Regarding C54, if not, what is the reason you did not try (C55) 
If yes, have you drawn up an application form or other documents related (C56) 
For households who failed to be entitled to NBLS benefits (CS7-80) 
C57 When did you fail to be entitled 
C58 The way the local authority has let you know the result 
C59 Whether knowing the exact reason rejected 
C60 If yes, the reason failed to be entitled 
C61 Number of persons in household at the time of means-test 
C62 If disqualified due to Income criteria, how much was the income calculated at the 
time of means-test 
C65 Whether satisfied with the income calculated by the social welfare officer 
C66 If you failed to be entitled due to Asset criteria, for which asset did you be 
disqualified 
C67 Whether satisfied with the assets calculated 
If you were disqualified due to criterion of existence of those legally responsible to 
support you, how many supporters have you got (C68) and how much money do you 
receive from them (C69) 
C72 Whether satisfied with the disqualification due to the criteria of existence of 
supporters 
C73 Is your supporter(s) is actually trying to give you financial support 
C74 The reason not supported by the supporter(s) 
C75 How do you feel that you have disqualified from NBLS but others around you have 
been qualified 
C76 Whether having difficulty with living after the failure of the entitlement 
C77 How have you resolved the problem of living after the disqualification of 
entitlement 
C79 Reaction to the failure in the entitlement 
C80 If you have not actively appealed against administrative decision, what it the 
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reason 
C81 Whether still needing the NBLS benefits because of difficulty in living 
C82 Experience of delinquency of paying the National Health Insurance contribution 
C83 How did you do when you had failed to pay it or been excluded from the Nil 
coverage 
C84 Premium of the NHI (a month) 
C88 Is the NHI premium a burden for living 
C89 Experience of default of payment for National Pension Scheme 
C90 Premium of the NPS (a month) 
C94 Is the NPS premium a burden for living 
C95 Whether covered by Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance 
C96 Whether covered by Employment Insurance Programme 
Numl Region 1 (1 big city, 2 middle and small town, 3 rural areas) 
Num. 2 Region 2 (1 Seoul, 2 Gyeonggi-do, 3...... ) 
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Appendix D Sensitivity of results for poverty lines 50 and 60 per cent of median 
Table D. 1 Poverty rates and poverty reduction figures for the poverty lines of 50 and 60 
per cent of median (as a percentage of all social assistance recipient households, 
2001/02 
Poverty Poverty status Poverty status Absolute poverty Relative poverty 
before SA after SA reduction reduction 
benefits benefits (percentage (percent) 
(percent) (percent) points) 
50% 60% 50% 60% 50% 60% 50% 60% 
Extreme poverty Y<60% 38.4 46.6 2.5 5.6 -35.9 -41.0 -93.5 -87.9 
Severe poverty 60%: S Y< 80% 15.3 19.7 8.0 21.3 -7.3 1.6 47.7 8.1 
Moderate poverty 80%Y< 100% 14.9 13.2 20.4 22.2 5.5 9.0 36.9 68.2 
Near poverty 100%: 5 Y< 120% 10.5 7.9 17.5 19.4 7.0 11.5 66.6 145.6 
No poverty Y>120% 20.8 12.6 51.6 31.6 30.8 19.0 148.1 150.8 
Poverty (less than Y< 100% 68.6 79.5 30.9 49.1 -37.7 -30.4 -54.9 -38.2 
100%) 
Notes: 50% = poverty line of 50 per cent of median (N = 5,778); 60% - poverty line of 60 per cent of median (N - 
5,778); Y= gross household income adjusted for household size; 100% of the poverty line equal to 50 or 60 per cent 
of the median gross household income. 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
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Table D. 2 Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by social assistance 
transfers for households who were poor before having received any social assistance 
benefits (based on poverty lines 50 and 60 per cent of median), 2001/02 (US dollars or 
percentage) 
50% 60% 
Poverty gap before social assistance benefits 157 193 
Poverty gap after social assistance benefits -29 18 
Absolute poverty gap reduction -186 -175 
Relative poverty gap reduction (%) . 118 -91 
N 3,859 4,516 
Note: Using the OECD purchasing power parities for 2001, US$1 - £0.632. 
Source: FRS (2002), own calculations. 
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